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# **Blackinton: A Case Study of Industrialization 1856-1876**

**Elizabeth Allegret Baker**


Blackinton was a small manufacturing community in the northern Berkshire hills, situated in parts of North Adams and Williamstown, Massachusetts. Dominated for most of the 19th century by a single industry, the flourishing village was considered by the local press and visiting dignitaries to be a model of industrial prosperity, harmony, and charm. But in October 1876, the industrial harmony was shattered. Six hundred woolen workers went on strike. Confined at first to the Blackinton mill, the strike expanded to two other woolen mills in North Adams, also controlled by Sanford Blackinton. The strike lasted three and one-half weeks, and was, according to a local resident, "the topic of North Adams."<sup>1</sup> And well it might be, for that strike was the only instance of significant protest in the history of the Blackinton woolen mill. This paper aims to explain the reasons for the 1876 strike and in so doing to examine the organization and culture of the Blackinton mill workers.<sup>2</sup>

Much has been written about the introduction in 1870 of seventy-five Chinese laborers into a North Adams shoe factory to break the hold of the militant shoeworkers' union, the Knights of St. Crispin.<sup>3</sup> International attention was focused on North Adams with the completion of the Hoosac Tunnel through the Berkshire Mountain in 1873, a feat of engineering and a political boondoggle which took 196 lives and twenty years to complete.<sup>4</sup> But there is little in the extensive literature of the New England textile industry which touches on the woolen mills of Berkshire County, historically overshadowed by the larger mills of eastern Massachusetts and geographically isolated from Boston and the Atlantic seaports. The Blackinton mill, one of the largest in Berkshire County, may serve as a case study of industrial revolt during a time of social change.

My analysis of rebellion centers on the theories of Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward.<sup>5</sup> Two central questions are raised: what conditions are necessary for protest to emerge? When protest does occur, how is it influenced by the social and historical context? Turning to the first question, two pre-conditions of protest seem crucial: the existing institutional arrangements must be perceived as both wrong and subject to redress, and realistic options must be seen as available for protest. In answering the second question, the following three criteria must be

taken into account: the community's world view, its legitimizing notions and moral assumptions; the group's social norms, the socially appropriate ways of behaving according to age, sex, social class, ethnicity, and the group's social resources or organization, including the collective or dispersed nature of every day life.

Sanford Blackinton's woolen mill began in 1821 on the banks of the Hoosic River. For the next thirty-five years it grew slowly in size and production. By 1856 its operations had become large enough to need a bookkeeper, and Oscar Archer, a schoolteacher from upstate New York, was hired. Archer was a symbol of change for the mill. His presence marked the first extension of management. He instituted double entry bookkeeping and a regular pay day every three months, replacing the old system of running accounts at the Blackinton company store.<sup>6</sup>



Sanford Blackinton, from the *History of Berkshire County* (New York, 1885).

Apart from a brief lull in production caused by the Panic of 1857, the three years before the Civil War saw both the woolen company and the entire textile industry of North Adams working at full capacity.<sup>7</sup> This prosperity, however, was but prologue to the boom years created by the Civil War. Fed by government contracts for blue wool army cloth, production at Sanford Blackinton's woolen mill soared. For six months between October 1861 and March 1862, the mill ran night and day to keep up with the orders which poured into the company's office. At its peak, the mill made nearly \$1000 every day during the war. Additions were made to the mill; more tenement houses were built. In 1862 a railroad depot was opened at Blackinton. In 1863 new machinery was added which increased the capacity of the mill by twenty-five percent. By 1864, when the Blackinton Woolen Company was the largest in Berkshire County, it had exactly doubled its 1859 production capacity.<sup>8</sup>

By this time Sanford Blackinton had become a rich man. His personal income of \$51,200 in 1865 was one of the three highest in Berkshire County. As president of the newly formed North Adams Woolen Company, in 1864 he bought a second woolen mill in the village of Braytonville, near Blackinton, and in 1868 added a third woolen mill at the Glen, a nearby section of North Adams.<sup>9</sup>

The dramatic growth of the Blackinton Company during the Civil War and the years after would not have been possible, however, without the expansion of the railroad. The first rail connections from Boston to Berkshire County came to Pittsfield in 1841. Five years later a connecting spur was built from Pittsfield to North Adams (with Sanford Blackinton one of the original investors).<sup>10</sup> The importance of this link to Boston is reflected by the fact that the population of North Adams nearly doubled in that decade.<sup>11</sup> The next step in railroad expansion was the proposed northern connection from Boston to Troy, New York. To overcome the major obstacle to this plan, a tunnel was to be blasted through the mountain between Greenfield and North Adams. The first segment of the railway between North Adams and Troy was completed in 1859.<sup>12</sup> Now the products of North Adams' manufacturers could be shipped directly to the West, thus eliminating the longer and more costly route through Pittsfield. Again the population jumped; between 1860 and 1870, North Adams nearly doubled again in size.<sup>13</sup>

But it took the long-awaited completion of the tunnel in 1873 for North Adams to become a major center of commerce and manufacturing. Shipping costs of wool and coal decreased dramatically as a result of the direct rail connection which now included Boston as well as the West. By 1880, 125 freight trains a day came through North Adams, and Blackinton was in need of a new depot.<sup>14</sup> And in 1876 successful manufacturers like Sanford Blackinton knew that the tunnel would mean increased productivity for their factories and they were preparing to take advantage of it.

The expansion of railroad lines not only sparked the export of locally manufactured goods but also facilitated the import of immigrant labor into the factories of North Adams. Into the Blackinton Woolen Company came immigrant workers from Wales. Although it is difficult to document the exact number of Welsh workers at Blackinton in the period covered by this study, one can surmise from various sources that the Welsh were a significant portion of the workforce by 1875.<sup>15</sup> It seems likely that a fair number were skilled workers.<sup>16</sup>

When the Welsh did arrive in Blackinton, which in 1872 was a village of 700 residents, they came as families.<sup>17</sup> Housing for the workers, unlike the boarding house arrangement of Lowell, was in two-family tenements, built and owned by the company, and rented to the employees.<sup>18</sup> The mill employed more men than women, which was true of the woolen industry as a whole. Supervisory positions were all held by men, while more than half the weavers were women.<sup>19</sup> Of the 300 employees at Blackinton in 1869, perhaps a dozen were in supervisory positions. These included an overseer or "boss" for each of the production divisions of the factory: the wool sorting house, the dye house, the carding, spinning, and weaving rooms, and the finishing room. Overseers were paid much more than the operatives who worked under them and usually in proportion to the productivity of their departments.<sup>20</sup>

The superintendent of the mill coordinated and supervised all phases of production and was included when management decisions were made to run the mill on reduced time.<sup>21</sup> Archer, at first only the firm's bookkeeper, gradually assumed the role of spokesman for the owner in dealing with the operatives. But there was never any doubt about who was boss. Sanford Blackinton personally ruled over his entire domain. Even after he moved from the village of Blackinton in 1872 into an impressive mansion in North Adams, he continued to make daily rounds of the mill, inspecting the finished cloth, pinpointing causes of technical problems, reprimanding recalcitrant workers, and frequently leaving one of his walking canes in some corner of the mill as tangible evidence of his rule.<sup>22</sup> But the mill workers did not always accept Sanford's rule. Sometimes they rebelled. From this historical record it appears that at least five episodes of protest occurred from 1858 to 1876. The first of these took place in April 1858. In October of 1857 as a result of the Panic, the mill at Blackinton began running on reduced time.<sup>23</sup> This was a common practice during slumps in manufacturing. Instead of running a normal work day of twelve or thirteen hours, the Blackinton mill operated only nine hours.<sup>24</sup> Production was thereby reduced, and so, of course, were wages.

When the mill returned to full time operation on the first of April, 1858, the operatives at Blackinton staged a brief strike for their former wage rates.<sup>25</sup> The *Adams Transcript*, however, vigorously denied the existence of a strike at Blackinton, calling it a "rumor." The weavers had only inquired about their wages with the resumption of full-time work, explained the *Transcript*. There was no strike.<sup>26</sup> Whether or not a strike actually did take place, this incident was the first protest on record for Blackinton.

The next example of collective action by the workers took place at the end of the Civil War in 1865 and concerned the length of the working day. Although some progress had been made toward a reduction of hours of labor in Lowell and Lawrence, Berkshire County textile operatives were still working twelve to thirteen hours a day.<sup>27</sup> In September 1865, employees of cotton and woolen mills throughout Berkshire County were holding meetings and petitioning their employers for a reduction of hours to eleven per day. The *Transcript*, this time in support of the operatives' demands, equated the longer hours of labor with slavery and announced that "free labor slavery in the North is going the same road as slave labor in the South, as an inevitable consequence of the abolishment of the latter." Within a week, most of the mill owners in North Adams, including Blackinton, had agreed to the eleven-hour day.<sup>28</sup>

A near-strike occurred at Blackinton in November 1873. The background is similar to the disputed strike of 1858. Following a financial crash in October 1873, the Blackinton mill began running on half time. The workers accepted this time reduction, but when another change was announced a few weeks later, they protested. Now the mill would run full time again but with a 12½ percent cut in wages. A meeting of operatives was called to discuss strike action, a vote was taken, and the decision was made to "turn out." But Archer, who also attended the meeting, informed the workers of the financial plight of the company and warned them that "if they turned out they would probably stay out." Duly "impressed with the idea that they had gone too far," in Archer's words, the operatives went back to work at the 12½ per cent reduction.<sup>29</sup>

By January 1876, the full effects of the Panic of 1873 had reached western Massachusetts. As early as November 1875, some local mills had instituted ten percent wage reductions, and on January 1, 1876, so did Blackinton. This time the operatives, led by the weavers, struck immediately, and on January 3 the mill was shut down.<sup>30</sup> There had been some trouble before the strike. The previous September there was a change of superintendents at both the Blackinton and Braytonville mills. At Blackinton, the superintendent retired after seventeen years and was replaced by someone from Connecticut. The new superintendent at Braytonville was a man named Penniman, a long-time employee of Sanford Blackinton's son. There must have been some resentment of Penniman, as in December his barn was burned and it was thought to be arson. He was also thought by the mill workers to be responsible for the ten percent wage reduction at Blackinton in January.<sup>31</sup>

The January wage reduction, coming at a time when the workers, according to Archer, thought the mill to be profitable, was the immediate issue underlying the strike. For the first four days, the strikers were "sullen and mean" and appeared determined to "stick it out." Some of the workers, however, were discouraged and had left Blackinton to return to Wales. By the fifth day, January 7, there was talk of going back to work. On the sixth day of the strike, a Saturday, the strikers held a meeting and sent a delegate to discuss terms with Sanford Blackinton. Sanford, who was prepared to close the mill altogether until April, refused to compromise. The strikers met again and this time voted to return to work the following Monday, even with the existing wage cut.<sup>32</sup> Only a few weavers came to work on that Monday, however, and now Archer was angry. He threatened to fire all those who stayed away and the next day, January 11, the strike was over. It had lasted eight days, the longest strike so far at Blackinton.<sup>33</sup>

North Adams continued to experience the hard times of the economic depression throughout the spring and summer of 1876. It is not surprising, then, that in April Sanford Blackinton had put his three woolen mills—Blackinton, Braytonville, and the Glen—on half time.<sup>34</sup> Further reductions followed. In June, wage cuts of ten percent for day laborers and fifteen percent for weavers were announced. July brought a change of orders: the mill was to run on three-quarters time, including an additional forty-five minutes a day, for straight three-quarters pay.<sup>35</sup> There was much opposition to this work plan. Several times the workers at Blackinton asked the superintendent to present their case to Sanford, but nothing happened. Finally, on October 20, they took action. After working eight and three-quarters hours—the number of hours for which they were getting paid—they walked out, demanding exact three-quarters time for three-quarters wages. They were immediately discharged and the mill was closed. Within a week the operatives at Braytonville and the Glen were also on strike. At issue in this strike, as it had been in January, was the belief of the workers that times had improved enough to warrant normal wages. Furthermore, they had very real grievances concerning wage levels. Day laborers, for example, who had earned only a dollar a day before, were now down to seventy-five cents for nearly a day's work.

Sanford Blackinton was intransigent. His only concession was to grant the strikers two or three weeks in which to return to work under the existing schedule, or he would simply close down the mills for the winter. He then announced that those strikers living in company houses were to be evicted and that the factory stores were not to give credit to the strikers. He refused even to communicate with a committee of strikers as long as they stayed away from work. Instead, he and Archer

sat “cooly by and let them sweat” and proceeded with some necessary repairs to the mill.<sup>36</sup>

Despite—or perhaps because of—the punitive measures taken against them, this time the workers reacted collectively and defiantly. Some did leave town to find work elsewhere, but many others, especially those with families, were too deeply in debt from the months of reduced wages to be able to leave. A committee was organized to get aid from neighboring towns, and two weeks into the strike, they still voted against returning to work. Angered by the fact that the overseer of the finishing room continued to work during the strike, they set fire to his barn and haystack.

The strike, which was “the topic of North Adams,” was also the topic of the Sunday sermon at Blackinton’s Union Church on November 5. The church, donated to the village in 1871 by Sanford Blackinton, was non-denominational and was attended by most of the village’s residents, including the Archer family. (The Blackintons, however, went to the Baptist Church in North Adams.) On that Sunday, the sermon, given by a Dr. Arrable, was “calculated to encourage our strikers,” according to Archer, who was both surprised and “sorry he should preach such a sermon.”<sup>37</sup> Dr. Arrable’s message must have been especially troublesome to Archer in view of the fact that church attendance, strikers included, was particularly large during the strike.

Even the *Adams Transcript* which was usually business-oriented, showed some concern for the workers’ issues. But although “deep interest” was expressed in “an amicable adjustment of these difficulties,” the *Transcript* felt obliged to point out that as Mr. Blackinton had always been kind and just in the past, the operatives should now “act wisely and not rashly.”<sup>38</sup> The strikers stayed out for three and one-half weeks—even longer than Sanford had granted them—before coming back to work. With a promise from Sanford that wages would improve when times were better, the employees of the three mills returned to work for the same rate of pay against which they had rebelled. Full wages and full time work were not restored before April of 1877.<sup>39</sup>

A review of the five events described above suggests that the recurrent theme in each of the strikes was a wage reduction during times of economic depression. But to conclude that the woolen workers protested only because they wanted more money is to underestimate the complexity of human behavior. To understand that complexity, a theoretical analysis of the revolts is in order. The primary “existing institutional arrangement” for the mill workers of Blackinton was the mill itself. The structure of work was characterized by the paternal relationship between Sanford Blackinton and the workers. The roles of dominance and subordination were recognized by all concerned as part of an implicit social contract; Sanford assumed the responsibility for the welfare of the workers and the workers, in return, were obliged to give him their “loyal labor.”<sup>40</sup>

A workplace organized in the paternalistic model exercised authority by what Richard Edwards calls a system of simple control. Typical of the early stages of capitalistic development, this type of organization was controlled by a single powerful entrepreneur who maintained close personal contact with all the workers and supervised all the overseers. Because workers were reluctant to break the personal ties with the entrepreneur, opposition to his authority was difficult.<sup>41</sup>

Sanford Blackinton's mill epitomized simple or entrepreneurial control. His contact with the workers went beyond the mill and extended into every sphere of their lives. They lived in houses owned by Sanford Blackinton and bought all their provisions at the Blackinton store. They read the books he approved of in the mill's library and attended the church he had given them. Their children went to the school he had built, and when workers died, they were buried in the Blackinton cemetery. He was recalled by Archer as a man who was "kind and considerate with all employees who did faithful work" but had "no patience with shirks."<sup>42</sup>

The brief protest of 1858 was the first time the "faithful" workers were defiant. They had thought they would receive full wages when the mill went back on full time and expressed discontent when wages remained unsettled. Thus the existing arrangement was seen as wrong. But when Sanford Blackinton blamed their lowered wages on the economic crisis, they were convinced that their grievance was not subject to redress. Furthermore, the low wages appeared to be the consequence of "natural disaster" and not caused by him. Given those conditions, according to Cloward and Piven, people are more likely to endure than to resist.<sup>43</sup>

The successful protest in 1865 over the hours of work came at a time when North Adams was still enjoying the economic prosperity resulting from the Civil War. In addition, with the recent abolition of slavery the nation's economic system was now referred to as a "free-labor" system. The notion that free-labor could generate "wage-slaves"—wage earners with no productive property of their own—was an ideological dilemma and a paradox to radical reformers and factory owners alike.<sup>44</sup> The economic conditions at that time created a climate favorable to change and a solution to the dilemma. These conditions are precisely the kind of "historical circumstance" which Piven and Cloward have suggested may result in concessions to protesters.<sup>45</sup> Thus the workers' rapid victory was made possible by the historical circumstances of a good economic period and a supportive post-Civil War ideology.

By the time of the near-strike in 1873, a sense of solidarity was emerging in the work force at Blackinton, a solidarity based on the increasing number of Welsh workers and on their common experience in the mill. The mill workers had defined a work ethic—a social norm—for themselves. Unlike the industrial entrepreneur, who believed in hard work for its moral and financial rewards, they believed that the rate of pay for work should be in equal proportion to the hours worked. The actual amount of money earned was of less importance than the equitable balance of "fair pay to fair day." Thus they would comply with the order to work half time for half pay but they rebelled at working full time at a 12½ percent wage reduction, even though the latter arrangement would have meant more money in their pockets.

In the near-strike of 1873, the workers wavered between reacting collectively and defiantly to their discontent and yielding to paternal persuasion. Archer's presence at the strike meeting, however, seems to have tipped the decision in favor of paternalism. The old bonds of personal contact, apparent in their relationship with Archer as Sanford's deputy, were still strong enough to prevent them from rebelling. They accepted Archer's explanation of the company's financial difficulties as a "disaster" to be endured and they went back to work.

In 1876 there were two strikes at Blackinton. In a sense it was a year of discontent, as the issues of the first strike in January were not resolved and they overlapped



with those of the October strike. Both strikes were marked by a continued economic depression in North Adams and were triggered by wage reductions. And both strikes were in part made possible by a new set of historical circumstances.

The death in 1875 of William Blackinton, Sanford's only son, came when Sanford, now seventy-eight years old, expected to turn the business over to his son. William's death caused a disruption in the organization of the company which was not resolved for over a year. In addition, the change of superintendents in two of Sanford's three mills further jolted the company's customary operation. The combination of these events resulted in a weakening of authority and control in the Blackinton Company. This "breakdown in social controls," according to Cloward and Piven, is a historical circumstance which encourages protest to erupt.<sup>46</sup>

And it did erupt. The burning of Penniman's barn in December reflected the resentment and frustration the workers felt toward him as the messenger of change. When the wage cut was announced in January, they responded immediately to the violation of their work ethic by striking. Even after the vote was taken to end the strike, it was a day later before they all agreed to go back to work. Although the workers did not succeed in terms of wages, the strike enriched their repertoire of social resources, setting a precedent for future strike action by giving the workers the experience of organizing to act out their defiance collectively.

Worker solidarity which was beginning to develop at Blackinton in 1873 had expanded to the mills at Braytonville and the Glen by 1876. These three mills shared ownership, working conditions, and proximity. The most important bond, however, was the workers' shared ethnicity, as a large proportion of Sanford Blackinton's workforce came from Wales—and apparently all from the same small town in northern Wales. Although the Welsh immigrants spoke English rather than the native Celtic language, they joined together in other cultural experiences. In times of hardship they collected funds for local Welsh families in distress. Ties to their native country were maintained by visits back to Wales, while one person sent a regular column of Blackinton news to the local Welsh newspaper.<sup>47</sup> Drawing on an old Welsh tradition of choral singing, they had formed two glee clubs by 1876. There was even a Welsh temperance organization in Blackinton. Their ethnic unity, reinforced by solidarity at work and their collective action in January, became, in Alan Dawley's words, "tools of historical experience" which enabled them to unite in revolt against Sanford Blackinton in October 1876.<sup>48</sup>

There was also another, less visible struggle taking place in 1876. This conflict was grounded in what E.P. Thompson calls the "moral economy" of a community, those essential facts and traditions which determine its notions of legitimacy and justice.<sup>49</sup> The rights and obligations attached to paternalism played an important role in the moral economy of the Blackinton community. but during this year of discontent, the legitimacy of the moral economy was in question and in October, the conflict came into sharp focus. On one side of the conflict were the workers, increasingly dissatisfied with the wage reductions and working conditions. They turned to the paternal notion of justice and asked to see Mr. Blackinton, presuming that if he heard them out, he would respond to their grievances. But Sanford, from the other side, dealt with them only through the superintendent of the mill and would not see them in person. This was clearly in violation of Sanford's obligation to assure the welfare of the workers, according to the social contract. If he would not honor the implicit contract, neither would the workers. They stopped

being loyal and obedient, thus also violating their paternal obligations, and they went on strike. In the manner of E.P. Thompson, an outrage to their moral assumptions had provoked action.<sup>50</sup>

The workers' strike was, in fact, provoked by a combination of three outrages to their notions of justice. First of all, the wage cuts in June and July were, as before, an affront to their work ethic. Next, their belief that the mill had become profitable again in October challenged the legitimacy of the wage cuts; there was no longer a natural disaster to be endured. But what seems to have been the final straw was that they were not able to present their grievances to Sanford Blackinton themselves. Having had to rely on the superintendent as intermediary, they felt that their issues were not fairly represented and that therefore Sanford did not understand their position.

An assessment of the financial gains and losses from the October strike would award the victor's crown to Sanford Blackinton. But if success is measured by less tangible results, the workers were not defeated. The October strike showed the workers that they could no longer rely on Sanford's personal attention and paternal authority to resolve grievances of work in their behalf. But the strike showed them that they had resources and tools of their own. They had strength in collective solidarity and were quick to punish the overseer who broke their unity by continuing to work during the strike. They had a powerful tool for bargaining with Sanford: he needed the workers. He would not have allowed them to stay out for so long if there had been replacements readily available. These workers were skilled workers, and it seems likely that Sanford, with an eye toward the future, did not want to be caught short when the tunnel began to generate additional business. And finally, the workers had community support, evident in the minister's sermon at the community church and in the more even-handed treatment by the newspaper.

The period covered in this study was a time of transition. From 1856, when the first protest appeared at Blackinton, until 1876, when the Blackinton mill workers marked this transition with a significant strike, there was a gradual shift away from the traditional assumptions of paternalism and toward more assertive and independent work relationships. The old moral economy, based on paternal rights and obligations and the absolute authority of the entrepreneur, collided with a new standard of legitimacy in which the workers would have the right to bargain for the terms of their own work but would also have the obligation to take care of themselves. How far they could go and how well they would do is not in the scope of this paper.

#### NOTES

1. Oscar A. Archer, Diary, 1869-1880, personal collection of Carol F. Morse, Cold Spring, N.Y.
2. For a more extensive analysis, see the original manuscript from which this paper is drawn: Elizabeth A. Baker, *Blackinton, Massachusetts: A Case Study of Industrialization 1865-1876*, unpublished Master of Arts thesis. (On file at Manhattanville College, Purchase, N.Y.; North Adams State College and North Adams Public Library, North Adams, Massachusetts.)

3. See, for example, Frederick Rudolph, "Chinamen in Yankeedom: Antiunionism in Massachusetts in 1870," *American Historical Review* *LIII* (October 1947), 1-29.
4. William A. Carney, *A Berkshire County Sourcebook* (Pittsfield, Mass., 1976), pp. 152-56.
5. The theories which follow are from Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York, 1977); also Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "Hidden Protest: The Channeling of Female Innovation and Resistance," *Signs* *IV* (Summer 1979), 651-69.
6. O.A. Archer, "The Story of the Blackinton Mill," *North Adams Evening Transcript*, 26 Apr 1905.
7. *Adams Transcript*, 4 Sept 1858; 30 Aug 1860.
8. *Hoosac Valley News and Transcript*, 26 Sept, 30 Oct 1861; 9 Jan, 20 Mar, 24 Apr, 8 May 1862; Archer, "Story;" *News and Transcript*, 9 June, 8 Dec 1864.
9. *Adams Transcript*, 26 July 1866; 9 Jan 1868; *News and Transcript*, 21 July 1864.
10. Carney, *Sourcebook*, pp. 152-53; *Adams Transcript*, 21 June 1860.
11. The population rose from 3639 in 1840 to 6172 in 1850. From Rudolph, "Chinamen," p. 3.
12. J.E.A. Smith, *History of Berkshire County, Massachusetts, With Biographical Sketches of the Prominent Men* (New York: 1885), I, pp. 442-450.
13. The population rose from 6924 in 1860 to 12,090 in 1870. Francis A. Walker, Superintendent of Census, *Compendium of the Ninth Census of the United States 1870* (Washington, 1872).
14. *Adams Transcript*, 15 July, 26 Aug, 30 Sept 1880; 3 June 1881.
15. See Francis Dewitt, Secretary of the Commonwealth, *Census of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1855* (Boston, 1857); Oliver Warner, Secretary of the Commonwealth, *Abstract of the Census of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1865* (Boston, 1867); Carroll D. Wright, *Census of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1875*, Vol. I, (Boston, 1876); Massachusetts, *Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor for 1870*, (Boston, 1870), p. 389; Massachusetts, *Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor for 1871*, (Boston, 1871), p. 291; *Adams Transcript*, 3 June 1869; Archer, *Diary*, 6 June 1871, 24 Jan, 6 May 1873.
16. The Welsh came from Newtown, North Wales, a town with a number of woolen mills. It was common during this period for American manufacturers to import skilled British labor to work in American textile mills. Sanford Blackinton followed this practice and, in fact, recruited workers himself when he took trips abroad.
17. *Adams Transcript*, 18 Apr 1872.
18. *Ibid.*, 17 Sept 1850; see also 17 Jan 1878 for a description of mill housing in Williamstown similar to that in Blackinton.
19. *Adams Transcript*, 28 Dec 1871; Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, *Report for 1870*, p. 389; Judith A. McGaw, "'A Good Place to Work.' Industrial Workers and Occupational Choice: The Case of Berkshire Women," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *X* (Autumn 1979), 227-48.
20. Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, *Report for 1870* and *Report for 1871*; Archer, "Story;" Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Rockdale: The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1978), p. 387.

21. Archer, Diary, 25 Oct 1873.
22. Archer, "Story." Sanford Blackinton's mansion is now the North Adams Public Library.
23. *Weekly Transcript*, 1 Oct 1857.
24. Archer, "Story."
25. Massachusetts, *Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor January 1880* (Boston, 1880), p. 16.
26. *Adams Transcript*, 17 Apr 1858.
27. Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker 1840-1860* (Boston, 1924; reprint ed., Chicago, 1964), pp. 125-34, 161.
28. *Adams News and Transcript*, 21 Sept 1865.
29. Archer, Diary, 20 Oct, 1, 29 Nov, 1 Dec 1873.
30. *Adams Transcript*, 4 Nov 1875; Archer, Diary, 3 Jan 1876.
31. *Adams Transcript*, 16 Sept, 30 Dec 1875; 6 Jan 1876.
32. Archer, Diary, 3, 5, 7, 8 Jan 1876.
33. *Ibid.*, 10, 11 Jan 1876.
34. *Adams Transcript*, 23 Mar, 20 Apr 1876; Archer, Diary, 15, 20 Apr 1876.
35. Data for the remainder of this section was drawn from the following sources: *Adams Transcript*, 2, 16, 23 Nov 1876; Archer, Diary, 20 Oct-16 Nov 1876; Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, *Report for 1880*, p. 43.
36. Archer, Diary, 25, 26 Oct 1876.
37. *Ibid.*, 5 Nov 1876.
38. *Adams Transcript*, 2 Nov 1876.
39. *Ibid.*, 22 Mar 1877.
40. Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises: The Shaping of the American Working Class Consciousness* (New York, 1973), p. 191.
41. Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1979), pp. 18-27.
42. Archer, "Story."
43. Cloward and Piven, "Hidden Protest," p. 662.
44. David Montgomery, *Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans 1862-1872* (New York, 1967), pp. 14, 30-32.
45. Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*, p. 36.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

47. *Adams Transcript*, 30 July 1874.
48. Alan Dawley, *Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 148.
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