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To Secure The Party:

Henry L. Dawes and the Politics of Reconstruction


by Steven J. Arcanti

The struggle between Andrew Johnson and his own party during the winter of 1865-1866 is one of the most analyzed episodes of Reconstruction history. Historical study has tended to focus on Johnson and his most vitriolic Congressional critics. While historians have recognized the importance of moderate Republicans in this struggle, radical Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens have received a disproportionate share of attention.

This essay attempts to redress the imbalance by concentrating on a lesser-known moderate Republican Congressman, Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. One of the organizers of the party in his state, Dawes began his fourth term in December 1865. His tenth Congressional district would continue to elect him to the House until 1875, when the Massachusetts legislature awarded him the Senate seat of the late Charles Sumner.

A party stalwart, Dawes joined in the break with Andrew Johnson in 1866. This essay will attempt to assess the forces that led Dawes to this decision. It is my thesis that the greatest influence on the Congressman was his perception that a break with the Republican president was necessary, paradoxically, in order to preserve a strong Republican party. For Henry Dawes, at least, the future security of the Union depended upon Republican predominance. Events in Washington, the South, and in his own district, would make his course clear.

On April 14, 1865 the news of Lincoln's assassination shocked the nation. Henry Dawes had been a great admirer and a close associate of Lincoln while the prairie lawyer was President.² The day after Lincoln's death Dawes and Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio paid a visit to the new President, Andrew Johnson. Dawes offered to help the President as much as possible. He listened anxiously as Wade told Johnson that Lincoln had had too much of "the milk of human kindness," but that Johnson would surely do justice to the rebels. The President responded "in the same tone, only in sterner language."³



Lincoln's Assassination

Dawes came away from the meeting somewhat disturbed. He feared that Johnson might become the tool of the radical wing of the Republican party. Although he did not look with favor upon the rebels, Dawes judged that Johnson might encourage a split in the Union party⁴ if he allied himself with one wing. He worried to his wife:

The new President thus far deports himself with great propriety—but it is the opportunity of faction and it is making the most of it. . . The attempt is being made to put new men in and inaugurate a new policy.⁵

Despite some apprehensions, the Congressman knew that his duty to his party and his country required support of the President.

Dawes' attitude seemed to reflect public opinion in his home district. The Springfield *Republican*, for instance, came to the President's support almost immediately. Although nagged by his previous indiscretions,⁶ the *Republican* was convinced that Johnson could rise to the occasion. The paper noted:

Mr. Johnson's language has been such as to win the confidence of the country. . . The announcement that he intends no sweeping change of policy, and the fact that the cabinet is to be kept intact, at least for the present, have a reassuring effect. . . ."

Even the rabidly Democratic *Pittsfield Sun* refrained from criticism. It only said that the future looked uncertain, but would depend on Johnson's character and response to Reconstruction issues. The *Sun* did speculate, however, that Johnson would soon return all the Southern states to the Union.⁸

The President had a reputation as a strong unionist and a champion of the common man. When his own state of Tennessee joined the Confederacy, Johnson stood firm in opposition. He had served as a war governor of his state before election to the vice-presidency in 1864. As Wade's remarks indicate, the radicals were confident that Johnson was their man. Yet Johnson remained a mystery.

The only certainty about him appeared to be his attitude toward the former rebels. The *Republican* wrote that the only prominent theme in Johnson's declarations was that "traitors must be punished."⁹ This theme mirrored the attitude of many Northerners,¹⁰ the people of western Massachusetts included. Most desired that the federal government insure that there be no repetition of the Civil War. Northerners wanted assurances of the South's loyalty as a minimum condition of readmission to the Union. The *Republican* reflected this sentiment when it wrote:

What we want is to put the government machinery of the southern states into loyal hands, and, whatever we may hold as to states rights, the general government must make sure of this, otherwise have the sacrifices of the war been in vain.¹¹

The newspaper warned against any compromise that would fail to insure the authority of the national government or the future peace of the country. "It is our right and duty to insist that the restored state governments of the South shall be loyal in form and in substance."¹² The Massachusetts Republican state committee echoed this sentiment in its July 18, 1865 statement on Reconstruction. Calling for "nothing less than absolute guarantees," the committee declared itself in accord with the people. Further, it identified the future safety and security of the nation with the success of the republican party:

But while an organized political force [the Democrats] exists hostile to the principles which have triumphed in the nation, and watching for opportunities to recover its forfeited power, we deem it of vital importance to strengthen and enlarge that organization which has followed patriotic instinct, . . .¹³

This equation of the safety of the Union with the Republican ^{ly} illustrates the deep moral force the Republicans had accumulated as a result of the war. The Republican victory in 1860 had precipitated the secession crisis, and the North's success had been a uniquely Republican victory. The Democrats were fastigated as Copperheads hostile to the triumphant ideals of the North. No Republican could doubt this.¹⁴ Former rebels had to show repentance before they could regain their rights as citizens. Virtually all Republicans were agreed: the federal government must provide guarantees against repetitions and the Southerners must repent. The safety of the government and of the country became equated with the future and success of the Republican party. These were the boundaries within which many Republican politicians operated.

Although the outlook for Reconstruction remained generally optimistic, some disturbing news came out of the South. A July 1, 1865 *Republican* editorial pointed to reports that freedmen in the South were being mistreated. The paper called upon Congress for guarantees stronger than the words of Southern politicians to assure the position of the blacks. While the *Republican* made no brief for universal suffrage, it did fear that a result of the North's victory—the abolition of slavery—might be lost if the former slaves were not protected. The paper was sure, however, that Johnson would pressure the South if necessary. In addition, indications were that the President was not committed to any one Reconstruction policy. He would surely find alternatives if the South did not respond properly.

Northerners had much to celebrate on July 4, 1865. In the western Massachusetts town of Pittsfield, citizens enjoyed a town dinner, attended by Congressman Henry L. Dawes. In response to a toast to the President, Dawes rose to make his first significant public statement on Reconstruction.¹⁵ Dawes affirmed his faith in President Johnson, who was carrying on the work of the martyred Lincoln. On this point Dawes hit hard. Lincoln's great sagacity and experience had produced a weighty Reconstruction plan.

That plan just as then adopted may be found in the subsequent proclamation of President Johnson, . . . So that criticism of this plan is criticism of the wisdom of President Lincoln. . .

Dawes cautioned all to be prudent. "Least of all is there occasion under such circumstances to sound the war cry, or spread distrust in the public mind of those who have carefully wrought out this plan from the most varied experience." He went on to declare the entire social system of the South corrupt.

The whole existing social system, founded in force and violence, is at war with the theory upon which the government is built, and cannot exist under it. This must be uprooted. . . But the means by which that end is to be attained are not so apparent. And in the conflict of opinion that has here arisen charity has found no place.

Warni against dangerous precedent, Dawes opposed excluding Southern states if they failed to grant Negro suffrage. Loyalty was the important qualification. But "if loyal state governments will not be instituted without the extension of suffrage, and I fear they will not, then they must wait."

Vague and somewhat contradictory, Dawes' speech hardly represented a great statement of principles. At the same time it was an excellent political speech. His warnings to Johnson's critics hit a responsive chord considering the generally favorable opinion of the President's policy. The evocation of Lincoln also stirred the audience. At the same time Dawes stood firm on the issue of loyalty, and gave his support to further steps, if necessary, to insure the fealty of the South. Having appeased both points of view, as noted by the *Republican* correspondent "Warrington," Dawes would "have no difficulty in retracing his steps" if he found that he had "made a blunder."¹⁶

As the summer wore on the wisdom of Dawes' speech became more apparent. Bad news from the South continued to upset Northerners. Former rebels poured into Washington to request personal pardons from the President.¹⁷ The *Republican* observed the "Worst Kind of Rebels Applying" for pardons.¹⁸ "Van," its Washington correspondent, wrote that the secessionist spirit was certain to triumph if Southern municipal elections were held at once. Elections bore him out as time and again unrepentant former rebels were elected to office.¹⁹ While the *Republican* generally held to a wait-and-see attitude, one of its correspondents wrote that if the Southerners continued their defiant ways, "it is fair that they should suffer the penalty of their continuacy."²⁰ Also unsettling were continued reports of violence against the freedmen.²¹ "Van" thought the situation hopeless by early August, but retained confidence in Johnson. He was certain that the President would never leave the Southern states "in the hands of traitors." He believed that Johnson and the Republican party agreed on this.²²

Henry Dawes must have felt some apprehension in contemplating the upcoming 39th Congress. The South was behaving badly, and the solution to the problem appeared illusive. At minimum Congress would have to temporarily deny the South representation in the national legislature. Some elements of his party wanted more. Radicals desired to enfranchise the Negro. Dawes doubted that Negro suffrage would be acceptable in the racist atmosphere of the North. "Van" agreed with the Congressman:

Lloyd Garrison said last week to a friend of mine that *he feared* Sumner and the radicals [would] make a *test* of negro suffrage — "if they do" said he "they will be beaten and in the defeat the rebel states will all be rushed in."²³

Samuel Bowles, editor of the Springfield *Republican* and a close associate of Dawes, wrote his opinion:

The elections appear to me to settle affairs, & make clear things. Had the Southern states known how they were to end, I think they would have acted & voted differently. Don't you?²⁴

Dawes was concerned. A dispute among Republicans might divide the party and enable the Democrats to recapture power through the return of the rebel states. The unity of the Republicans remained the paramount concern in the Congressman's mind; as long as the party stuck together the nation was secure.

The reality of political conflict assaulted Dawes when he arrived in Washington in December. Dawes voted with the majority to create a special Congressional committee to consider Reconstruction matters. He did detect an undercurrent of opposition to his own reappointment to the chairmanship of the Committee on Elections and Privileges—from the Boston radicals, he surmised to his wife.²⁵

Whatever the internal divisions of the party, the creation of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction got overwhelming support. The Committee was weighted in favor of moderation, with William Pitt Fessenden of Maine serving as chairman. Empowered to investigate conditions in the South, receive Reconstruction bills and resolutions and to make recommendations to Congress on future Reconstruction matters, the Committee's creation reflected Republican unanimity concerning an active Congressional role in restoring the Union. Some Republicans wanted to state definite terms for the South's readmission, while others wanted to delay, but none, as "Van" noted, favored the repeal of any laws which guaranteed the loyalty of the South.²⁶

The *Republican* thought the creation of the committee was in line with popular opinion. Bowles told Dawes that the people accepted it "quite as you plan." The editor cautioned against overzealous leadership, especially that of Thaddeus Stevens. "Let us be patient and hopeful," he wrote, "I have great faith that things will work well."²⁷ "Van" agreed that formation of the committee represented the will of the people; he further added that Johnson recognized the popular will and would not resist any reasonable proposals.²⁸

As Congress convened in December, 1865, the Republicans seemed united on the issue of securing the loyalty of the South before readmitting Southern representatives, and this stand apparently reflected constituent opinion. Republicans also pictured their party as the guardian and protector of the sacred Union. As to future relations between the Congress and the President, well-placed observers predicted that their differences were negotiable.²⁹ The Springfield *Republican* editorialized that Johnson's severe critics were a hopeless minority; the solidarity of the party seemed assured.³⁰ "Warrington," however, suspected that Johnson was rigidly committed to his Reconstruction plan. He argued that while a split was not inevitable, Congress and the President would clash when the former presented a plan of its own.³¹

The general response to Johnson's annual message was praise and optimism. Moderate in tone, the message nevertheless raised substantive issues which caused concern. The President apparently believed that Reconstruction had been virtually completed. Although he noted that Congress retained the power to admit or exclude its own members, he concluded that the process of Reconstruction was finished. No Republican could accept this; for them the loyalty of the South remained in doubt. Yet the message elicited little criticism from the Republicans at first.³²



Andrew Johnson

But when Congressional Democrats lavished praise on the communication the effect proved devastating, and few Republicans could ignore its impact. If the Democrats liked it, they reasoned, something had to be wrong.³³ Henry Dawes received a letter from Edward R. Tinker, Collector of the Internal Revenue in his district. The Congressman's chief political lieutenant, Tinker constantly kept Dawes informed about his constituents' mood. Tinker expressed disapproval of a New York Republican Congressman's praise of Johnson's message. Tinker told Dawes that "our friends" agreed with the Representative's views: "not to make too much speechmaking, but try & get together by other action." He added:

The Republicans are determined, that this rebellion shall not only be thoroughly suppressed, & the reconstructed states shall guarantee freedom, & equality of laws to all, but are determined sufficient guarantees for their future good behavior shall be had & given.³⁴

The first serious attempt at a legislative program of Reconstruction occurred on January 5, 1866. Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced two bills, an amendment to the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill. Increasing reports of the ill-treatment of Southern freedmen led to both bills. As measures to assist and provide for the freedmen as well as to guarantee their civil rights, both attracted widespread Republican support. Neither proposed Negro suffrage, which had little support in the North at this time. On the other hand the protection of the minimal rights of Southern blacks seemed an inescapable federal responsibility. Both bills involved the crucial issues of security of the Union and preservation of the Northern victory as symbolized by emancipation. The two proposals became the turning point in the relations between President Johnson and the Republican Congress, Henry Dawes included.³⁵

After clearing the Senate, the Freedmen's Bureau Bill passed the House on February 6, 1866. Dawes joined with 135 other Republicans to carry the bill against 32 Democrats and 1 Republican.³⁶ Nearly all Republicans thought that Johnson should and would sign the bill. The Boston *Advertiser* joined other newspapers in agreeing that the President favored the principles involved.³⁷ Dawes, however, sensed trouble. He was disgusted with those members of his party who seemed determined to quarrel with the President, and fearful that Johnson would not disappoint them. He ruefully confided to his wife:

Things look bad politically—There are a few who are determined to have a quarrel with the President, and he is not disposed to disappoint them. There is a foul prospect of a break up.³⁸

Johnson vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill on February 19. His veto message objected to the bill on Constitutional grounds as well as protesting its expediency and expense. The second part of the veto message created the greatest furor. The President declared that further legislation bearing on Reconstruction would be invalid as long as the South remained unrepresented in Congress.³⁹

With small satisfaction Dawes told his wife that he had seen difficulties coming for some time, but he gained peace of mind knowing that he had done nothing to bring them about. He blamed "those furious radical men" for their intractable stands, at the same time recognizing that they would be "hailed by the country as far seeing patriots." Johnson lacked statesmanship and political perception, and "now he acts badly."⁴⁰ Above all Dawes deplored the effect of the veto on the Republican party.

The veto had made the Congress very furious and the war had begun which *can* only end in the general ruin of the party. Madness rules the house and there is no reason at either end of the Avenue. The great fruits of war are to be lost or postponed for a generation.⁴¹

The Union party, preserver and defender of the victory and guardian of the national security, seemed about to split.

On Washington's Birthday Johnson made his famous speech labeling Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner as traitors. He touched off a sensation. Samuel Bowles telegraphed his paper that the President's remarks were "very undignified, ill-tempered and unjust to the North. . . . If printed as delivered it will make reconciliation impossible."⁴² Henry Dawes received the comments of R.A. Chapman, a political associate who wrote that Johnson's remarks were read with disapproval in Boston; many people thought the President must have been drunk. Uncertain that the country would sustain Congress in a fight with the President, Chapman fretted that a division of the Republicans would allow the Democrats and former rebels to capture power.

I hope therefore there will be no hesitation in retracing any rash steps that have been taken, and if the president is bent on going off as I fear he is, let him be clearly in the wrong. . . . Pray don't let the old Copperheads & rebels return to power.⁴³

Arguing that Johnson had united with the South, Samuel Bowles predicted that the President would use his patronage powers to destroy his enemies, and thereby ruin the Republican party.⁴⁴

By mid-March 1866, Henry Dawes predicted that political affairs would drift through the remainder of this Congressional session and come to a crisis in the next.⁴⁵ Johnson's actions pained him. Certain that the security of the nation required stronger safeguards, Dawes nevertheless loathed the tactics of the radicals. His conviction that more safeguards were needed seemed in accord with the demands of his constituents. The Massachusetts House of Representatives had recently sent him copies of its March 14 resolutions affirming the idea that the South should manifest a spirit of loyalty before regaining its seats in Congress.⁴⁶

Dawes hesitated to appear too radical, still smarting from a Pittsfield *Sun* attack. The paper accused Dawes, Chairman of the Elections Committee, of ousting a Democrat from his House seat at the direction of Thaddeus Stevens.⁴⁷ Edward Tinker alerted him to the charges and advised that he correct his image.⁴⁸

The President made it difficult for Dawes to support him. On March 27, Johnson destroyed any such possibility when he vetoed the Civil Rights Bill. Again, Johnson's objections were broad. Dawes recognized that a break was unavoidable. Again, the Congressman found no satisfaction in the course of events. He blamed the radicals for forcing a fight, but censured the President for isolating himself from potential supporters by his rigidity. To his wife, Dawes railed at both sides, wondering if the President was "fool enough or wicked enough, . . . to furnish them [the radicals] with material fuel for the flame, . . ."⁴⁹

The *Republican* placed the blame more squarely on Johnson. The paper

believed that he had imprudently alienated party support, having yielded to the "madness of the hour." The President's vetoes left the party no choice but to desert him rather than compromise the principle of protection of the freedmen and Southern Unionists.

It follows from the suppression of the rebellion—it is clear as a principle of the republican party, as palpable a duty of the national authority, as that two and two make four. The party is nothing, if it does not do this—the nation is dishonored if it hesitates in it.⁵⁰

In the House the necessary two-thirds majority to override the President's veto included 122 Republicans, among them Henry Dawes. Having previously cleared the Senate, the Civil Rights Bill became law on April 9, 1866.

Dawes stood on firm ground in regretting the split with the President. The news began to circulate that Johnson was trying to create a new party. Although a failure, his attempt made for some uneasy moments for many Republicans, again including Henry Dawes. It also convinced any still-wavering Republicans that an alliance with Johnson was out of the question. The President's actions seemed malicious and harmful to the Union, and to the Union party. "Van" doubted that Johnson had traitorous motives, but he nevertheless believed that "in prosecuting his plans he will go over to the enemy."⁵¹

In any new-party threat patronage would be one of the most powerful weapons in Johnson's hands. His control over federal jobs might well be used to build a new coalition or to destroy the Republicans. In his use and threatened use of patronage, Johnson aimed less at the removal of every officeholder than at forcing them to support his policies and through them to gain public support.⁵²

By April 28 "Van" was reporting that Johnson had begun to purge federal offices of his opponents.⁵³ The Pittsfield *Sun* reported similarly on May 3, adding that the Post Office Department had started to withdraw patronage from opposition newspapers.⁵⁴ Dawes was concerned; patronage cemented his own political organization in the 10th district. While the President actually made the appointments, custom had always been to defer to the recommendation of the Congressman. The collapse of this patronage system might end Dawes' political career. Given the perception of the Republican party as the guardian of national security, the toppling of the party structure also implied dire consequences for the Union.

Some of Dawes' political appointees began to waver. Edward Tinker reported that after a recent political dinner, when liquor had loosened tongues, the Assessor of the 10th district began to compliment Johnson and condemn the Republican Congress. Tinker quickly denied that the man spoke for Dawes, and warned the other office-holders present that if Johnson went over to the

Democrat, they would all lose their jobs. He reminded them that they could not expect Dawes to sacrifice his principles and standing in the Republican party for the sake of their jobs, "as that would be asking too much." Tinker seemed to have the situation in the 10th district under control. Tinker added that Henry Chickering, also a Dawes supporter, had decided that a break with Johnson was unavoidable and had resigned himself to losing his job. Tinker concluded his letter by reaffirming his faith in his party's course.

It is going to be such a fight as never has been. But we are going to crush the hosts of hell, come from where they may or in what name. The people of this country are not to be governed by that party who attempted to ruin it.⁵⁵

Tinker's letter illustrates the tremendous devotion and moral force commanded by the Republican party in 1866. Professional politicians like Tinker and Chickering recognized the necessity of sticking to party principles, and sustained their party's break with the President. While these men were willing to surrender their offices, they also believed that the Republican Congress would be upheld. The people would decide against Johnson and the jobs would soon be returned. Johnson could not use patronage to blackmail the Republicans of the 10th district.

Some Republicans wanted Congress to stay in session throughout the summer, lest Johnson totally purge the federal government in their absence. Some feared that Johnson would lead a military coup and become a dictator. Disgusted by what he considered the most absurd ideas ever heard outside a lunatic asylum, Dawes waited for the heat and humidity of a Washington summer to melt the summer-session plan, which it finally did in late July.⁵⁶

Dawes was happy to leave the site of an exasperating political controversy and return home. While he detested the tactics of the radicals, he agreed with his constituents in demanding stronger guarantees of Southern loyalty than Johnson would provide. The vetoes had put Johnson outside the consensus of the Republican party. His moves to destroy the only party that could be trusted to secure the safety of the nation appeared almost traitorous. Dawes had no choice but to oppose the President, and his political lieutenants in the 10th district supported his decision.

Few historians have studied the relationship between political parties and the government during the Civil War and Reconstruction. The importance of maintaining party solidarity may have motivated more than one Republican. For Henry Dawes, securing the Republican party meant saving the Union from the Democrats and their rebel friends. It meant securing the Union itself.

1 Dawes' district encompassed the extreme western part of the state. All Berkshire and Hampden and part of Franklin counties were included. The largest city by 1865-66 was Springfield.

2 "The Reconstruction Period," an oration, Chapter IA, p. 1, Folder I, Box 48, Henry L. Dawes Papers, Library of Congress.

3 *Ibid.*

4 At this time the terms "Republican" and "Union" were used interchangeably to describe the party of Lincoln.

5 Henry Dawes to Electa Dawes, April 17, 1865, Box 13 Dawes Papers.

6 Due to the combined effects of illness and liquor, Johnson had delivered a rambling and incoherent speech at his March 1865 Vice-Presidential inauguration. Many thought him drunk.

7 Springfield (Weekly) *Republican*, April 22, 1865. Samuel Bowles edited this and the Daily *Republican*. Since both papers followed the same editorial policies, I will distinguish between them only in the footnotes.

8 Pittsfield *Sun*, April 20 and April 27, 1865.

9 Springfield (Weekly) *Republican*, April 22, 1865.

10 Eric McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago, 1960) discusses the mood of the North, pp. 15-41.

11 Springfield (Weekly) *Republican*, April 15, 1865.

12 Springfield (Daily) *Republican*, September 7, 1865.

13 Text of state Committee's statement in *ibid.*, July 22, 1865.

14 McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, pp. 43-48, discusses morality of the War and the Democratic and Republican parties.

15 Text of the July 4 speech in Springfield (Daily) *Republican*, July 19, 1865.

16 *Ibid.*, "Warrington" was William S. Robinson, Boston correspondent and Clerk of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

17 Although most rebels had been granted a general pardon, certain classes, including former Confederate political leaders, were accepted and had to apply for special pardons from the President.

18 Springfield (Daily) *Republican*, July 20, 1865.

19 *Ibid.*, July 29, 1865. Michael Perman, *Reunion Without Compromise: The South and Reconstruction 1865-1868* (New York 1973) studies post-war of the South.

20 Springfield (Daily) *Republican*, August 2, 1865.

21 Reports reprinted in *ibid.*, August 22, 1865.

22 *Ibid.*, August 5, 1865. "Van" was D.W. Bartlett, Dawes' clerk on the Committee on Elections and Privileges.

23 D.W. Bartlett to Henry Dawes, October 19, 1865, Box 19, Dawes Papers.

24 Samuel Bowles to Henry Dawes, November 21, 1865, *ibid.*

25 Henry to Electa Dawes, December 4, 1865, Box 13, Dawes Papers.

26 Springfield (Daily) *Republican*, December 9 and 15, 1865.

27 Samuel Bowles to Henry Dawes, December 7, 1865, Box 19, Dawes Papers.

28 Springfield (Daily) *Republican*, December 9, 1865.

29 See "Van's" optimism, *ibid.*, December 13, 1865.

30 *Ibid.*, December 14, 1865.

31 *Ibid.*, December 7, 1865.

32 See McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, pp. 254-58.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 257-58. Not all Democrats were traitors, though many people, especially Republican Congressman, thought so. See Richard O. Curry, "The Union As It Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretation of the 'Copperheads'" *Civil War History*, XIII, (March 1967), 25-39.

34 Edward Tinker to Henry Dawes, January 13, 1866, Box 19, Dawes Papers.

35 McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, pp. 274-325.

36 Congressional *Globe*, 39th Congress, 1st Session, February 6, 1866, p. 688.

37 See McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* p. 284 f27.

38 Henry to Electa Dawes, February 1, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.

39 Veto message in Edward McPherson, *The Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction* (New York, 1969) pp. 68-72.

40. Henry to Electa Dawes, February 20, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.
41. Henry to Electa Dawes, February 22, 1866, *ibid.*
42. Quoted in the *Pittsfield Sun*, March 1, 1866.
43. R.A. Chapman to Henry Dawes, February 24, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.
44. Reprinted in *Pittsfield Sun*, March 8, 1866.
45. Henry to Electa Dawes, March 16, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.
46. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1866* (Boston, 1866), pp. 208-210.
47. *Pittsfield Sun*, March 15, 1866.
48. Edward Tinker to Henry Dawes, March 30, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.
49. Henry to Electa Dawes, March 31, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.
50. *Springfield (Weekly) Republican*, April 7, 1866.
51. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1866.
52. Michael Les Benedict in *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York, 1973), pp. 46-49, argues that after Johnson began to use patronage power Republican officeholders began to fall in line. My conclusion about the 10th Massachusetts district differs from this thesis.
53. *Springfield (Weekly) Republican*, April 28, 1866.
54. This patronage came in the form of contracts to publish federal statutes and other government announcements, and to print copies of these for public distribution.
55. Edward Tinker to Henry Dawes, March 30, 1866, Box 19, Dawes Papers; for a similar expression see Tinker to Dawes, May 21, 1866, *ibid.*
56. *Springfield (Weekly) Republican*, June 9, 1866; Henry to Electra Dawes, July 12 and 14, 1866, Box 13, Dawes Papers.

Greek Immigrants In Springfield

1884 - 1944

by: George T. Eliopoulos

In 1821, the Greek Revolution began against the oppressive Turkish Empire. Long before the Greek immigrants had arrived in Springfield, they received the sympathy of the Springfield press. The *Hampden Patriot*, an early Springfield newspaper, reported a meeting at Peabody assembly hall on December 13, 1823.¹ The meeting was held to pledge support for Greek freedom and independence. The participants claimed that Greek emancipation was of utmost importance to all free people everywhere.² Springfield continued to express its sympathy for Greece throughout the entire war. When America celebrated its independence on July 4, 1824, Dr. A. J. Miller of Springfield composed a poem in honor of the memory of Lord Byron, himself a poet and a hero of the Greek Revolution.³ Another mass meeting in support of Greece was held in 1827. O. B. Morris presided, and Reverend Bezaleel Howard pledged arms and ammunition for the Greeks in their fight against Turkish tyranny.⁴ Samuel Bowles, editor of the *Republican*, wrote at this time: "We revert to affairs of Greece as of first importance to the cause of freedom and liberty."⁵

Although Americans had sympathized with the Greeks since early in the 19th century, it was not until the 1880's that Greeks began to filter into the area. Those who came to America did so for many reasons. First, Greece was always a poor country. The difficulty of scratching out a meager living on the rocky soil of Greece led a number of Greeks to seek a better way of life. The Greek immigrants who came to Springfield were not only from Greece proper; many came from Eastern Thrace, Asia Minor, Crete, Northern Epirus, and the Aegean Islands.

Eleftherios Pilalas was the first Greek in Springfield, but the exact date of his arrival is not known.⁶ He apparently came around 1884, however. He lived on Calhoun Street and worked at the Kibbe Company candy factory. After a few years, he became manager for the Kibbe Candy Company on Harrison Avenue. When other Greeks began to arrive, Pilalas was instrumental in bringing them to the Kibbe Company as employees. He later purchased Vaughan's Candy