

James Hanlan and Bruce Cohen, "Do Unto Others: The Golden Rule Fund and Organized Labor in Worcester, Massachusetts, 1955-1965" *Historical Journal of Massachusetts* Volume 27, No. 1 (Winter 1999).

Published by: Institute for Massachusetts Studies and Westfield State University

You may use content in this archive for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the *Historical Journal of Massachusetts* regarding any further use of this work:

masshistoryjournal@westfield.ma.edu

Funding for digitization of issues was provided through a generous grant from MassHumanities.



Some digitized versions of the articles have been reformatted from their original, published appearance. When citing, please give the original print source (volume/ number/ date) but add "retrieved from HJM's online archive at <http://www.westfield.ma.edu/mhj>.

Editor, *Historical Journal of Massachusetts*
c/o Westfield State University
577 Western Ave. Westfield MA 01086



Do Unto Others: The Golden Rule Fund and Organized Labor
in Worcester, Massachusetts, 1955-1965
By James Hanlan and Bruce Cohen

The effectiveness of organized labor in achieving significant improvements in workers' wages during the post-World War II, collective bargaining era is widely recognized. The newfound "affluence" of workers, however, meant that new and different pressures would be brought to bear, both on working people and on their organizations. While the militant hostility of employers who chose to fight out battles in the street was largely in the past, employer hostility to unions and to workers lived on in more subtle forms. This article is intended to demonstrate the more civilized hostility of management to labor in the collective bargaining era in one New England city from the mid-1950s through the mid-'60s. In the more subtle atmosphere of industrial relations of this period, management-labor hostility did not always manifest itself solely at the bargaining table or in the workplace. The issue of control, however, remained crucial as elites attempted, in a more hidden, and thus insidious, way, to both retain control of communities outside the workplace as well as to tap into workers' relative prosperity by imposing new expectations that workers themselves would pay for community services previously funded by private and tightly controlled local charities or by local governments where patterns of control were long entrenched.¹

¹ The authors are grateful to John F. Sullivan, who served for many years as the United Way Labor Staff member, for passing on to them the full documentation of the labor-Golden Rule struggle in Worcester. Sullivan carefully preserved the documents collected by Michael Delle Femine. We are also grateful to both John F. Sullivan and John D. Sullivan, USWA Worcester, for sharing their experiences in oral history interviews with the authors.

While employers sought to shift the costs of private charities to working men and women, they attempted simultaneously to retain control of those charities in the hands of an exclusive small group who traditionally controlled private boards. The differences that arose between workers and owners, were sometimes less centered around such direct workplace issues as conditions of labor, wages, and hours than they were over issues of community influence and participation in broad-based community decision-making. Local business leaders would find that national trends mandated union recognition and gave unions a voice in the workplace. National firms with local offices would set the tone for management-labor relationships in spite of what might have been the harsher preferences of local ownership. Workers' influence in community decision-making and the granting to workers' organizations of status and community prestige was quite a different matter, though. Elites in Worcester, Massachusetts, long accustomed to anti-union cooperation and resistance, shifted their battles to the wider community in the 1950s. The efforts of local industrial leaders focused on denying status and participation in broad-based community decision-making to organized labor, particularly in light of what local elites persisted in seeing as the CIO-heritage of industrial disruption.²

Worcester had a long tradition of anti-union cooperation among major employers. From even before the concerted local organizing effort of the AFL in the late 1880s, locally based owners had effectively opposed organizing in Worcester's major shops. Peter J. McGuire recognized this in his famous and oft-quoted reference to Worcester as "one of the scab-holes of the state."³ The Worcester County Employers' Association, the local office of the National Metal Trades Association, and the members of exclusive clubs such as the Worcester Club, all worked together to conduct an anti-union campaign, remarkable for both its longevity and its success. Local ownership was not used to working cooperatively with labor. Thus, with the spread and increasing acceptance of unionization nationally, spearheaded locally by the

² The relationship between Worcester's workers and elites has been treated extensively by Roy Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours For seat We Will: Workers & Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Rosenzweig particularly develops the theme of employer interest in the out-of-workplace lives of employees.

³ *Worcester Telegram*, December 3, 1889.

steelworkers' union, Worcester elites were faced with shaping a new and unfamiliar working relationship with organized labor. Not only would labor exert influence in the workplace, where there would be a national model to which local employers could turn for reassurance, but labor would seek wider influence in the community at large, previously dominated by a tightly controlled exclusive group. Here there was less basis for guidance for local owners. When they reacted, they did so in ways which reflected their inherent insecurities.

The battle in Worcester centered around labor's role in the Golden Rule Fund, the central community charity which supported some 29 broad-based community service and charitable organizations. The founders of the Golden Rule Fund were the most prominent members of local industrial ownership and either they or their descendants still controlled the organization in which they took great pride. From the very beginning, the local Golden Rule Campaign was the business of the city's businessmen. In 1920, after several years of deliberation, a group of local business and industrial leaders formed the Worcester Welfare Federation, the chief goal of which was to increase funding for, and exert more direct coordination of, social welfare agencies in the city. The plan worked beyond the founders' wildest dreams. In 1919, out of Worcester's 180,000 people, only 2,573 donated to the social welfare charities. They donated a total of \$150,000. In the following year, the first Golden Rule Campaign increased the number of givers to 40,929 and increased donations to \$405,000. The Golden Rule Fund was a money machine that exceeded even the fondest dreams of its founders.⁴

Beginning in 1950, local labor leaders, following national trends, sought greater labor participation in local charitable efforts. Both the AFL and CIO local organizations cooperated with executive staff of the Worcester Golden Rule Fund to conduct 8-week union counselor training programs. The formally stated goal of such programs was to inform union officials about the range and type of services provided by the various Golden Rule-supported charities and organizations. Thus informed, they would be able to refer their members who might be in need of services to the appropriate agencies.⁵ Aside from the stated rationale for the counselor training program, though both sides had other, unstated goals. Labor's hidden agenda was to break the virtual monopoly

⁴ Worcester Welfare Federation Report, September 23, 1919; January, 1920.

⁵ Golden Rule Fund (hereafter referred to as GRF), Bruce to Delle Femine, May 15, 1950.

on community decision-making that local industrialists had enjoyed for as long as anyone associated with labor could remember. The Golden Rule Fund itself was somewhat of a closed club and the boards of the member agencies were even more so, an embarrassing reality which Golden Rule Officials would have to concede before their battle with organized labor was over.

The stated objectives of Golden Rule Fund officials in participating in union counselor training programs was to better inform clients, or potential clients, of community and charitable services which were available to them. The hidden agenda of the Golden Rule Fund was to solicit increased financial support from organized labor and from the families and neighbors of union members. Local charities found budgets accelerating and needed new sources of giving. It was clear to Fund officials and directors alike that the small donor segment was becoming increasingly crucial for the Fund in Worcester, as for Funds nationwide, in meeting community-wide fund-raising goals. Throughout the battle with organized labor, labor's potential financial clout would be uppermost in the considerations of Fund staff and directors.

By 1951, the national office of the community chest/golden rule funds had created a labor participation department. While the department director was a non-union man, his six staff members were union representatives: three drawn from the A.F. of L. and three drawn from the C.I.O. The national office saw the importance of involving unions in every aspect of charitable service and urged local offices of community chests and golden rule funds to include a paid member of organized labor on their staffs. By the mid-1950s, virtually all larger community chest campaigns had complied with the example set, and urged upon them, by the national office. In New England, only Hartford, Connecticut and Worcester held out.⁶

Worcester industrial leaders expressed inordinate anxiety about the prospect of having to hire a union man. In late 1953, one prominent Worcester industrialist cautioned against the argument that had prevailed up until that time: that staff would be hired solely on the basis of experience. Acquaintance with social work and fund raising must come before mere affiliation. A simple "artisan" could not possibly have the "engineering and management background" for a responsible staff

⁶United Way Association (hereafter referred to as UWA), Executive Committee Meetings, April 16, and October 1, 195 1; GRF memo Smith to Brown, April 12, 1955.

position, one local leader insisted. Another industrialist, however, feared what might happen should the unions call their bluff and put forth a qualified person: "We make a mistake in spelling out [in] too much detail the qualifications of a person to fill a job."⁷

Communities all over America were finding union staff who were perfectly qualified and who performed superbly. At its national convention in December of 1957, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution calling for labor staff participation in golden rule and community chest campaigns. The convention noted the acceptance of labor participation by the GRF national leadership and the widespread acceptance of labor staff in GRF campaigns in communities throughout the country.⁸ Worcester however, would prove a tough nut to crack.

In Worcester the influence of Lyscom A. Bruce was crucial. In 1942, Bruce came to Worcester as Director of the Worcester Community Chest. Previously, he had directed the Community Chest of Newton, Massachusetts, for 10 years. Bruce served on the Executive Committee of the New England Association of Community Chests and was keenly aware of issues facing local fund-raisers and was personally well acquainted with men and women involved throughout the region in fund-raising activities. Bruce was also aware of the nature of the community to which he was coming and would lead the effort to hold organized labor at arm's length, while simultaneously appearing to court labor support.⁹

Bruce made it a point to recruit labor representatives to serve on the GRF Board as well as on GRF subcommittees. He went out of his way to cooperate with the Union Counselor training program in the early '50's, although being careful always to differentiate between the volunteer nature of the union counselors and the professional case workers employed by GRF and member agencies. Bruce was careful to cultivate contacts with Worcester labor, especially with AFL leaders whom he regarded as more steady, stable, and reliable than those whom he characterized as "pepper pots", whom he believed represented CIO

⁷UWA, Community Chest Executive Committee Meeting, September 9, 1953.

⁸AFL-CIO, Second Constitutional Convention, "Community Services Resolution," December, 1957.

⁹*Worcester Telegram*, April 13, 1942.

leadership. Bruce clearly knew for whom he worked and whose best interests he should cultivate.¹⁰

Bruce's appointment in 1942 was announced by Harry G. Stoddard, chairman of Wyman-Gordon, a major city employer, and majority owner of the city's daily newspapers, the *Worcester Telegram and The Evening Gazette*. Bruce was careful to defend local industrialists as "perfectly fair, reasonable, and open-minded," and to remind labor leaders that the leaders of industry were busy men who might require several months advance notice of a meeting.¹¹ When meetings were scheduled, they were invariably luncheon meetings scheduled for noontime when labor representatives would find it difficult to attend. Not until a local labor editor protested this practice was it changed; he scheduled his own noontime meeting.¹²

In fact, Bruce and the Worcester Community Chest's position on labor representatives reflected themes common to labor-community relations in the 1950s. As Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf indicates in her book *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, business and industrial leaders often controlled local chest staff through boards of laymen, such as in Worcester. Indeed, "as late as 1955, local coordinating councils for private social agencies employed only fifty-two full-time labor representatives."¹³

After the merger of the AFL-CIO, business leaders and social workers worked against union attempts to gain more labor representation in community services programs. By 1957, the number of full-time labor staff had grown to 125 but, as Alice Cook observed in 1959, "judged by a variety of standards ... this representation is small -- small in proportion to the number of workers in these communities and of contributions they make in support of these agencies." Elsewhere, as in Worcester, board meetings were held at times and under circumstances that made labor participation difficult. Day meetings and/or night meetings were held in a hostile environment.¹⁴

¹⁰GRF Meetings Union Counseling Institute (CIO), July 5, 1950, 6; and December 20, 1950.

¹¹GRF, Bruce to Saltus, May 19, 1953, 17; and November 14, 1953.

¹²GRF, Saltus to Bruce, November 10, 1953, 18; and Tobin to Bruce, July 24, 1950.

¹³Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, pp. 141-142.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 151.

Labor's role was also undermined by the agencies' insistence again, as in Worcester, on themes of "community interest" and voluntarism.¹⁵ Community interests were often defined by corporate paternalism; while nationwide the media defined community relations according to the standards of the Advertising Council, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Chamber of Commerce.¹⁶ "In January of 1960, National Industrial Conference Board President John S. Sinclair concluded that as a result of these efforts [supplemented by economic education campaigns], business had probably never enjoyed a more favorable climate of public opinion."¹⁷ Fones-Wolf concludes that the labor movement could never use its community chest role to gain public support because labor could not match either business' resources, nor the individualistic ethos which reappeared in the 1950s.¹⁸ By the 1970s and into the 1980s, business defined not only the "American Economic System," but welfare as well. In the 1990s, welfare is defined not in terms of support of the nation's general welfare by the federal government and other major institutions, but in terms of voluntarism and welfare reform.

In private correspondence and in the minutes of closed committee meetings, Bruce's attitude towards organized labor became clear. Beginning in 1954, he took the position that the Golden Rule Fund was essentially a **citizens'** campaign. Thus there could be no group representation on "your community chest."¹⁹ Bruce stated bald-facedly that the GRF had no representatives from the National Metal Trades Association, no representatives from the Worcester County Employers' Association and, thus, should have no representatives from organized labor either. This, in spite of the fact that his Board and its Executive Committee were dominated by local industrialist members of the metal trades and employer organizations who used committee meetings to openly discuss strategy for keeping labor out lest their fears come true

¹⁵Ibid., p. 152.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 174.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 286.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 287.

¹⁹ GRF, Bruce to Saltus, May 1, 1959.

that the Golden Rule Fund become a vehicle for the organizing of the city's major non-union employers.²⁰

Being aware of national and regional trends, Lyscom Bruce, referred to as "Lyc" by local industrial leaders, saw the handwriting on the wall. All across the country and throughout New England, Community Chest and Golden Rule campaigns were hiring union staff representatives to serve as outreach to workers, soliciting their contributions and informing union members of services while simultaneously informing local charities of the needs of working people.²¹ Worcester would be one of the hold-outs. Bruce grudgingly recognized two factors: his board and the boards of member social service agencies were dominated by West Side residents, middle class citizens and business and industrial leaders, while other geographic sections, where working people lived, were virtually excluded. Bruce saw that labor representation would eventually be necessary, but he adopted a strategy that called for delaying as long as possible until national trends absolutely mandated giving labor a greater voice. His "first principle" of voluntary community representation was largely a ploy to this end.²²

The critical year for union-Golden Rule Fund relations was 1957. In January of 1957, Lyscom Bruce articulated to the GRF Executive Committee his explicit strategy, which he bragged of pursuing for the past 10 to 12 years, of refusing repeated union requests to put a union person on the GRF staff. His contempt for union representatives was evident when he wrote, in an account describing himself, "The discussion with the USW staff man was perfectly frank, because in this instance, as in others, [Mr. Bruce] saw no reason for beating about the bush. In his experience, union people understand and appreciate very direct language ... the discussion ... was all in perfectly plain, one syllable words."²³ His expectations for union people were low: "Having known most of the men for some years, I expected the two pepper-pots to let 'er fly once in a while and they did, in the same vein as they have erupted before."²⁴ Bruce held out the implied promise of consideration of the

²⁰Ibid., see also UWA, May 2, 1954 concerning the views of the Executive Committee of the Chamber of Commerce.

²¹ GRF, memo, Smith to Brown, April 12, 1955.

²² GRF, Community Relations Committee, March 8, 1956.

²³ See UWA Report, Bruce, April 16, 1951.

²⁴GRF Notes, January 18, 1957.

union request, but insisted that union leaders support the GRF annual campaign, regardless of the Executive Committee decision. On January 31, though, at Bruce's recommendation, the GRF Executive Committee that "it would be contrary to one of the fundamental principles of the Community Chest and Council -- an organization of citizens -- to have on the staff a representative of any group, as such, for the expressed purpose of specialized service to such a group."²⁵ This action was taken in full knowledge of both the AFL-CIO resolution calling for adoption of this position nationwide and the positive reactions that had resulted from widespread acquiescence by local GRF offices throughout the nation.²⁶

In responding to the GRF decision, both the president of the AFL-CIO CLU and the president of the CIO Council, in a joint letter, expressed their dismay at the lack of a hearing. No labor representative was invited to discuss the matter with the Executive Committee. James Lavin and Earl Patnod pointed out that, in more than 100 cities across America, many smaller in size and volume of charitable giving than Worcester, Labor Staff had proven invaluable. In the short period between the receipt of the GRF letter notifying organized labor in February, and labor's response in early April, 4 more cities had joined the national trend and appointed Labor Staff. Lavin and Patnod gently reminded the GRF that labor had many occasions on which to seriously doubt the sincerity of the GRF claims to welcome labor's "partnership and participation." Labor, they pointed out, was excluded from a voice in the top, policy-making, level of the GRF. Labor was not represented on the GRF Evaluation Committee. They made the argument that "any group that seeks to serve the entire community must be truly representative of all segments and responsive to the needs of all the people." Working people felt excluded. Patnod and Lavin requested a face-to-face meeting with GRF leadership.²⁷

By September, as the GRF Campaign was about to kick-off, such a meeting was held. The meeting of September 11 would prove absolutely crucial for years to come. Two days before the meeting, Lyscom Bruce did his best to poison the well. In a memo to Paris Fletcher, Ralph Gow, Wade Houk, and Loren Hutchinson, the group chosen to represent the Executive Committee, Bruce wrote, "As you see, there will be ten of the

²⁵ GRF Community Relations Committee, January 31, 1957. See also GRF Erikson to Central Labor Union (CLU), February 13, 1957.

²⁶ GRF, CLU to Erikson, January 29, 1957.

²⁷ GRF, Lavin and Patnod to Erikson, April 4, 1957.

Union men to five of us which, without doubt, gives none of us any concern whatever." Then he wrote of the labor leaders' "motives":

For the last few days, I have been trying to think in disinterested and objective manner about what may be the real motives behind this insistent pressure on us to put a Union man on our staff, without being suspicious or antagonistic to this proposal.²⁸

Bruce then speculated on union motivation. He differentiated between national and local factors. On the national scene, he speculated that only a minority of Funds could "probably raise enough money to 'warrant'...union staff." The real issue nationally, though, was that:

...the union boys have not been making too much progress in getting staff men in Chests and Funds. If they can "break" Worcester, then I believe they would be in a position to say something like this -- "There is Worcester, an old, well-established, successful Chest, in an area where only about 20% to 25% of the employees are organized. That Chest decided it needed to have a Union man on the staff so its campaigns could continue to be successful."²⁹

The second, and likely more effective, speculation on union motivation was what Bruce called "local." Locally he differentiated between the "volunteers" who "do not depend upon organizing Unions for a living," whose motives, he speculated, might, for "some of them, anyway, [be] perfectly sincere." Moreover, such "locals" could be inspired because "there may well be some local boy whom they have in mind for the job, should it be created." The more serious local threat was presented by those whom Bruce labeled "the 'professionals' -- like Roy Stevens [Steelworkers], and the AFL Business agents." The hand of organized labor was now strengthened, he argued, "The CIO has been the most ardent for a man on our staff up to now, but they're all in it together with a possible merger imminent." Stevens, in particular, was feeling

²⁸GRF, memo, Bruce to Gow, Houk and Hutchinson, September 9, 1957.

²⁹Ibid.

pressure, he speculated, because of the failure of the local Telechron and Crompton and Knowles strikes. Stevens would have to show his bosses some results.³⁰ Then Bruce played his trump card.

He claimed that he would take, at face value, the claim from "nine of the boys" that "a Union man on our staff would have no part in trying to organize "open shop plants." He went on, however, to tell his superiors:

BUT, there is no question whatever in my mind that the paid organizers would use our having a Union man on our staff as a talking point in trying to line up, say, Morgan, Norton, and Wyman-Gordon, which are, as you well know, thorns in the flesh of union organizers.³¹

The sub-committee members represented the city's most prominent industrial firms. Hutchinson was Vice-President of Wyman-Gordon; Gow represented Norton Company; Houk had day-to-day contact with Stevens as an executive with the unionized American Steel and Wire Company; Paris Fletcher, perhaps the city's most prominent attorney, was son-in-law to Harry Stoddard, who owned a controlling interest in both Wyman-Gordon and the Telegram and Gazette. Hence, Bruce's message hit close to home. The outcome of the face-to-face meeting with union leaders was sealed before the meeting began.

Bruce reminded the Community Relations Committee that "we" did have "our weaknesses":

...there is not one man to represent the Unions' point of view on any agency Board. For the last ten years or so, Chest Presidents, in writing and verbally, have been urging the agencies to develop representative Boards, but to no avail. I believe we are in this spot, to some extent, because the agencies have been deaf and blind to this request -- one which they should have heeded long ago.³²

³⁰Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

Ironically, when Roy Stevens would make essentially the same charge in public -- that Worcester charities were the exclusive province of the elites of the city -- he would be condemned as a troublemaker and rabble-rouser, whom local industrialists would make every effort to discredit.

The fate of the meeting, two days after Bruce's memo, was preordained as indicated in the section of his memo which Bruce labeled "Finale":

It is agreed that on 9/11 we are going to listen; that I shall keep my mouth shut in at least ten languages.... We may have a difficult situation on our hands if we turn down this request, but I can not help believing that it would be only temporary; I believe only the red-hot Unioneers would take recriminations.³³

Bruce and his committee would discover how wrong he could be.

The September 11 meeting included both AFL and CIO local representatives, as well as Frank Coyle, representing the national AFL-CIO Labor Participation Department. The discussion proceeded to rehash arguments that had been made for a dozen years. Roy Stevens pointed out that the Worcester GRF campaign derived 60% of its funds from Advanced Gift fundraising. Forty percent came from employee giving.³⁴ Then Stevens got to the crux of the matter. He claimed that the Worcester "COMMUNITY Chest" did not represent the interests of the community at all. It was, rather, "run by a few of the well-to-do as a hobby; ... [hence] Union representation is not actual but only token."³⁵ In a move that would rupture relations for years, Stevens vowed that "If the Chest doesn't put a Union man on the staff, then I'll do my best to see that our members give \$50,000 *less* [emphasis in the original document] to the Golden Rule Campaigns!"³⁶ The whole tone of the meeting changed after this. Stevens was attacked by Loren Hutchinson for making "a direct threat." Even Stevens' labor colleagues made haste to

³³Ibid.

³⁴ GRF, Notes on Special Committee Meeting, September 11, 1957.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 75-76.

³⁶ Ibid.

explain that "Mr. Stevens really didn't mean exactly what he said..."³⁷ Lyscom Bruce's notes on this meeting indicate that it ended amicably. Paris Fletcher promised to take the matter under advisement and report to the Executive Committee. In the meantime, Bruce reported, it was "agreed by all that no further steps would be taken -- Unions will await Board of Directors' action on request for Labor Staff man."³⁸

It soon became evident that Roy Stevens left the meeting with a distinctly different understanding. Six days after the meeting, on September 17, 1957, Roy Stevens sent a memo on Local USW stationery, to the officers of all Worcester Steelworkers' locals urging an immediate boycott of the upcoming fund campaign. Stevens stated his arguments succinctly and unequivocally:

The Worcester Community Chest is tightly controlled by a small but powerful group of old guard people who only want Union cooperation for the fund-raising activities. ALL Local Union Officers are requested to withhold cooperation until the relations between the Union and the Community Chest show an improvement.³⁹

Stevens' action initially split the local labor community. The Central Labor Union was quick to disavow Stevens' call for a boycott and affirm their continued support of the GRF. Shortly after Stevens' call, Earle Patnod, President of the CLU, AFL, re-affirmed the request to "ask all members to contribute as liberally as possible."⁴⁰ Likewise, Samuel Donnelly, of the Building and Construction Trades Council, pointed out that the Council "heartily endorses the Community Chest and the 1957 Golden Rule Campaign."⁴¹ In striking at the favorite charity of Worcester's industrialists, Stevens caused less cautious labor leaders, although they likely saw the situation in terms similar to his, to back away in caution.

Lyscom Bruce delighted in Stevens' predicament as he did in labor's division. Stevens published his letter and followed up with an interview

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ GRF. Stevens to Officers, Worcester Locals USWA, September 17, 1957

⁴⁰GRF, Patnod to TWIMC, September 23, 1957.

⁴¹ GRF, Donnelly to TWIMC, September 23, 1957.

on a local radio station. The radio interview revealed the split in labor's ranks. It was not only the more conservative AFL contingent that feared the consequences of a boycott. Jim Lavin, head of the local CIO and himself a steelworker, made a show of supporting the GRF campaign and actively urging workers to contribute. Lavin headed 200 union clerical workers at American Steel and Wire. Stevens, however, would rally the support of 2200 ASW production workers who largely turned their backs on the GRF plea.⁴²

The effectiveness of Stevens' plea would soon become evident to all. The litmus test would be the level of giving to the 1957 annual campaign. Essential to the success of the campaign was the work of the Commercial and Industrial Division of the GRF. This division divided up the city's major employers -- and the minor employers for that matter. It then conducted a well-orchestrated campaign to extract maximum donations through on-the-job giving. Meanwhile, Lyscom Bruce and other GRF personnel were attempting to minimize the impact of the boycott. Bruce pointed out that decreased giving would, of necessity, mean decreased social services delivered to the city. Bruce publicly pledged that there would be no retaliations against union members, though. On the other hand, reduced or eliminated services, he argued in a letter to the editor of the *The Evening Gazette*, would negatively effect the union as well as the non-union public.⁴³

By the end of September, GRF officials began to have some idea of the impact of the boycott. The unionized employees of Gaychrome Company, local 5412 USW, refused to sign pledges for 1957 and canceled all ongoing contributions.⁴⁴ Gaychrome informed the GRF that the unpaid balance on workers' 1956 pledges were uncollectible.⁴⁵ Bruce knew what this foreshadowed. He had written to a union officer at Gaychrome attempting to rebut Roy Stevens' charges.⁴⁶ The union officer, Catherine Palmer, saw through Bruce's defense. Roy Stevens was asked for his response to Bruce. Stevens took the gloves off. In a letter, a copy of which went to Bruce and to area labor leaders, Stevens charged that Bruce had never fully accepted the role of organized labor in the Community Chest. Stevens would allege that:

⁴² GRF, Stevens, Radio Station WAAB Interview, September 24, 1957.

⁴³ GRF file copy, "Letter to Editor," *Evening Gazette*, September 28, 1957.

⁴⁴ GRF, Palmer et.al. Local #5412 USWA, Gaychrome to TWIMC, September 30, 1957.

⁴⁵ GRF, Gaychrome Company to Chamber of Commerce of Worcester, October 3, 1957.

⁴⁶ GRF, Bruce to Palmer, October 2, 1957.

Under Mr. Bruce's leadership the Worcester Community Chest has failed miserably. ...The AFL and the CIO have for years notified the community Chest through Mr. Bruce and others that the Labor Unions were not satisfied with the token representation now accorded the unions. ...Support of the Unions drive ... will hasten the day when the domination of civic and charitable affairs of Worcester by a few anti-labor people will be broken and agencies such as the Community Chest will be administered and staffed by people representative of the entire community and aware that working people are part of the community.⁴⁷

On October 10, the GRF Executive Committee held a special meeting, the sole purpose of which was to try to ascertain the effects of the steelworkers' boycott. The head of the critical C&I division, Joseph Carter, of Wyman-Gordon, told the committee that it was a virtual certainty that his division would not make its goal. There were many factors. Worcester industries had lost 5,500 workers in the space of a year; overtime had disappeared; work hours were shorter. Most critical, though, was the boycott.⁴⁸ The rank and file responded to Stevens' call. James Lavin, President of the Industrial Union Council, was instructed by the CIO Council to resign from the Community Chest Board of Directors. Bruce and others were furious. Lavin had been one of the labor leaders on whom they thought they could count. Industrialist Fred Daniels, of Riley-Stoker Corporation, lashed out at Stevens. He wrote, "This man Stevens must be very pleased with himself when his steel workers cut the giving for Commercial and Industrial to 82% of goal." Daniels urged a hard line and an absolute and final rejection of the union request for a staff position.⁴⁹

The problem was turned over to the Chest's Community Relations Committee which would eventually, in bitterness and sarcasm, refer to itself as the "Labor Relations Committee." The charge to the committee was "to consider the unilateral action of Roy H. Stevens, Jr., of the

⁴⁷ GRF, Stevens to Palmer, Oct6ber 3, 1957

⁴⁸ GRF, Notes, Executive Committee Special Meeting, October 10, 1957.

⁴⁹ GRF, Daniels to Bruce, October 14, 1957; See also Lavin to Bruce, October 11, 1957, and Bruce to Lavin, October 12, 1957.

United Steel Workers." The further charge was to minimize the damage of Stevens' actions. They tried to isolate Stevens as the only problem. The problem, they said, was "a flagrant violation by one and only one -- Worcester labor official (Mr. Roy H. Stevens ...)." Stevens' most grievous offense was "seeding of misconceptions throughout our community and the very strong possibility throughout the country regarding the Worcester Community Chest, its' practices, policies, staff personnel and lay leadership." This constituted "a moral issue of significant magnitude."⁵⁰

The Committee argued that this was a dispute between one man and the GRF. They denied that there was any labor-management problem either between the GRF and labor or between Worcester industry and labor. All other labor leaders, they maintained, "demonstrated themselves to be responsible citizens." None of his cohorts in labor could "understand his behavior nor ... attempt to offer any logical explanation or excuse for him." Stevens was portrayed as a master at the spread of misinformation, the effects of which "can never be completely eradicated."⁵¹

By the end of October, the extent of damage would be obvious. While the campaign as a whole made 95.2% of its goal -- thanks in part to enormous pressures put upon salaried, office, and administrative workers -- the critical Commercial and Industrial Division had come up with only 82% of their goal. The report on the results praised the C&I Division for doing as well as they did while "facing very unusual obstacles not of their own making."⁵²

After the close of the campaign, data would reveal the effectiveness of Stevens' call for a boycott. Table I illustrates the effect at American Steel and Wire Company:

Table 1: Participation By Category of Employment, AS&W Company⁵³

Company	1956 Campaign	1957 Campaign	Percent
Change			
Executives Givers	370	393	+6.2%
Hourly Givers	2,757	2,174	-21.1%
Total Exec. \$	7,687	8,238	+7.2%

⁵⁰GRF, Memo, Community Relations Committee, October 16, 1957.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²GRF, Bruce to Community Chest Executives Bulletin No. XIV, October 21, 1957.

⁵³GRF, data tabulated from handwritten manuscript, "Giving Sample: 15 CIO Steelworker Companies".

Total Hourly \$	15,950	9,946	-37.6%
Avg. Exec. \$	20.78	20.96	+ .8%
Avg. Hourly \$	5.79	4.57	-21.1%

With a decrease in dollars given by hourly employees of over 37%, it was clear that increased executive giving could not make up for the massive falloff in giving by hourly employees. The \$6,000 reduction in giving at just this one company was devastating. Even worse, Stevens' influence extended beyond American Steel and Wire to other area steel companies. Table 2 illustrates the impact at Worcester steel companies generally.

Table 2: Community Chest Giving at Worcester Area Steel Companies⁵⁴

	1956 Campaign	1957 Campaign	Percent Change
Number Solicited	11,714	10,432	- 10.9 %
Number Donating	10,928	7,690	- 29.6 %
Dollars Given	71,161	48,330	- 32.1 %

The 32 percent falloff in donations could not be explained away by a sour local economy. Clearly, steelworkers were heeding Roy Stevens' call. The impact was even worse at other steelworker companies than at AS&W. Table 3 illustrates the trend for steel worker union companies as well as at other unionized, but non-steelworker companies:

Table 3: Participation at Unionized Companies⁵⁵

Category	Steelworker Union Companies			Other Union Companies		
	1956	1957	% Change	1956	1957	% Change
Exec Givers	572	862	+50.7%	427	390	-8.6%
Hrly Givers	7687	4859	-36.8%	3175	3057	-3.7%
Exec \$	17,776	17,638	-0.7%	6,424	6,632	+3.2%
Hourly \$	43,915	21,397	-51.3%	16,521	15,641	-5.3%
Avg Exec\$	30.91	20.46	-33.8%	15.07	19.01	+26.1 %
Avg Hrly\$	5.71	4.40	-22.9%	5.20	4.57	- 12.1 %

Once Stevens' call for a boycott was public; and once the results were in, local business executives had to face up to his charges as well as

⁵⁴ Data tabulated from memorandum, "1956-1957 Golden Rule Campaign: Results-CIO-Steelworkers".

⁵⁵ GRF, data tabulated from two handwritten manuscripts: "Giving Sample, 15 CIO Steelworker Companies," and "Giving Sample: 11 Union Companies (Not CIO Steelworkers)".

formulate a strategy for dealing with them. The first reaction was outrage, but ironically it was Lyscom Bruce who recognized that Stevens' most damaging allegation was that the charities were the playground of the local leadership and that they remained unrepresentative of the community at large. In a memorandum dated 21 October, 1957, Bruce told the agencies that they would have to face reductions in grants. He explained that this was largely because of the actions of one man: "Most organized labor, especially A. F. of L. Unions, has been, and is, most cooperative. This is a case of just one man." He went on to acknowledge, though, "where the union leaders have us on the hip." This was:

When they say that agency Boards are not representative of the community. You will remember that Chest leaders, for the last ten years, have been urging the Member-Services to develop Committees and Boards truly representative of the entire community. That condition does not exist and has improved little, if any, during the last decade, I regret to say.⁵⁶

By suggesting to the member charities that the problem was with *their* boards, Bruce was effectively overlooking the extreme anti-labor attitude of his own Board, dominated, as it was, by the city's most influential industrialists. Bruce and other GRF leaders knew all too well the validity of Stevens' charges. Since January of 1957, GRF officials had the text of a privately commissioned study report conducted for the GRF by consultants John D. WeHman and Charles X. Sampson. The report cautioned that the GRF was headed for trouble because: "The Board is too large with too many men." Further, Sampson wrote, "a relative handful of citizens fill all the posts ... these people are drawn largely from the more advantaged elements of the community." The study pointed out "the absence of representation of certain community groups" and urged the "top leadership of Worcester" to "address itself forthwith to the problem."⁵⁷

Unfortunately, the problem would burst into the open later that year before it could be privately or quietly addressed. The critical event in relations between organized labor and the GRF would come as a result

⁵⁶ GRF, Bruce, Community Chest Executives Bulletin No. XII, October 21, 1957.

⁵⁷ GRF, Sampson Report, January, 1957.

of a letter sent, on 31 October of 1957, to Francis J. Coyle, national head of the GRF Labor Participation Department. Paris Fletcher, writing for the GRF Community Relations Committee, informed Coyle that the committee would be unable to report on the resolution of the issue of a Union Staff Representative. The reason, Fletcher stated, was that:

Frankly, however, we do not know with whom we are to deal and, as recent experience proves we do not know who can speak authoritatively for Worcester Unions. To continue our discussions under such circumstances seems fruitless. There is also the unfortunate possibility that there might exist at the present time an atmosphere which could be prejudicial to your interests.⁵⁸

Fletcher might not have anticipated the consequences of his letter, but his father-in-law, Harry Stoddard, saw at once the trouble that it would cause. Bruce had to explain to an angry Stoddard that the committee and Loren Hutchinson, whom Stoddard singled out for blame, had in fact been opposed to sending the letter. They had been "overruled by Fletch." The consequences were disastrous. Coyle telephoned Bruce, "hot and bothered about the letter, and said the AFL-CIO boys were, too." The local unions had, Bruce told Stoddard, "completely misinterpreted the meaning of the letter."⁵⁹

If the GRF strategy had been to isolate Stevens, to portray him as aberrant, and to cultivate more "moderate" labor leaders, Paris Fletcher's letter put an end to those hopes. Coyle formally informed Fletcher that "to say that the [Worcester] C.L.U. was disturbed by your letter would be putting it very mildly."⁶⁰ Stevens' position would shortly become the position of all of organized labor in Worcester. Stevens wrote to Paris Fletcher and implied that Worcester executives had never intended to deal honestly with labor, "The refusal of your committee to recommend acceptance of the Unions' program comes as no surprise to me." Furthermore, he suggested that Fletcher was disingenuous:

⁵⁸ GRF, Fletcher to Coyle, October 3, 1957.

⁵⁹ GRF, Bruce to Harry G. Stoddard, November 11, 1957.

⁶⁰ GRF, Coyle to Fletcher, November 14, 1957.

You stated in your letter that you did not know who spoke for the Labor Unions in Worcester and, yet, you sent a copy of your letter to seven people with whom your committee has met on more than one occasion. The seven people to whom you sent copies of your letter have been and still are authorized to speak for the Unions in this area as I suspect you knew when you wrote the letter.⁶¹

There is some evidence that Paris Fletcher had come to rethink the wisdom of sending his controversial letter. Fletcher and Roland Erickson, President of Guaranty Bank were berated in a letter from Robert Stoddard, President of Wyman-Gordon and Fletcher's brother-in-law, for their overly gentle attitude in dealing with the situation. Stoddard wrote, "I see no reason whatsoever why we should pussyfoot and treat it [the Union Situation] like sex, as though it was something we shouldn't talk about."⁶² He then urged an all-out isolation of, and attack upon, Roy Stevens. By the time of Stoddard's letter, the devastating decline in giving in the C&I Division was apparent to all. Internal data are reflected in table 4, below:

Table 4: 1957 Campaign Giving: 70 Union Companies⁶³

	1956	1957	Percent Change
# of Employees	21,791	20,595	-5.5%
# Giving	19,823	16,347	-17.5%
Dollars Given	122,332	98,024	-19.9%
Percent Participation	91.0	79.4	- 12.7 %

Perhaps the most frightening aspect of this decline was not simply the 20 percent decline in revenue nor the double digit decline in percent participation, but the fact that such had been achieved while labor was divided, with some union leaders continuing to call for donations to the GRF. An all-out labor boycott, with local unions united and determined,

⁶¹ GRF, Fletcher to Stevens, November 19, 1957.

⁶² GRF, Robert Stoddard to Erickson, November 25, 1957.

⁶³ GRF, data tabulated from handwritten manuscript, "Analysis of 1956 and 1957 Campaign Giving Among 70 Union Companies," December 11, 1957.

could be potentially devastating. Fletcher and Erickson clearly recognized that.

The Worcester Central Labor Union formally replied to Paris Fletcher at the end of November. They indicated that labor's patience had run out. They also implied that other labor leaders were ready to recognize openly the legitimacy of Stevens' claim that labor had been too long excluded in important areas of Worcester's life:

In your letter, you also say that there is a possibility at this time that an atmosphere exists which could be prejudicial to our interests. We believe you are right but we also believe that this condition has existed for far too long in Worcester and that if organized labor had the same opportunity as management or industry it could demonstrate that labor is second to no group in its desire to make the community a better place in which to work and live, to raise their Families and pay their share of the taxes.⁶⁴

The CLU demanded an answer, at long last, to labor's request.

In formulating that answer, the Community Relations Committee undertook a disciplined study of other cities' experiences with labor staff. Committee members were assigned the job of investigating the experiences of Bridgeport, Erie, Harrisburg, Holyoke, Lowell, New Bedford, New Haven, Reading, Scranton, and Wilkes-Barre. The committee gathered data on fund campaigns, by year, in each of those cities for the past ten years. They analyzed the effects on giving of hiring labor staff. They interviewed the GRF Chief Executive Officer in each city. Alan Willson, of State Mutual Life Insurance Company, reported on the success enjoyed in New Bedford, where, despite declining employment and a hostile Community Chest Executive Secretary, labor staff had proven invaluable not only in improving and expanding services but in raising funds as well. In 1957, the New Bedford GRF achieved 103% of its goal. Paris Fletcher followed up on Willson's report, indicating that "there was no evidence of any attempt by

⁶⁴ GRF, WCLU to Fletcher, November 22, 1957.

the Union staff man to interfere ... by securing access to or influencing wage scales, unionizing activity, etc."⁶⁵

Wade Houk, of AS&W, and Ralph Gow, of Norton Company, found New Haven "completely satisfied," and noted that "in New Haven, a much larger percentage of the funds comes from workers than in Worcester."⁶⁶ They also noted an energized community involvement in decision making in New Haven.

Loren Hutchinson investigated Scranton. He found little "measurable increase in fund raising," but noted good performance on educating the community with regard to services. Nevertheless, Hutchinson felt obliged to note one crucial difference between Scranton and Worcester. Scranton "was about 85% [union] organized" while "with only 20% to 25% of Worcester's business and industry organized," there might be "little reason for hiring a full time labor staff man." In the unlikely event that Worcester chose to acquiesce to labor's demand, Hutchinson stressed "the importance of proper conditioning of a few hand picked labor leaders before any action is taken in hiring a full time labor staff man."⁶⁷ He surely missed the point that the opportunity for such "conditioning" had been immeasurably lessened by Paris Fletcher's letter.

By the end of December of 1957, Paris Fletcher's "Union Relations Committee" had come to the reluctant and grudging conclusion that "eventually we would doubtless be obliged" to give in to labor's demands. The only remaining question was when and how this should occur. If the GRF acquiesced, "that would be appeasement under bludgeoning" and would result in the GRF's "loss of integrity." On the other hand, if they refused and the inevitable boycott resulted, the committee was concerned that they "be smart enough to show up [the] unions' real reasons and attitudes." The committee had come to recognize that what the unions really wanted in Worcester was "social recognition." They insisted, though, that they could not grant that recognition now "under Stevens' clubbing." In private correspondence hand-carried to executives' homes lest it "inadvertently [be] opened by the wrong person," committee members acknowledged the possibility of agreeing to

⁶⁵ GRF, Bruce to Fletcher, November 30, 1957; memo, Alan R. Willson, Community Chest Chairman, December 5, 1957; memo, Fletcher, December 11, 1957; Fletcher to CLU, December 6, 1957.

⁶⁶ GRF Memo, Houk and Gow, December 11, 1957.

⁶⁷ GRF, Hutchinson to Fletcher, December 20, 1957

"the principle" of a labor staff representative without having to "accede to the verbatim demands of the union representatives."⁶⁸

In a masterly statement of equivocation, the Fletcher committee recommended neither a definite negative answer nor an unqualified positive answer. Instead, they recommended "a qualified 'yes.'"⁶⁹ Lyscom Bruce saw "a community relations problem of the first magnitude" when this decision was announced. Hence, he recommended a strategy. A labor staff person would be hired, answerable only to Bruce, to study the problem for a year. This would be done if, and only if, organized labor pledged full cooperation with fundraising. Bruce spoke openly of the need to appear to be fair to the average "man on the street." Simultaneously, the Executive committee should keep in mind other factors. Foremost was the fact that Worcester was only 20 to 25% organized. Secondly was the "degree to which organized labor has fallen into ill repute because of the McClellan investigations." Thirdly was the need to make the public aware of "the 'gun point' techniques being used by organized labor."⁷⁰

In May of 1958, both the CLU and the Industrial Union Council rejected the GRF offer, insulted that the "offer, although made in good faith, implies that Labor is solely interested in getting a job for someone from organized labor and it leaves us with the feeling that Labor is still just tolerated and not necessarily accepted in the Community."⁷¹ In view of the rejection, Bruce called for an all-out war on organized labor in Worcester.

Bruce wrote that dealing with labor was no longer something "for a bunch of amateurs to fool around with," especially since "our stand may set the pattern for some other communities in this country and Canada. It is the first time ... where any Chest or Fund has stood up to organized labor."⁷² Bruce recommended hiring the Boston office of Barton, Burton Durstine and Osborne to prepare publicity materials, organize anti-labor mailings, and lead a full-scale anti-labor crusade. Worcester would have to toughen up:

⁶⁸ GRF, Notes, Union Relations Committee, December 30, 1957

⁶⁹ GRF, Memo, "Union Relations Committee," January 2, 1958; January 10, 1958.

⁷⁰ GRF, Memo, Bruce, January 22, 1958.

⁷¹ GRF, Patnod and Lavin, WIUC-CIO to Fletcher, May 17, 1958.

⁷² Bruce to Board of Directors, Chamber of Commerce, June 18, 1958.

If we're going to have a battle on our hands, it will be with an unscrupulous foe, and we should be prepared to land some solar-plexus blows at the very start -- good and hard, but not below the belt -- You remember what Calvin Coolidge said about dealing with a skunk?⁷³

During the summer of 1958, the two parties continued their stalemate over the issue of labor representation in the Community Chest. A similar conflict occurred between labor and management as to the composition of the Greater Hartford Community Chest.⁷⁴

Finally, in late August, there was a break in the stalemate when the two sides in Worcester began to talk about the AFL-CIO Labor-Management Social Service Institute proposed for September 20th. Ultimately a new date was set -- November 29, 1958, The continuing discussion in Worcester was in sharp contrast to the ongoing conflict in Hartford over the 1958 chest drive.⁷⁵

However, Worcester's own drive remained in limbo despite the Institute breakthrough. Indeed there is evidence that the conflict was still smoldering. In October, 1958, Roy Stevens refused to allow chest solicitation of USWA office workers because of the "local set up."⁷⁶ Also, in a January 6, 1959 letter to Lavin and Patnod, Bruce was critical of one of the union representatives "hopping on Olson without having ascertained the facts."⁷⁷

Subsequently, in January of 1959, labor members, including Lavin, refused to serve on the Community Chest's committees and boards. Lavin's letter of February 21, 1959, indicates that labor still wanted a paid representative on the Community Chest staff.⁷⁸ Bruce heatedly

⁷³ GRF, Bruce to Hutchinson, June 20, 1958.

⁷⁴ GRF, E. Sloan, GHCC to K. Madigan, President, Greater Hartford Labor Council, AFL-CIO, July 11, 1958; Madigan to Labor Organization, Greater Hartford Council, August 6, 1958; Letter, Sloan to *Hartford Courant*, October 8, 1958.

⁷⁵ GRF, Bruce to Patnod, August 23, 1958; Bruce to Patnod, August 27, 1958; Clayton Kasper to Bruce, August 30, 1958; Bruce to Kasper, September 2, 1958; Kasper to Bruce, October 27, 1958; Bruce to Kasper, November 19, 1958.

⁷⁶ GRF, Memo, Bob Shaw, October 16, 1958.

⁷⁷ GRF, Bruce to Lavin and Patnod, January 6, 1959.

⁷⁸ GRF, Lavin to Bruce, February 21, 1959.

addressed this latest "rejection" of his overtures to labor in a March 16, 1959 letter to Lavin.⁷⁹

Finally a summit conference between the two sides was arranged for April 6, 1959. But the results were disappointing. Neither side really budged on the labor staff issue. Despite a second meeting that was held on September 11, 1959, Bruce had already concluded on August 31, 1959, that labor's strength in Worcester (16% to 17%) was too weak to dictate the hiring of a labor staff person.⁸⁰ Bruce also was critical of a report "Why Labor Staff" that had been sent by Roy Stevens to Joseph Carter on April 28, 1959, and subsequently sent on by Carter to Fletcher on July 2, 1959. His hand-written comments on the report included such terms as "party-line," "union-juice," and "rather dogmatic."⁸¹ He also continued to oppose the calls for a labor staff assistant on the basis of voluntarism, as well as on the basis of organized labor's small base in Worcester. At the September 11, 1959, meeting, the Chest's executive committee went into executive session, per Bruce's instructions. Out of this session came a document fleshed out by Bruce entitled, "The Responsibilities, Relationships, and Qualifications of Local Fund-Chest-Council Labor Representative," which again left the labor staff issue dangling.⁸² Indeed, all that Paris Fletcher as Chest president offered Lavin, President of the Worcester Union Council, AFLCIO, was a letter sent on September 17, 1959, indicating that a recommendation would be made by the Executive Committee on the labor staff issue at the November meeting of the Chest's Board of Directors.⁸³

A tougher letter on the issue was sent to Francis J. Coyle, Labor Participation Department United Community Funds & Councils of America, Inc. by Bruce, also on October 29th.⁸⁴ The desultory relationship between labor and management in Worcester was not helped by Bruce as Executive Director of the Chest/Fund. A revealing and biased view of labor-management relations was sent to the Chest's "Union Relations Committee" on January 26, 1960, stating, again, his

⁷⁹ GRF, Bruce to Lavin, March 16, 1959.

⁸⁰ GRF, Bruce to Executive Committee, August 31, 1959.

⁸¹ GRF, "Why Labor Staff," ND.

⁸² GRF, Tentative Draft, "Responsibilities, Relationships, and Qualifications of Local Fund-Chest-Council, Labor Representative," September 4, 1959.

⁸³ GRF, Fletcher to Lavin, September 17, 1959.

⁸⁴ GRF, Bruce to Coyle, October 29, 1959.

view that organized labor was "cocky," "corrupt," and weak in Worcester. His report included the following statement:

The McClellan hearings have proven that some National and Inter-National Unions' leaders are without scruple. I am convinced they wish to "crack" Worcester in order to use us as a "can-opener" on other Chests and Funds in the U.S.A. and Canada. That may sound conceited, but our outfit is of top repute in North America.⁸⁵

Bruce's anti-unionism was again evident in his letter of March 7, 1960 "documenting his case" -particularly in a "Quick re-cap," stating that Worcester's percentage of union labor was only 15.2%.⁸⁶

This letter was sent to his "Union Relations Committee just before a March 9th meeting between labor and management. That meeting was subsequently postponed to March 24, 1960, where the labor staff controversy was again joined at length (2 hours)."⁸⁷

Frustrated and angry, Lavin sent a letter on April 1, 1960, to Bruce stating that the Labor Council was severing all ties with the Community Chest and Council of Worcester because the meetings had come to nought.⁸⁸ Bruce's response was cautious, but personally he was so pleased at standing up to labor that he wrote a letter entitled "Union Business" to Fletcher on September 8, 1960.⁸⁹ Perhaps he felt vindicated because the Greater Hartford Community Chest and the Greater Hartford Labor Council had also severed ties in July, 1960.⁹⁰ Bruce continued to berate organized labor for its boycott of the Chest and Council into 1961, but the labor Council stood by its decision in a letter from Lavin to Bruce on February 23, 1961.⁹¹

⁸⁵ GRF, Bruce to "Union Relations Committee," January 26, 1960.

⁸⁶ GRF, Bruce to "Union Relations Committee," March 2, 1960.

⁸⁷ GRF, Notes, Special Meeting both Chest and Union representatives, "Re: Adding Union Man to Chest & Council Staff," March 24, 1960.

⁸⁸ GRF, Lavin to Bruce, April 1, 1960.

⁸⁹ GRF, Bruce to Fletcher, September 6, 1960.

⁹⁰ GRF, Charles M. Young, Greater Hartford Labor Council, to James C. Turner, July 8, 1960.

⁹¹ GRF, Bruce to Lavin, February 14, 1961; Lavin to Bruce, February 23, 1961.

The bad blood between labor and the Community Chest would not cease until Lyscom Bruce transferred to the Newton, Massachusetts, Community Chest in 1962. After Bruce's transfer, the directorship was assumed by Robert Cahill, a Bruce protege who had worked with the industrial division to re-involve labor.⁹² Shortly after Cahill's appointment the boycott ended and a labor staff person was hired. Labor staff participation has continued to the present day.

⁹² UWA, "Publicity," March 12, 1960; September 14, 1962.