

In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts' maritime interests were substantial. Maine remained a part of the Commonwealth's territory until the 1820 Compromise. The combined coastline of Maine and Massachusetts was longer than that of any other of the thirteen colonies. Maine's border with Canada (a remaining British possession), along with threatened rebellion in Maine, remained a concern for delegates from Massachusetts, particularly regarding foreign policy and security issues.


FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IN MASSACHUSETTS

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Abstract: *This article examines the role of foreign policy in the heated debates that took place in Massachusetts newspapers and at its state ratification convention. In Massachusetts, the Constitution was endorsed by only a slight majority: 187-168 or 52.7 percent in favor. With 355 delegates, the convention was the largest in the nation and among the most impassioned. Tensions ran high. Conflicting interests and ideologies deeply divided the delegates. In contrast, the total count from all thirteen state conventions reveals that nationally 67 percent voted in favor of ratification (1,171 of the 1,748 delegates). Indeed, in three states the vote was unanimous: Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia.*

Massachusetts had a unique set of foreign policy interests connected both to the sea and to its large frontier possession in Maine, which bordered the remaining British colonies in Canada. Federalists connected these local commercial and security concerns to foreign policy issues in order to argue in favor of the strong national government. In contrast, Antifederalists downplayed the alleged commercial and security dangers posed by foreign nations. Antifederalists argued instead that the powers that would be granted to a national government to conduct foreign policy, particularly the powers to raise an army and make treaties, created even greater potential threats to domestic liberty.



Previous scholarly focus on how these debates played out at the national level has obscured the importance of local and state-level debates around ratification. Because the constitution was ratified in thirteen local conventions, the foreign policy issues were as much local as national. Dr. Robert W. Smith has written extensively about these debates. His latest book, Amid a Warring World: American Foreign Relations, 1775-1815, is forthcoming from Potomac Press.

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Since its founding, Massachusetts has played a significant role in the wider world. From Puritanism to abolitionism and beyond, the state has stood at the center of the political movements that shaped the broader Atlantic. The Commonwealth's companies, whether involved in fishing, shipping, manufacturing, or biotechnology, have long shaped the global economy. The contest over the ratification of the United States Constitution was a critical moment in which citizens debated Massachusetts' place in the wider world. Supporters of ratification attempted to connect local commercial and security interests to national foreign policy concerns.

Historian Frederick Marks observed that foreign policy was the Federalists' best issue, and they made it the centerpiece of their campaign in favor of ratifying the Constitution. The Antifederalists, on the other hand, downplayed foreign dangers, relying instead on the argument that the powers granted to the national government to conduct foreign policy, particularly the powers to raise an army and make treaties, threatened domestic liberty. Historians readily acknowledge the role of foreign policy in the national debates over the Constitution.¹ However, a focus on the national level obscures the importance of local debates.

There was no national vote on the Constitution. It was ratified in thirteen separate state conventions. In a sense, each state had its own foreign policy; the absence of a strong central government led each state to protect its own interests and treat others states as essentially foreign powers. The larger states naturally tended to have a more defined set of external interests. Thus, the foreign policy issues raised in the heated ratification debates were as much local as national ones, and proponents always had to consider local interests. In each state, the foreign policy debate over the Constitution proceeded on two tracks: the broader national issues and the specific local interests.

These debates in Massachusetts afford an opportunity to examine foreign affairs on both tracks. Massachusetts Federalists, in public and private, echoed the sentiments of their fellows throughout the nation; in their view,

the weakness of the Articles of Confederation led to the loss of national reputation, the loss of credit, the loss of trade, and imminent danger from Great Britain and Spain. At the same time, foreign policy was very much a local issue, and Massachusetts Federalists argued that the Constitution would promote the foreign policy interests of the commonwealth. In response, Antifederalists downplayed foreign dangers, minimized the failures of the confederation, or argued that the remedy proposed would produce more evil than good. They concluded that the Constitution would harm local interests, particularly trade.

On September 15, 1787, twelve days before the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia completed its work, an essayist with the pseudonym Numa laid out what would become the Federalist case for ratification on foreign policy grounds. He wrote in the Northampton *Hampshire Gazette*:

A federal constitution is essential to bestow dignity on the union, to control our finances, to regulate commerce, to make treaties...protect against foreign invasions, [and] aid and insure the establishment of our credit abroad.

A new government would allow the United States to fulfill its obligations to its allies, France and the Netherlands. Otherwise, Numa warned his countrymen, “they will cast you off and let you reap the harvest which you prefer.” That harvest would surely be disaster: “Think besides how your enemies (for enemies you have) will feast upon your folly, fatten at your charge, and plume themselves on the success of steps which they suggested.”²

Numa’s conclusion was clear: a government incapable of doing justice to the friends of the United States would leave the country a moral outcast, defenseless and at the mercy of a Great Britain bent on revenge. Numa predicted that the Constitution would produce a government that could remedy the evils he described and begged that the nation would approve it.

About six weeks later, an Antifederalist writer using the name John DeWitt was far more optimistic about the condition of the United States. With Shays’ Rebellion over, he believed, “we are in a much better situation, than we were at this period last year.” DeWitt could not understand the rush to ratify the Constitution, nor could he believe the claims of the Federalists. “We are told by some people, that upon adopting this New Government, we are to become everything in a moment: — Our foreign and domestic debts will be as a feather; [and] our ports will be crowded with the ships of all the world, soliciting our commerce and our produce...” To John DeWitt, the only

reform necessary was to reduce imports and promote domestic production. "Nothing more is wanted to make us happy at home and respectable abroad."³

The proposed Constitution was first published in Massachusetts on September 5, 1787, and the Federalists were ready to attribute almost magical properties to it. A correspondent using the penname A True American, writing in the *Massachusetts Centinel*, saw an immediate cure for the nation's diplomatic ills. If the states ratified, the writer argued:

we shall at once be acknowledged our proper rank among the nations of the earth – our laws respecting trade will be such as will soon convince the British nation that unless she will consent to deal with us on terms of reciprocal advantage, her vessels will not be admitted to our ports, and that the produce of these States is necessary to the very existence of her settlements in Nova-Scotia, New-Brunswick, and the West-Indies, every one is at length sufficiently convinced.⁴

Other writers agreed that the loss of national honor was at the heart of the United States' diplomatic problems. Nathan Fiske (1733-1799), a Brookfield minister writing as Worcester Speculator in *Worcester Magazine*, lamented the decline of American virtue: "How great the contrast between her present character, and that which she sustained at the conclusion of the late important war!" Fiske noted that abroad, "their smiles of approbation are converted into frowns of contempt."⁵ Someone writing as Remarker in the *Independent Chronicle* saw the same decline in spirit. The American Revolution produced a sense of common good that overrode the need for a stable government. "Since that time the seeds of civil dissention have been gradually ripening and political confusion hath pervaded the State," he wrote. Material decline followed spiritual decay: "Commerce hath been declining, our credit suffering, and our respectability as a nation hath almost vanished."⁶

The abstract issue of national character fused with the more concrete issues of foreign danger and the loss of trade in the ratification debates. In both trade and security, Great Britain was the main source of difficulty. The Federalists argued that Great Britain would not yield on trade or any other matter until the United States had a government capable of applying economic pressure. "Without a national system of government, we shall soon become a prey to the nations of the earth," an observer wrote in the *Independent Chronicle*. "Our commerce will become contemptible, and our boasted expectations terminate in disgrace."⁷ Another writer, calling himself

“A” of Newburyport in the *Essex Journal*, pointed specifically to the British danger:

The British are sensible of our national difficulties, and undoubtedly rejoice at them, well knowing we have no government, which has sufficient energy to counteract their measures, or redress our own grievances – for it is true enough, we now lie at the mercy of those whose tender mercies we have experimentally found to be cruelty in the extreme.⁸

Another commentator predicted that the first result of the ratification of the Constitution “will be the relinquishment of the WESTERN POSTS, by the British, according to the treaty of peace—which are now so unjustly detained from us, and for no other reason but a contempt of government.”⁹ However, the western forts were not a prominent issue in Massachusetts; rather, economic relations with the British were a much greater concern.

Public proclamations matched the private sentiments of the Federalists. Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant (1731-1791), a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, noted Congress’s inability to pay back loans or regulate commerce. This led to embarrassments at the hands of the British, who refused to sign a commercial treaty and monopolized American trade. Sargeant also blamed the British for the war Algiers launched against the United States in 1785, which “thereby obliged us to give 5 per Cent. to them for insurance against the Algerines—all this while we have not had ye power to retalliate upon them in one Single Article.”¹⁰

The Constitution, the Federalists believed, positioned the United States favorably in relation to events unfolding in Europe. For example, the debate in Massachusetts coincided with news of the Dutch crisis. Throughout the summer of 1787, the French-backed Patriots battled with the Orangists, supported by Great Britain and Prussia, over control of the Netherlands. The Patriots sought to control the power of the stadtholder, the Dutch executive. A Patriot revolt seized control of much of the Netherlands in 1787. The crisis culminated with a Prussian military intervention on September 13, 1787. A general war in Europe would spill over onto the Atlantic, potentially impacting American trade with Europe.¹¹ Thus, General William Heath (1737-1814) of Roxbury followed the crisis closely in his diary from September through the fall of 1787. He drew a simple lesson from the threat of war in Europe:

Happy will it be for America if the People of the united States adopt the Excellent Constitution which has been formed for

them, -- and keep themselves out of the troubled waters of Europe in such Case they will not only enjoy Political felicity themselves but prove an asylum for the distressed of all nations who may come hither to enjoy peace, plenty and prosperity.¹²

Heath was not alone in seeing the United States, properly organized, as a haven for useful refugees. A writer under the penname One of the People, writing in the October 17, 1787 *Massachusetts Centinel*, predicted that if the United States ratified the Constitution, "we shall then behold America with extended arms, inviting the numerous oppressed and distressed inhabitants of Europe; we shall see them flooding to America; our woods and waste lands will become at once valuable and in great demand."¹³ Other Massachusetts Federalists saw opportunity for commerce in Europe's troubled waters. "Our government once established what a harvest would an European war be for our country," wrote A True American. "In a state of peace, with a war[r]ing world, our vessels would become the carriers to all Europe."¹⁴ Nathan Fiske, writing as Worcester Speculator, agreed, arguing that a European war "is the fortunate period for America to open her ports to all nations, and establish a regular, extensive commerce."¹⁵

As the reaction to the Dutch crisis indicates, overseas trade was a central concern in Massachusetts. At the time, Massachusetts was the second most populous state and had a number of unique interests. Unlike other states, Massachusetts had no Western claims after 1786, and even before then took little interest in the navigation of the Mississippi. No British troops remained on Massachusetts soil, but it had a large frontier possession in Maine, which bordered the remaining British colonies. (The Maine boundary was not completely resolved until 1842). Massachusetts had little agriculture for export. But it did have an extensive coastline, making the state dependent upon maritime industries such as fishing, whaling, and shipping for its economic survival. The sea drew in other land industries, particularly shipbuilding, carpentry, and even farming. Thus, its foreign policy interests lay in the sea: access to the fisheries, protection of the carrying trade, and promotion of related land-based industries, such as shipbuilding.

Thus, the foreign policy of Massachusetts, if that term may be used, focused on extracting wealth from the sea, including the carrying trade, the cod and whale fisheries, and related industries such as shipbuilding. However, those industries were in deep decline in the 1780s. The British Order-in-Council of July 2, 1783, had banned American ships from carrying American products to the British West Indies. American vessels were also forbidden from carrying fish to the British colonies. The order dealt a

crippling blow to the fishing industry of Massachusetts, which had thrived before the American Revolution. The British also promoted Nova Scotia as a replacement for American shipping and produce. Before the war, the New England fishing fleet employed some 10,000 men, both on the ships themselves and in related industries. By the late 1780s, however, the fishing fleet employed no more than 4,000 men.¹⁶

The situation of the whale fishery was even more dire. The value of American whale oil dropped by half after the war, and the British placed duties on imported whale oil that drove American oil out of the market. Nantucket was the hardest hit. Its whaling fleet had 150 vessels before the war, but averaged 28 vessels from 1784 to 1787. Its position became so desperate that in 1785, Nantucket, whose connection to the mainland was always tenuous, sought to secede from the United States in order to revive its whaling industry as a neutral nation. Some gave up the island and joined a British-sponsored whaling settlement in Nova Scotia.¹⁷ Maine lost not only its fishing trade with the British West Indies, but also a very lucrative lumber trade.¹⁸ With the decline of trade and fishing, the collapse of the shipbuilding industry inevitably followed. Massachusetts shipyards constructed some one hundred vessels per year before the American Revolution. Massachusetts' ships were not only used as domestic carriers, but also as payments to British merchants. Total shipbuilding dropped from fifteen to twenty per year from 1784 to 1787. This harmed large ports such as Boston, and it crippled smaller towns such as Newburyport.¹⁹

Naturally, the Federalists made effective use of maritime issues to present the Constitution as a benefit to the interests of Massachusetts. One unidentified correspondent in the *Boston Gazette* tied all of Massachusetts' economic woes together and connected them to the same source:

The *husbandman* finds no encouragement to encrease his stock and produce, for he finds no vent for them – the *mechanick* stands idle half his time, or gets nothing for his work but truck – half our *sailors* are out of business – the *labourer* can find no employ – our *traders* involved in debt, while they can command nothing that is due them – our *merchants* have been sinking money ever since the peace, for want of a commercial treaty, and the wealth of those few individuals who have large sums in cash by them, lies dormant for want of encouragement to loan it, under the security of just and equal laws.



Whaling

Massachusetts was dependent on its many maritime industries, including whaling, depicted here in a nineteenth-century painting by Abroise Louis Garnay. Massachusetts' flagging fishing and whaling industries were of particular concern in discussions about national foreign economic policy in the months leading up to the ratification convention.

The implication was that only the U.S. Constitution could remedy these ills.²⁰

On December 5, 1787, a writer calling himself One of the Middle-Interest published a lengthy essay on trade in the *Massachusetts Centinel*. He described how different state laws destroyed American—and particularly New England—commerce. Lack of uniform commercial laws opened the southern market for fish, whale oil, and whale bone to Nova Scotia, when, “New-England vessels can supply the same market.” A stronger government would be able to encourage the American carrying trade, the writer argued, which would revive “the natural staple of New-England at the expense of *foreigners*.”²¹ On the eve of the Massachusetts’ ratifying convention, the tradesmen of Boston endorsed the Constitution, with the expectation that

“trade and navigation will revive and increase, employ and subsistence will be afforded to many of our tradesmen, who are now suffering from want of the necessaries of life.”²² Concern for the maritime trades even extended to some in the interior.

At an October 9, 1787, town meeting, the people of Chesterfield, in Hampshire County, instructed their representatives in the General Court to remember “the absolute importance of the rigorous and successful prosecution of husbandry and Fishery, to the great emolument of the State, and the honour, happiness, and prosperity of all its inhabitants.”²³ Dwight Foster (1757-1823), an attorney and later a member of Congress, delivered an address to the town of Brookfield concerning the loss of trade on both the national and local levels. Foster noted, “the Embarrassments to our Trade and Commerce, the Loss of publick Credit,” and “the miserable Situation in which we should find Ourselves in case of an attack by a foreign Power.” Turning to more local interests, Foster observed that “our Trade is insulted,” with American vessels seized abroad and foreign, particularly British, ships dominating the American carrying trade. As a result, “Shipbuilding which might be exceedingly profitable to Us is almost at an End.”²⁴

The trade numbers were not completely dismal. Salem enjoyed a brisk trade with the West Indies, where the imperial regulations were not vigorously enforced. But that bottomed out by 1786. Legal West Indian trade shifted to the Dutch islands, while Salem merchants branched out into new routes, particularly in the Baltic, China, and India.²⁵ Salem’s relative prosperity, however, did not mitigate against the argument for the Constitution. One resident noted in the *Salem Mercury* that the economy had revived since the end of the war and that exports had boomed: “If this be the state of our commerce, under its present innumerable embarrassments, to what a noble height of prosperity must it arrive, under the protection of an efficient national government.”²⁶

Presented with a portrait of a nation in collapse and under siege, Massachusetts Antifederalists responded that the situation was not nearly as dire as the Federalists would have it. “Are the enemy at our gates, and have we not time to consider it?” asked an Antifederalist writing as John DeWitt.²⁷ Furthermore, the Constitution permitted Congress the power to maintain an army, which most republican thought considered fatal to liberty. The lack of a check on that power led DeWitt to conclude that it was “for the purpose of consolidating and finally destroying your strength, as your respective Governments are to be destroyed.”²⁸ Writing as Candidus, Benjamin Austin (1752-1820), a Boston merchant, argued that the structure of the American government had no bearing on commercial difficulties. When the European

nations laid duties on American products, such as fish, whale oil, and tobacco, they did so for their own interest. Even if the Constitution guaranteed the northern states the carrying trade of the southern states, it would not be worth the price of the states surrendering “their whole power of *legislation* and *taxation*.”²⁹

The idea that the powers related to foreign policy could be turned against American liberty was a staple of Antifederalist argument everywhere. John DeWitt devoted all of his December 3, 1787 essay to the issue of a standing army, a primal fear in American political thought. DeWitt had a rash of questions about the power to raise an army, wondering how large the army would be, where it would be used, and where it would be based. Most importantly, he asked, “[i]s this power to be fettered with any one of those necessary restrictions which will shew they depend upon the militia, and not upon this infernal engine of oppression to execute their civil laws?”

DeWitt considered the army question related to the idea of national respectability, which the Antifederalists believed to be overplayed. “The advocates at the present day, for a standing army in the New Congress pretend it is necessary for the respectability of government,” he wrote, arguing, “I defy them to produce an instance in any country, in the Old or New World, where they have not finally done away with the liberties of the people.”³⁰

Antifederalists expressed similar fears in private. William Symmes Jr. (1760-1807), an Andover attorney, wrote a long letter to a friend objecting to the Constitution. Symmes concluded that the power to raise an army might be necessary, but argued that the Articles of Confederation already granted that power. The main problem in the Constitution was that “there is no bar against a standing army in time of peace.”³¹ Symmes saw an equal danger in the treaty power. To Symmes, the treaty power was far more important—and dangerous—than the war power. Terms of peace were entirely at the president’s discretion. “Is a peace of less consequence to ye. nation than a war, or is it of more, that this power be given to one man? What is the privilege of declaring war, compared with ye. power of making *all kinds* of treaties?” he asked.³²

James Winthrop (1752-1821), a librarian at Harvard, wrote a lengthy series of essays under the pseudonym Agrippa that stands as the most accomplished of New England Antifederalist efforts. Winthrop dealt extensively with commerce and laid out a free trade argument against granting Congress the exclusive and unlimited power to regulate it. Winthrop argued that the commerce clause would give Congress the power to grant exclusive charters, which were “injurious to the general commerce, by enhancing prices, and destroying that rivalship which is the great stimulous to industry.”³³

Winthrop argued that power was unnecessary to preserve the union, and that the common bond of commerce was enough to keep it together.³⁴

Winthrop did not accept the idea that the nation was in collapse, or that trade difficulties could be attributed to the weakness of the Articles of Confederation. On December 28, 1787, he wrote that British restrictions had been beneficial to the United States in promoting domestic manufacturing: "In this way we have made rapid advancements toward independence in resources as well as empire." Ratification of the Constitution, with an enhanced commercial power, Winthrop argued, would reverse those gains.³⁵

Like *Candidus*, Winthrop believed Great Britain's trade policy was based on interest and resentment, not American weakness.³⁶ He actually credited the Articles of Confederation for economic growth. On January 15, 1788, he wrote that the economic state of the country—and of Massachusetts—was not nearly as bad as had been portrayed. The sale of western lands would pay much of the national debt. Americans traded all over the world and were developing manufactures. "All of this happiness arises from the freedom of our institutions and the limited nature of our government," he wrote.³⁷ To Winthrop, American trade needed no special encouragement, other than freedom. "When commerce is left to take its own course, the advantages of every class will be nearly equal."³⁸

In contrast, Massachusetts Antifederalists, like their counterparts in other large states, believed the creation of a new central government threatened the state's external interests. One essayist under the name Hanno saw an immediate danger to Boston's trade under the Constitution. A new central government, with Philadelphia as the anticipated capital, would make Philadelphia the center of the nation's trade. "On the other hand, this town [Boston] is now the seat of sovereign power," Hanno wrote, explaining:

Here we have an influence in legislation, by giving that commercial information to legislators whether they represent the seaports or the inland town[s], which enables them to adopt those regulations, that promote the industry of the former, and find the readiest vent for the produce of the latter.³⁹

Winthrop also denied the Federalist argument that the Constitution would promote Boston's shipping, and shared the fear—common among Massachusetts Antifederalists—that Boston would lose out to Philadelphia, as the presumed new seat of government.⁴⁰

The debates within the ratifying convention paralleled those preceding it. The convention began on January 9, 1788. However, debate did not begin

until January 14, and the convention searched for a place to meet until finally settling in Jeremy Belknap's Congregational church on Long Lane on January 17. Foreign affairs did not dominate the discussion. But the Federalists made the same case inside what became known as the Federal Street Church as they had in the newspapers, arguing that the Constitution would serve both national and local foreign policy interests. The Antifederalists dismissed arguments based on national danger, and emphasized instead the danger to local interests. The convention, as was common in the other states, considered the Constitution clause by clause. The Federalists did not raise the foreign policy as part of a concerted plan, but did so opportunistically, as the topic of debate allowed.



For example, on the morning of January 18, Thomas Dawes Jr. (1758-1825), a Boston lawyer and the son of a prominent Boston merchant, brought up foreign affairs as part of the debate over the apportionment of taxes. Dawes defended the right of Congress to levy taxes as necessary for national security. The United States had contracted loans which must be paid back. Congress could determine how much each state owed to the national treasury, but could not compel payment. States therefore often refused to pay, leaving Congress short of money. In that event, Dawes argued, "the Dutch are left in such a case to put their own demand in force for themselves. They must raise by force of arms what we are afraid Congress shall collect by the law of peace." Furthermore, what money Congress had been able to borrow had been at a higher rate given Congress's inability to pay.⁴¹ Dawes remarks concluded the morning's debates.

Francis Dana (1743-1811), the former minister to Russia, opened the afternoon debate. Dana, a member of the Supreme Judicial Court, was the only



Federal Street Church

With 364 delegates, Massachusetts held the largest ratification convention of any state. It took several days to find a location that could accommodate all the delegates and spectators. The convention eventually settled in a Congregational church on Long Lane.



Elbridge Gerry (left) and Rufus King (right)

Gerry had represented Massachusetts at the Constitutional Convention and had been one of three delegates who refused to sign it. King, a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying convention, had also served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.

former diplomat at the Massachusetts ratifying convention. He picked up where Dawes left off, speaking even more explicitly about the dangers the United States faced: “Ought not a controuling authority exist, to call forth, if necessary, the whole force and wealth of all the states,” he asked. Dana emphasized the danger from the British, saying, “Nova-Scotia and New-Brunswick, filled with tories and refugees, stand ready to attack and devour these states, *one by one*.”⁴²

The next day the convention moved on to the powers of the Senate. The Antifederalists called as an expert witness Elbridge Gerry (1744-1814), who was not a delegate to the ratifying convention. However, Gerry had represented Massachusetts at the Constitutional Convention, and had been one of three delegates who refused to sign it. Gerry opposed the six-year term for senators proposed in the Constitution. Rufus King (1755-1827), who had served with Gerry at the Constitutional Convention, approved of the six-year term and dismissed the idea that it posed a danger. Senators could not afford

to disobey instructions from their legislatures, King argued, but senators needed time to properly consider treaties with foreign nations.⁴³

The convention reconvened on January 21, and in the afternoon session reached Article I, section 8, governing the powers of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. This was the heart of the debate. It dominated the entire week and contained the most discussion of foreign policy, mostly from the Federalist side. This debate best illustrates how the two tracks of national and local benefit unfolded in the debates. Thomas Dawes returned to the topic of taxation, which he had raised in a speech on the afternoon of January 21, outlining the effect of a weak confederation on agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing. Dawes argued that the lack of a power to levy duties invited the importation of foreign produce and depressed American agriculture.⁴⁴ Turning to shipping, Dawes stated that Congress had allowed foreign carriers into domestic American traffic, which was “contrary to the policy of every nation on earth.”⁴⁵ Congressional weakness struck directly at Massachusetts’ commercial interests. “A vessel from Roseway or Halifax finds as hearty a welcome with its fish and whale bone at the southern ports, as though it was built, navigated and freighted from Salem or Boston,” he warned. “And this must be the case, until we have laws comprehending and embracing alike all the states of the union.”⁴⁶

Dawes and others tied to Boston merchants might have considered the settlement at Port Roseway a direct provocation. The settlement, consisting of the white loyalist town of Sudbury and the black loyalist town of Birchtown, sat on the southern end of Nova Scotia, almost due northeast from Boston. It sprang up almost overnight in 1783. The inhabitants were mainly Loyalist refugees from New York who were anxious to demonstrate their devotion to the empire. They also came to hate life in Nova Scotia, fueling fears that, by themselves or with British support, they might seek to return to their former homes.⁴⁷

Dawes then outlined the obvious advantages American shipping should enjoy. He calculated that some three-quarters of the produce exported from Pennsylvania to Georgia was shipped in British vessels, as well as three-fourths of the goods imported to those states. “This is money which belongs to the New-England States, because we can furnish the ships as well as, and much better, than the British,” Dawes claimed. “Our sister states are willing we should receive those benefits, and that they should be secured to us by *national* laws,” but only if Congress had sufficient power to make those laws. “We are independent of each other, but we are slaves to Europe,” he declared.⁴⁸

Dawes concluded with a farsighted view of American manufacturing. He noted that large numbers of “foreign citizens” had migrated to the United States. This added to the natural advantages of the nation, especially New England, already possessed. “Besides these, the very face of our country leads to manufactures,” he contended. “Our numerous falls of water, and places for mills, whose paper, snuff, gun powder, iron works, and numerous other articles are prepared—these will save us immense sources of money, that would otherwise go to Europe.”⁴⁹

Christopher Gore (1757-1828) of Boston, a future governor, again picked up Federalist foreign policy themes on January 22. “Is America to wait until she is attacked before she attempts a preparation for defense?” he asked. War required money, which the Constitution would permit Congress to collect. Gore then returned to the classic Federalist argument, that of foreign danger. Gore noted that some say “we have no enemies,” when in reality, “we are encircled with enemies from Maine to Georgia.”⁵⁰ William Phillips (1722-1804), a Boston merchant and state senator, followed and echoed the same points as Gore and Dawes the day before. “Great-Britain and France come here with their vessels, instead of our carrying our produce to those countries in American vessels, navigated by our own citizens,” Phillips complained. This could be rectified only if Congress had a full power to regulate foreign commerce.⁵¹ Turning to the power to create an army, Phillips believed that “great mischiefs would ensue” from any restrictions placed on Congress. If Congress could create an army, Phillips believed, it would deter foreign enemies.⁵² Phillips saw no middle ground between ratification and disaster. “I see nothing but destruction and inevitable ruin if it is not adopted.”⁵³

John Choate (1737-1791), a blacksmith and state representative from Ipswich, returned to foreign affairs on January 23. That day saw the most sustained discussion of foreign policy. In a short speech, Choate explained the need to concentrate national power, “not only for our common defence, but for our advantage in settling commercial treaties.”⁵⁴

General Samuel Thompson (1735-1797) of Topsham, Maine, rose and responded with a slashing attack on the whole idea that a more powerful government was necessary for national defense. He was an implacable foe of distant government, be it in London, Boston, or Philadelphia. He launched his revolutionary career in May 1775 when he planned an assault on a British warship lying at Falmouth (now Portland), quite against the wishes of Falmouth’s leading citizens. After the war he was one of the leading figures in Maine’s effort to separate from Massachusetts, and was Maine’s most prominent Antifederalist.⁵⁵

On January 21, Thompson revealed his hatred for section 8 of Article I, and continued the attack on January 23. Thompson called the section “big with mischiefs,” particularly the power to create a standing army.⁵⁶ “We are able to stand our own ground against a foreign power—they cannot starve us out—they cannot bring their ships on the land,” Thompson argued. He also dismissed the idea that creditor nations would attack to recover their debts. “The balance of power in the old countries will not permit it—the other nations will protect us.”⁵⁷

Here Thompson made a foreign policy argument that served as the foundation for diplomacy during the American Revolution: that American trade was so valuable to European powers that no European power would permit itself to be excluded. To Thompson, the European balance of power



James Bowdoin

Bowdoin (1726-1790) served as president of the state constitutional convention.

would protect the United States. Many Americans who held this idea abandoned it by the end of the war because it did not work. The Jeffersonian Republicans continued to cling to it as the key to a foreign policy compatible with republication institutions.⁵⁸ If the European balance was sufficient to protect the United States, there was no need to create a more powerful government, or to be concerned with national respectability. "Gentlemen say we are undone if we cannot stop up the Thames: But, Mr. President, nations will mind their own interest, and not our's," argued Thompson.⁵⁹

James Bowdoin (1726-1790), the former governor, immediately responded with a defense of the powers granted to Congress, hitting all of the main Federalist points, including debt, the loss of trade, and national respectability. He began by observing that the confederation was formed in the heat of battle, with unionist sentiment running high. The end of the war removed the foreign danger that gave life to the union, and most of the states ignored requisitions from Congress.⁶⁰ As a result, the United States was unable to pay its debts. Debt was naturally a sensitive topic for the governor who had put down Shays's Rebellion. Creditor nations would want to be repaid, whether voluntarily or by force. Nations would respond to American bad faith by attacking trade and shipping "and in proportion as our's of this state may be larger and more extensive, than the trade and navigation of other states, we will be the greatest sufferers."⁶¹ Thus, it was necessary to grant Congress the power to levy taxes, both for the benefit of the United States and Massachusetts.

Similarly, Bowdoin favored a commercial power that would promote American trade: "Other nations prohibit our vessels from entering their ports, or lay heavy duties on our exports carried hither; and we have no retaliatory or regulating power over their vessels and exports to prevent it." Foreign powers choked off American trade, which prevented the United States from paying its war debt.⁶²

Like many Federalists, Bowdoin emphasized the attitude of European nations. He did not share Thompson's confidence that European countries would mind their own business. "*Their* attention is drawn to the United States; *their* emissaries are watching our conduct, particularly upon the present most important occasion;" he warned. If the United States did not ratify the Constitution, European nations might "plan a division or partition of the states among themselves; and unite their forces to effect it."⁶³

The convention wrapped up discussion of Article I section 8 in the afternoon of January 25. Nathaniel Gorham (1738-1796), a Charlestown merchant and former president of Congress, delivered the last major speech in its defense. Much of it was on diplomatic grounds. He observed that as


minister to Great Britain, John Adams had no success in signing a commercial treaty. The reason, Gorham believed, was that the British “think Congress but a feeble power.” The British barred the import of American goods into their colonies and attempted to promote Nova Scotia as a replacement. “They have a design in Nova-Scotia to rival us in the fishery and our situation at present favours their design,” Gorham argued, continuing, “From the abundance of our markets, we could supply them with beef, butter, pork, &c. but they lay what restrictions on them they please, which they dare not do, were there an adequate power lodged in the general government to regulate commerce.”⁶⁴

The convention concluded its clause-by-clause examination on January 31. The debate turned to general principles in the final week, and foreign affairs again played a significant role. On the afternoon of February 1, Thomas Russell (1740-1796), a Boston merchant and banker, spoke in support of the plan to ratify with proposed amendments. He believed that the new Constitution would protect commerce and argued that it “had always been the policy of trading nations, to secure to themselves the advantages of their own carrying trade.” The power to regulate commerce, he said, “would greatly increase our navigation—furnish us with a great nursery for seamen—give employment not only to the mechanicks, in constructing the vessels, and the trades dependent thereon.” The benefits of the Constitution would also extend to the farmers, who would fell trees for shipbuilding and find an increased market for agricultural products. In short, the Constitution would “give such a life and spirit to commerce, as would extend it to all the nations of the world.”⁶⁵

The Reverend Thomas Thacher (1756-1812), of Dedham, turned to a general foreign policy argument on February 4, hitting on all possible Federalist arguments. First, he noted affronts to U.S. commerce by foreign nations: “On the one hand, the haughty Spaniard has denied us of the navigation of the river Missi[s]ippi,” he told the convention, “on the other, the British are by extravagant duties ruining our fishery. Our sailors are enslaved by the pirates of Algiers.” American credit was effectively destroyed.⁶⁶ Thacher’s speech marked the only mention of the Mississippi at the Massachusetts convention, as well as one of the few mentions of North African piracy.

Thacher also presented a vision of extreme disunion. Maine already sought to separate from Massachusetts. The former Plymouth colony might wish to do so as well. Other states might similarly break into pieces. These dis-united states would be rendered more vulnerable, he argued: “Now conceive the number of states increased—their boundaries lessened—their interests clashing: How easy a prey to a foreign power!” Foreign powers would eagerly exploit American chaos, given the opportunity. “Will not foreign nations

States—like the gen'rous vine supported live,
The strength they gain is from th'embrace they give
THE FEDERAL PILLARS.



UNITED THEY STAND—DIVIDED FALL.

A vessel arrived at Cape-Ann, after a short passage from Georgia, confirms the pleasing intelligence announced in our last, that that State has unanimously ratified the Federal Constitution. Thus is a **FIFTH PILLAR** added to the glorious fabrick. May Massachusetts rear the **SIXTH**.

As we predicted in our last, so it happened—Monday morning, was ushered in with the ringing of bells in this metropolis, on account of the pleasing intelligence received by Saturday night's mail, that the State of Connecticut had added a **FOURTH PILLAR** to that **GRAND REPUBLICAN SUPERSTRUCTURE**, the **FEDERAL CONSTITUTION**.

attack us in our weak, divided condition, and once more render us provinces to some potentate of Europe? Or will those powers to whom we are indebted lie quiet?"⁶⁷ Fisher Ames (1758-1808), also of Dedham, made a similar point on the dangers of disunion the next day. Massachusetts had foreign policy interests that it could not protect on its own. "What security has this single state against foreign enemies?" Ames asked. "Could we defend the vast country, which the Britons so much desire?"⁶⁸


However, the convention turned not on foreign affairs but on the promise of future amendments. As most of the delegates were silent, it is difficult to measure the effect of the foreign policy argument on them. There is one example. Rufus King classified Charles Turner (1732-1818), a minister from Scituate, as one of the leading Antifederalists.⁶⁹ Samuel Bannister Harding, one of the earliest historians of the convention, considered Turner one of the ablest Antifederalists, although his influence was limited by missing much of the convention from illness.⁷⁰ On February 6, 1788, Turner announced he would vote for ratification. The promise of amendments made him a Federalist, but Turner defended his vote partially on foreign policy grounds:

When...I consider the *deplorable* state of NAVIGATION and COMMERCE, and *various* branches of business thereupon dependent, the *inglorious* and *provoking* figure we make in the eyes of our European creditors...when I also consider *that* state of our *finances* which daily exposes us to become a prey to the despotick humour even of an *impotent* invader...I think it my duty to give my vote in favour of this Constitution.⁷¹

When Turner finished, William Symmes Jr. of Andover joined him in switching sides, citing a fear of disunion.⁷² However, a significant minority remained unpersuaded. That same day, after three weeks of debate, the

Federalist Advertisement (facing page)

The Massachusetts convention was not conducted in isolation. Three states had already ratified the U.S. Constitution by the time the Massachusetts convention began; Georgia and Connecticut soon followed. The advertisement reads: "States – like the gen'rous vine supported live, The strength they gain is from the embrace they give THE FEDERAL PILLS. UNITED THEY STAND – DIVIDED THEY FALL. A vessel arrived at Cape-Ann, after a short passage from Georgia, confirms the pleasing intelligence announced in our last, that the State has unanimously ratified the Federal Constitution. Thus is a FIFTH PILLAR added to our glorious fabrick [sic]. May Massachusetts be the SIXTH."



Federalist Announcement

After impassioned debate, Massachusetts became the sixth state to ratify the U.S. Constitution on Feb. 6, 1788 by a vote of 187-168. The announcement reads: "Boston, Saturday, February 9. The GRAND FEDERAL EDIFICE. With the highest satisfaction we announce to the publick that the Convention of this Commonwealth, on Wednesday at five o'clock, P.M. ASSENTED TO, and on Thursday RATIFIED the CONSTITUTION...."

delegates ratified the Constitution by a vote of only 52.7 percent in favor (187-168).

* * * * *

Turner's conversion speech gives a clue to the impact of foreign affairs on those delegates who did not speak at the convention. Commerce and navigation were not abstract concerns to Turner. The North River, which ran through Turner's home of Scituate, as well as the neighboring towns of Marshfield, Hanover, and Pembroke, had been home to a thriving shipbuilding industry since the early colonial period.⁷³ All of the delegates from those towns voted to ratify.

In his seminal 1973 study, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution*, historian Frederick Mark argued that those most directly connected with foreign policy were more likely to be Federalists; this claim is clearly evidenced in Massachusetts by the roll of towns that voted to ratify.⁷⁴ Commerce and navigation also came into play when considering geography's correlation with votes.

In *Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791* (1972), Van Beck Hall divided the towns of Massachusetts into three groups: great commercial centers, lesser commercial centers, and the least commercial (or most rural) towns.⁷⁵ This split between the commercial and rural towns was the defining characteristic of Massachusetts politics. The four eastern mainland counties of Essex, Suffolk, Plymouth, and Barnstable, including the inland towns, gave the Constitution an overwhelming majority. Essex and Suffolk boasted two of the largest commercial centers in the nation, let alone the state, in Salem and Boston, respectively. Plymouth and Barnstable Counties included a number of commercial centers, as well as a significant amount of fishing and shipbuilding.

As the Boston delegates in particular pointed out, the economic success of inland towns depended on the health of commerce and shipping. This argument resonated with inland towns closer to the large commercial ports. The two delegates from Martha's Vineyard voted to ratify, as did the representatives of coastal Maine, who opposed separation from Massachusetts. The commercial communities of the Connecticut Valley, which were involved in the export of flax to Ireland and of lumber to Connecticut and Rhode Island, also voted to ratify the Constitution.⁷⁶

That maritime trade came into play in the voting is also suggested by the relationship between proximity to water and support for Federalism. Worcester County was the most Antifederalist county, and as historian Samuel Bannister Harding explained in his 1896 study, Worcester's "soil

was touched neither by navigable river nor by an arm of the sea.”⁷⁷ This explains why Dwight Foster’s plea for Massachusetts’ shipping fell on deaf ears in Antifederalist Brookfield. Although the representatives of the seaport towns tried to convince their inland brethren they were part of the same Atlantic economy, it is clear, especially in Worcester County, they did not believe it. Worcester County Antifederalists did not address the foreign policy issue. Rather, according to John L. Brooke’s careful study, *The Heart of the Commonwealth: Society and Political Culture in Worcester County Massachusetts, 1713-1861* (1989), fifty years of suspicion of central authority overrode every other consideration.⁷⁸

Both modern and contemporary observers have noted that the division of cosmopolitan and localist towns was related to the commercial/ rural split. Historian Jackson Turner Main divided Massachusetts into “cosmopolitan” and “localist” towns, with the cosmopolitan towns including the lesser commercial towns.⁷⁹ Contemporaries of the delegates also saw this division. George Richards Minot, the secretary of the convention, observed that “the learned professions, and the men of property” supported the Constitution, while “the great body of middling land holders were opposed to it.”⁸⁰

Similarly, Henry Knox divided the people of Massachusetts into “the Commercial part, of the state,” the great landowners, clergy, lawyers, and army officers, who supported the Constitution, opposed by Maine secessionists and Shaysites, who opposed it.⁸¹ The more cosmopolitan towns, as defined by Main, were mostly Federalist; the least were mainly Antifederalist. Those individuals more likely to have an interest in foreign affairs, as defined by Knox, Minot, and Main, were more likely to be Federalists.

The cosmopolitan/localist split must be refined. It often presumes a contest between national-minded Federalists and parochial Antifederalists. However, the supposedly cosmopolitan Federalists relied on a localist appeal. An appeal to local foreign policy interest was central and vital to the Federalist case. The Federalists in Massachusetts made a foreign policy argument from the standpoint of Massachusetts’ interests. Federalist writers moved from the general issues of national honor and credit to the promotion of local interests, such as the carrying trade, shipbuilding, and the fisheries. Paradoxically, the issue of foreign policy reveals the localist nature of the debate. The issue of the navigation of the Mississippi is conspicuous by its nearly complete absence from the debate in Massachusetts. It is not surprising that both Federalists and Antifederalists ignored the issue. However, the British possession of the border posts and the problem of North African piracy, both of which bolstered the Federalist case, were barely mentioned in the course of debate.

The Federalists were more cosmopolitan in the sense that they were willing to trust local interests to a more powerful and more distant government.

On the question of federal power versus states' rights, the Federalists firmly came down on the side of federal power. The Federalists consistently argued that it could not secure its foreign policy interests either alone or as part of a weak confederacy. The Antifederalist counter-argument, as stated by Samuel Thompson in the convention and James Winthrop outside, was that those local interests might be secured without creating a powerful, centralized government, or that such a government would sacrifice those interests. As much as the Federalists would have preferred to remove localist sentiment from the debate, they were forced to engage it, and in some aspects of the foreign policy debate, embrace it.

HJM

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

State	Convention Vote	Date Ratified
Delaware	30-0	December 1787
Pennsylvania	46-23	December 1787
New Jersey	38-0	December 1787
Georgia	26-0	January 1788
Connecticut	128-40	January 1788
Massachusetts	187-168	February 1788
Maryland	63-11	April 1788
South Carolina	149-73	May 1788
New Hampshire	57-47	June 1788
Virginia	89-79	June 1788
New York	30-27	July 1788
North Carolina	194-77	November 1789
Rhode Island	34-32	May 1790

Notes

¹ Frederick W. Marks III, "Foreign Affairs: A Winning Issue in the Campaign for the Ratification of the United States Constitution," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXXVI no. 3 (September 1971), 460-463. On the role of foreign policy in ratification debates, see Frederick W. Marks III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); David C. Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); and Pauline Maier, *Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010).

² Numa, "Political and Moral Entertainment" VII, *Hampshire Gazette*, September 5, 1787, in *The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States – Massachusetts*, 4 vols. John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, and Charles H. Schoenleber, eds. (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1997-2001), 1:9-11. Hereafter referred to as *DHRC:M*.

³ John DeWitt I, *American Herald*, October 22, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:110, 112-113. Shays' Rebellion was the name given an uprising of central and western Massachusetts farmers against the state government. Frustrated by the state legislature's failure to provide debt relief by issuing paper money and suspending foreclosures and imprisonment for debt, armed groups led by farmer Daniel Shays and others assembled to prevent debtor's courts from convening. The rebellion was quashed in 1787.

⁴ A True American, September 29, 1787 in *DHRC:M* 1:25

⁵ Worcester Spectator, October 18, 1787, in *DHRC:M* 1:105.

⁶ Remarker, December 27, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 2:528

⁷ Letter to the *Independent Chronicle*, October 24, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:44.

⁸ A of Newburyport, October 10, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:66.

⁹ *Massachusetts Centinel*, December 1, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:346.

¹⁰ Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger, 1788, in *DHRC:M*, 2:565.

¹¹ Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands 1780-1813* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 124-131; Jeremy Black, *British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions, 1783-1793* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 137-144.

¹² William Heath diary, October 11, 1787, in William Heath Papers, reel 31, Massachusetts Historical Society.

¹³ One of the People, *Massachusetts Centinel*, October 17, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:85.

¹⁴ A True American, September 29, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:25.

¹⁵ *Worcester Magazine*, October 18, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:107.

¹⁶ Harold A. Innis, *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 220; Raymond McFarland, *A History of the New England Fisheries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 111, 130-131.

¹⁷ Alexander Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery* (Secaucus, N.J.: Castle Books, 1989), 77-79; Edward Byers, *The Nation of Nantucket: Society and Politics in an Early American Commercial Center, 1660-1820* (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), 230-236.

¹⁸ James S. Leamon, *Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 189.

¹⁹ Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts 1783-1860* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), 34; Benjamin W. Labaree, *Patriots & Partisans: The Merchants of Newburyport 1764-1815* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), 42-70.

²⁰ *Boston Gazette*, October 15, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:80.

²¹ One of the Middle-Interest, December 5, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:386-387.

²² *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 8, 1788, in *DHRC:M*, 2:631.

²³ Chesterfield town meeting, October 9, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:59.

²⁴ Dwight Foster, Minutes of an address to the Town of Brookfield, December 17, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 2:941-942.

²⁵ James Duncan Phillips, *Salem and the Indies: The Story of the Great Commercial Era of the City* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 15-70; G. Bhagat, *Americans in India 1784-1860* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 9-11.

²⁶ *Salem Mercury*, October 30, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:173-174.

²⁷ John DeWitt I, *American Herald*, October 22, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:111

²⁸ John Dewitt V, *American Herald*, December 3, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:353.

²⁹ Candidus I, *Independent Chronicle*, December 6, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:396.

³⁰ John Dewitt V, *American Herald*, December 3, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:353-354.

³¹ William Symmes Jr. to Peter Osgood Jr., November 17, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:239-240.

³² William Symmes Jr. to Peter Osgood Jr., November 17, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:241.

³³ Agrippa III, *Massachusetts Gazette*, December 14, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:428.

³⁴ Agrippa VIII, *Massachusetts Gazette*, December 25, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 2:515-516.

³⁵ Agrippa IX, *Massachusetts Gazette*, December 28, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 2:541-542.

³⁶ Agrippa XI, *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 8, 1788, in *DHRC:M*, 2:650.

³⁷ Agrippa XII, *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 15, 1788, in *DHRC:M*, 2:721.

³⁸ Agrippa XIV, *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 25, 1788, in *DHRC:M*, 2:798.

³⁹ Hanno, *Massachusetts Gazette*, November 13, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 1:226.

⁴⁰ Agrippa VII, *Massachusetts Gazette*, December 18, 1787, in *DHRC:M*, 2:484.

⁴¹ Thomas Dawes Jr., January 18, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1245.

⁴² Francis Dana, January 18, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1250.

⁴³ Rufus King, January 18, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1263.

⁴⁴ Thomas Dawes, January 21, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1287.

⁴⁵ Thomas Dawes, January 21, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1288.

- ⁴⁶ Thomas Dawes, January 21, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1288.
- ⁴⁷ Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 87, 152, 159, 171.
- ⁴⁸ Thomas Dawes, January 21, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1288.
- ⁴⁹ Thomas Dawes, January 21, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1289.
- ⁵⁰ Christopher Gore, January 22, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1301.
- ⁵¹ William Phillips, January 22, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1301
- ⁵² William Phillips, January 22, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1301-1302.
- ⁵³ William Phillips, January 22, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1302.
- ⁵⁴ John Choate, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1316.
- ⁵⁵ T.H. Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: A Revolution of the People* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010) 46-50; Leamon, *Revolution Downeast*, 200-205.
- ⁵⁶ Samuel Thompson, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1316.
- ⁵⁷ Samuel Thompson, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1316.
- ⁵⁸ Robert W. Smith, *Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 21-22, 26-27, 44.
- ⁵⁹ Samuel Thompson, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1317.
- ⁶⁰ James Bowdoin, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1317.
- ⁶¹ James Bowdoin, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1318.
- ⁶² James Bowdoin, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1319.
- ⁶³ James Bowdoin, January 23, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1320.
- ⁶⁴ Nathaniel Gorham, January 25, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1353-1354.
- ⁶⁵ Thomas Russell, February 1, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1403-1404.
- ⁶⁶ Thomas Thacher, February 4, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1417.
- ⁶⁷ Thomas Thacher, February 4, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1418-1419.
- ⁶⁸ Fisher Ames, February 5, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1447.
- ⁶⁹ Rufus King to George Thatcher, January 20, 1788, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1546.
- ⁷⁰ Samuel Bannister Harding, *The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896), 66.
- ⁷¹ Charles Turner, February 6, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1472.
- ⁷² William Symmes, February 6, in *DHRC:M*, 3:1474.
- ⁷³ L. Vernon Briggs, *History of Shipbuilding on North River. Plymouth County, Massachusetts, with Genealogies of the Shipbuilders, and Accounts of the Industries Upon its Tributaries, 1640 to 1872* (Boston: Colman Brothers, 1884), 64-76, 260-71, 282-325.
- ⁷⁴ Frederick W. Marks III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 200-106.
- ⁷⁵ Van Beck Hall, *Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), 3.
- ⁷⁶ Robert J. Taylor, *Western Massachusetts in the Revolution* (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1954), 5-7.

⁷⁷ Harding, *Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts*, 100; Roll call of votes in *DHRC:M*, 3:1479-1487.

⁷⁸ John L. Brooke, *The Heart of the Commonwealth: Society and Political Culture in Worcester County Massachusetts, 1713-1861* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 227-228.

⁷⁹ Jackson Turner Main, *Political Parties before the Constitution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 84-86.

⁸⁰ George Richards Minot journal. Massachusetts Historical Society.

⁸¹ Henry Knox to George Washington, January 14, 1788, in George Washington, *The Papers of George Washington: Confederation Series*, 6 vols. W.W. Abbot, ed. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1992-1997), 6:39-40.