Edward Everett and
The Constitutional Union Party
of 1860

Thomas Brown

Edward Everett surely must be considered one of the most noteworthy (though neglected) figures in Massachusetts history. Born April 11, 1794 in Dorchester, Massachusetts, the fifth child of the Reverend Oliver Everett and his wife Lucy, he revealed great intellectual promise early in life. After graduating from Harvard in 1811 with the highest honors, he pursued studies in divinity, and received the M.A. in 1814. In February 1814, when not quite twenty, he was appointed pastor of the Brattle Street (Unitarian) Church in Boston, a station he filled for slightly more than a year. Between 1815 and 1819, Everett travelled and studied in Europe, achieving the distinction of being the first American to receive the Ph.D. (University of Göttingen, 1817). Upon his return to the United States, he assumed the position of professor of Greek literature at Harvard and became editor of the North American Review. In 1822 he married Charlotte Gray Brooks, daughter of the fabulously wealthy Boston businessman Peter Charndon Brooks. Everett’s marital ties to the elite of Boston, along with his intellect and oratorical powers, made him a suitable spokesman for the conservative political interests of Massachussets. In 1824 he was elected to the first of five terms (1825-1835) in the United States House of Representatives. Following his tenure in Congress, he was Governor of Massachusetts for four years (1836-1839).

Political advancement came to Everett rather easily, but he found the exercise of power difficult and challenging. As governor, he hoped to implement an ambitious reform program, but met with mixed success. He helped obtain legislation to abolish imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud, and to subsidize the Western Railroad. But he failed to secure a comprehensive codification of the common law and the abolition of capital punishment. Moreover, his administration was marred by a financial panic and depression which compelled all Massachusetts banks to suspend specie payments. In the hope of promoting recovery, Everett induced the state legislature to create a commission to investigate the banks’ activities, but it was ineffective. Everett’s troubles as governor were compounded by the divisive temperance issue. In 1838 the legislature passed a law prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages (except beer and wine) in
quantities smaller than fifteen gallons. Everett signed the law reluctantly, only to find that it provoked intense political controversy. Democrats denounced it as special class legislation, while the Whigs disagreed about its desirability and effectiveness. Presiding over a badly split Whig party, in 1839 Everett lost the governor’s race to Marcus Morton by a single vote.  

Everett continued to play an active role in public life after he left the governorship. With the election of a national Whig administration in 1840, he was appointed Minister to England, a post in which he served from November 1841 to August 1845. After his return to the United States, he was President of Harvard for three years (1846-1849). When Daniel Webster died in October 1852, President Millard Fillmore appointed Everett to replace him for the remaining months of his term as Secretary of State. While serving in this capacity, he was elected a United States Senator by the Massachusetts legislature. Everett assumed his congressional seat immediately after the completion of his duties at the State Department, but did not remain there very long. He failed to be present for the crucial Senate vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act—Everett claimed because of illness—and thereby brought down upon himself the wrath of the antislavery forces in Massachusetts. In May 1855, still smarting from criticism, Everett resigned from the Senate after having served there only fifteen months.

As sectional tensions intensified in the 1850s, Everett, who abhorred contention and strife, withdrew from direct involvement in politics. Instead, he toured the country lecturing on the life and character of Washington. The proceeds of his lecture tours went to help finance the purchase and preservation of Mount Vernon as a national historic site. Behind Everett’s oratorical efforts, however, there lay an obvious political objective. By reminding Americans of Washington’s patriotic services to the nation, Everett hoped he might help counter the divisive effects of sectional controversy.

Although he dreaded entanglement in politics, Everett remained deeply interested in public affairs. The demise of the Whig party, which occurred concurrently with his withdrawal from the public scene, deprived him of a congenial political home. Everett believed that the country needed a new national conservative party which would have the primary objective of repressing sectional conflict. Thus, when a public meeting was held in New York City in March 1859 to initiate the formation of such an organization, Everett lent encouragement to the effort. Writing confidentially to one of the organizers of the meeting, Hiram Ketchum, Everett confessed his belief in the need for a “new party, which would unite patriotic men of all names.” This projected party would bring together “the relic of the old Whig party,” those Republicans who realized the dangers created by a purely sectional party, “the union democrats of the South,” and most northern Democrats. It would be an alliance of “moderate and patriotic men” who refused to agitate sectional issues for personal or political advantage. Because such a party would have to be broadly based, Everett rejected the idea, suggested in some quarters, of reviving the Whig party. That scheme would only create “greater zeal on the part of the other organizations” by reminding men of old party ties and distinctions.
Despite his interest in the formation of a new party, Everett was “by no means sanguine” that it could be formed. He feared that conditions may have deteriorated too much for a party of union-loving “patriots” to achieve success:

Opinion, or rather feeling, has run to such extremes in both parts of the Union, that moderate Councils and those who adopt them are everywhere out of favor. Ultraism is the order of the day. Most men in public life do not look beyond local favor and support, and that is won by fanning local feeling, till those who, if left to themselves, would pursue a more comprehensive policy, are swept along with the current; and our politics have degenerated into a grand system of sectional antagonism. To speak a kind word of the other section of the country is to be denounced at home.  

Everett revealed ambivalent feelings in his description of the state of politics. The very conditions that repelled him also made it incumbent that “patriots” like himself act to prevent a further deterioration. This mixture of feelings was also apparent in Everett’s response to John Brown’s raid. He was so disgusted by its use as a partisan issue that he did not vote in 1859. Yet the sectional passions aroused by the affair reinforced his conviction that the country needed a new unionist party. Consequently, Everett was intensely interested in the formation of the Constitutional Union Party in early 1860. Everett discouraged those who promoted him as a potential presidential candidate of the new party and eschewed open involvement in its affairs. It is nevertheless certain that Everett wanted the Constitutional Unionists to become the party of disinterested “patriots” he had envisioned in 1859.

Everett’s hopes for the Constitutional Union Party are revealed in the advice he offered some of its leaders. Everett admonished Senator John Jordan Crittenden of Kentucky that the new party should not run on a platform “which in the present state of public opinion in the different sections of the country will be sure to lose in one quarter what it gains in the other. The Constitution of the United States is Platform enough and the public character of Individuals sufficient guaranty [sic] of their fidelity to it.” Similarly, Everett wrote to John Pendleton Kennedy urging that the party’s convention “assume the position of moderation in the great sectional conflict.” Only through such a policy would it attract the “good men” from both major parties “who without any change of theoretical views, are of [the] opinion that the sectional strife has reached a dangerous length, and that it is time to pause.” “Why should we annoy them,” he asked, “by dwelling upon the woes they have committed as members of their respective organizations[?]”

Although Everett was the presidential choice of his own state’s delegation to the Constitutional Union convention, he does not seem to have taken seriously his own chances for the nomination. He mentioned as possible nominees Sam Houston, John Bell, Edward Bates, and John McLean—the last two being potential candidates on a fusion ticket with the Republicans. With regard to the possibility of his own designation, Everett gave the following instructions to his representative in the Massachusetts delegation, George S. Hillard:
EDWARD EVERETT.
From the Encyclopedia of Biography: Massachusetts.
The convention now about to meet at Baltimore may render possible a mediation between the two great sections of the Country, and thus put an end to a struggle which, if much longer continued, will necessarily result in the separation of the States. For this reason, if my name stood alone before the Convention—though I still should not desire the nomination—I might not feel justified in declining it. But as several other names have been brought forward and are likely to be urged, of gentlemen every way entitled to the honor of the nomination, and as its success will mainly depend on the harmony and cordiality with which it is made, I desire to facilitate an approach to unanimity, by withdrawing my name—which I will thank you to do at the proper moment.13

Everett reiterated this position in a telegram he sent to Hillard: “Withdraw my name at the proper time, more by mail.”14

Through the course of action he described to Hillard, Everett probably hoped to insure that others would look upon him as a man of lofty motives. By the same token, the instructions allowed Everett to believe that his conduct was pure and high-minded. If his name were withdrawn at the convention, he could believe that he had sacrificed ambition upon the altar of party unity. But if the nomination were to come his way—because of a “spontaneous” upswelling of sentiment—then it would seem that his acceptance was motivated by a desire to further the unionist cause rather than his own advancement. In either case, Everett hoped to appear, to himself as well as others, as a selfless “patriot” dedicated to saving the Union.

Events at the convention upset all of Everett’s plans. On the first ballot for the presidential nomination, Everett received 25 of the 254 votes cast. During the second, Hillard withdrew his name when it became evident that John Bell would be chosen as the presidential nominee. But Hillard failed to mention that he had done so at Everett’s request. Neither did he say anything about Everett’s attitude toward the vice-presidential nomination; indeed, he had no instructions on the question. His silence on the latter issue lent credence to rumors, apparently spread by the New York delegation, that Everett was an “available” vice-presidential candidate. When the delegates reconvened several hours after the nomination of Bell, a frenzied pro-Everett demonstration began. Hillard, disarmed by this turn of events, but apparently caught up in the excitement, did not try to dissuade the convention from choosing Everett for the second spot. He confessed that he could not speak for Everett, but averred that “if my illustrious friend had been here and beheld your bright faces, heard the voices, and felt the enthusiasm which pervades this Convention at the mention of his name, he must be something more or less than human if he could hesitate to accept the nomination.” Hillard predicted that Everett would respond: “Stand not upon the order of your going but go at once. That is, let us go to the White House—Everett and Bell, Bell and Everett—it matters not which, so that they both go there.” At the conclusion of these remarks, Everett was nominated for Vice President by acclamation. The New York delegates originally proposed Everett for the second spot on a ticket headed by their favorite, Sam Houston. But the
Everett candidacy caught fire, in large part because of Everett’s reputation as the “Ladies’ candidate.” Everett’s popularity with women was in large part due to his sentimental rhetoric, and it was hoped that his presence on the ticket would induce wives to persuade their husbands to vote Constitutional Unionist.¹⁵

Everett’s response to the vice presidential nomination was far less serene than Hillard predicted. Everett complained that the designation “embarrassed,” “annoyed,” and “distressed” him.¹⁶ It had never occurred to Everett that he might be chosen for the second spot. Perhaps, too, he felt mortified at receiving such a dubious honor after being considered for the presidential nomination. Everett protested to associates that he had done all he could to avoid entanglement in politics. The only reason he had not precluded a nomination for Vice President was that the possibility of one had never come up for discussion. Everett declared that it was his “inclination” to decline, but he delayed a decision because of numerous pleas that he accept. Despite such appeals, however, he avowed that he would decline if he could do so “without too greatly offending” his friends.¹⁷ Everett reiterated his conviction that he felt justified in refusing the nomination because of the withdrawal of his name at the convention and his desire to stay out of politics.¹⁸ He also expressed the fear that “if I accept this nomination, my ability to render further service to the Mount Vernon cause is annihilated.”¹⁹

Yet Everett did feel that the success of the unionist movement was vital to the salvation of the country. His friends knew this, and those who favored his acceptance of the nomination pleaded with him not to let his own desires override the interests of the nation. Thus Everett reported that many of his associates appealed to his “patriotism” to “sacrifice personal inclination to the public good.”²⁰ Senator Crittenden, hoping to dispel rumors that Everett’s public silence indicated that he would reject the nomination, begged him not to confound the Unionists by spurning their offer. H. J. Frisbie, Secretary of the Constitutional Union Party, similarly wrote to Everett that his rejection “would be seriously embarrassing if not fatal to the success of the Union party of the Country.”²¹ Everett was also assured that his acceptance would not require him to become involved in politics. In an hour-long meeting on May 25, Leverett Saltonstall and W. G. Bates, members of the Massachusetts State Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party, told Everett that he would not have to play an active role in the campaign. Everett simply had to lend the prestige of his name to the ticket; Saltonstall would take care of his political correspondence.²²

The pleas had the desired effect. After meeting with Hillard and several other associates, Everett decided on May 29 to accept the vice-presidential nomination. The formal announcement was to be made at a Constitutional Union ratification meeting on June 1. In explanation of his decision, Everett asserted that “I cannot now decline [the nomination], without exposing my motives to disconstruction, throwing cold water on the cause, and greatly disobliging the friends who have bestowed upon me this mark of their confidence.”²³ Ambition had nothing to do with the acceptance. Indeed, one reason for it was that his refusal would be attributed to disappointment at not receiving the presidential nomination. The Constitutional Union convention had been right to nominate
a southerner for President, since most of the delegates were southerners, and most of the votes the ticket would obtain would be in the South. His primary reason for the acceptance had been entirely unselfish—“to oblige my friends in different parts of the country, and I neither expect nor desire any reward but that of gratifying them.”

There were suggestions, nevertheless, that Everett might reap a great reward from the nomination. It was rumored that he would be elected President by the Senate if the contest were deadlocked in the electoral college and the House of Representatives. Everett discounted the possibility. Moreover, he felt compelled to deny that he had any ambition for the presidency. Everett declared that he would be “the most unhappy man alive” if he were to be elected President.

Everett’s almost obsessive need to deny that he possessed self-interested motives was reflected in his descriptions of the acceptance of the vice-presidential nomination. He did not depict himself as an active agent, making his own decisions, but as a passive object impelled by external forces. He wrote of being “overpowered” by the “process of compulsion” generated by the friends who urged him to accept the nomination. By seeing events as parts of an inscrutable design, Everett could resign himself to whatever became of his candidacy: “After the nomination I struggled—like a man in a swamp—to extricate myself from it; but circumstances were too strong for me. But it is of little moment, one way or the other, a ripple on the great tide that sweeps us onward. I shall not be sorry when it sweeps me to the goal.”

Everett’s inactive role in the campaign was another way he preserved his self-image. Only by remaining above-the-battle could he appear to be a disinterested “patriot” who disdained the pursuit of power for its own sake. However, Everett learned quickly that he could not avoid becoming entangled in controversy. The vortex of politics had ways of sucking in even the best intended of men. Everett himself became a political issue when the southern supporters of John Breckinridge tried to impugn his “soundness” on slavery. They pointed to Everett’s approval, as governor, of resolutions passed by the Massachusetts legislature in 1839. These resolutions had called for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia and a ban on the admission of new slave states. In addition, they had affirmed Congress’ power to abolish the interstate slave trade and to prohibit slavery in the territories. The Breckinridge supporters also alleged that Everett’s nomination as Minister to England had been opposed by Senators from the South because of his approval of these resolutions. Such charges were politically embarrassing to the southern Constitutional Unionists, who pleaded with Everett to provide some explanation.

Saltonstall, writing in Everett’s behalf, prepared an elaborate defense of the Massachusetts orator. He contended that the positions embraced in the 1839 resolutions had only shortly before been widely prevalent among southerners, and that antislavery sentiments had been expressed openly in Virginia as late as 1832. As for the opposition to Everett’s appointment, it had been partisan rather than sectional in character. The southern Whigs in the Senate had supported Everett “warmly.” In addition to his response to the charges of the
Breckinridge men, Saltonstall took pains to demonstrate that Everett was a man of national rather than sectional sentiments. He pointed out that Everett had aligned himself with the conservative "Cotton Whigs" of Massachusetts, not the free soil "conscience" faction of the party. He also asserted that Everett had "always adhered to" the compromise of 1850, a position for which he was reviled by the abolitionists. Saltonstall conceded, however, that Everett had opposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and had signed a letter which condemned the caning of Charles Sumner. But this did not mean that he was a factious northern sectionalist. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the resulting violence in Kansas, and the assault on Sumner were "occurrences which more than all other things put together, have built up the Republican party at the North." Hence, by criticizing or opposing these "occurrences," Everett had acted to help prevent the rise of sectional feeling in the North.29

Another partisan controversy in which Everett became embroiled was that over the so-called "Selma Platform." In this document, the state convention of the Alabama Constitutional Union party affirmed the doctrine that Congress had no power to exclude slavery from the territories.30 Several Alabamians asked Everett to endorse it, but he refused. In a private letter, Everett explained that he believed that the Selma Platform was "wholly unnecessary" and "would necessarily be as prejudicial in one quarter, as it might be beneficial in another."

"The Union party," Everett added, "must look to the whole country." If its state and local branches were to take contradictory stands on sectional issues, it would "plunge into the same pit in which the Democratic party has just plunged." Saltonstall restated this position in letters he wrote for Everett. He also observed that, while local party conventions were free to make their own pronouncements, Everett was committed to uphold the national platform, which was silent on sectional questions. Saltonstall warned the southern unionists that if they were to go beyond support of the Compromise of 1850, as the Alabama party had done, they would make impossible "united political action" with "the most conservative men of the North."32

In his response to the Selma Platform, Everett revealed a sensitivity to the delicate position of the Constitutional Unionists. If they were to remain unified, they would have to avoid the sectionally divisive issues which had torn apart the other national parties. Similar considerations influenced his estimate of how important a role the Constitutional Unionists would play in the election. Only if they remained united could they hope to defeat the extremists in both sections—the Republicans in the North, the Breckinridge Democrats in the South. Moreover, Everett realized that the Constitutional Unionists would have to pursue different strategies in the two sections. In the South, where they had the support of an overwhelming majority of the unionists, they could afford to run alone. But north of the Mason-Dixon line, where the unionist movement was divided between themselves and the Democrats, they would have to run on fusion tickets.

At first, Everett does not seem to have had much hope that any unionist strategy could avert a victory of one of the sectional parties. The division among the Democrats would, he predicted, "give the great central states to the Republicans, and enable them to elect their candidate."33 This disturbed Everett, for he
believed that the election of a sectional northern candidate would prompt southern “Disunionists” to launch a secessionist movement. The Union, therefore, would probably not long survive a “republican dynasty.” But as Everett became caught up in the excitement of the campaign, he began to believe that the Constitutional Unionists might help determine its outcome. By July he was speculating that the Democratic breakup could result in the unionists carrying some southern states. However, it would take a fusion of all the non-Republican parties to win such “doubtful” free states as Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. As of July 22, Everett found that “no great excitement” had been aroused by this strategy.34

By August, Everett’s estimate of the Constitutional Unionists’ power and influence had grown considerably. His spirits were buoyed by the crowded and enthusiastic meetings they had arranged, and he reported that “thus far our Party is the only one that shows vitality.” Moreover, Everett found that visitors and correspondents “from all quarters” of the country shared this sentiment. Everett wrote that if he were to put credence in their claims, “we might count on almost every Southern State for the Union ticket, as well as New Jersey and New York.” Although Everett had his doubts, particularly about the unionists’ strength in the North, he confessed that there was a “widespread and growing excitement.” He ventured the opinion that all of the border states except Missouri were “sure” for the Constitutional Unionists.”35

In early September, Everett observed that “things providentially have turned out more favorably than the most sanguine calculations.” The Republicans were weakened “everywhere” by the “overthrow” of Seward, and the Democratic split “bids fair to give us most of the Southern States.” One report indicated that Virginia was “sure” for the Union ticket. But Everett’s spirits were soon dampened. In Massachusetts, where the unionists’ chances had seemed promising for a time, all efforts at fusion failed. What is more, the Republicans carried the state elections in Maine “by a great majority” because of the passivity of Stephen Douglas’ supporters. Nonetheless, there was still hope for fusion in “the great central states” where politics was “in active fermentation.” In the South, the Constitutional Unionists’ prospects were still “fair” because of the Democratic schism.36

By early October Everett had become deeply skeptical about the optimistic reports of the Constitutional Unionists’ chances. It was apparent to him that “the accounts depend as much on the prepossessions of those, from whom they proceed, that they cannot be depended upon.” There were “very confident expectations” that Lincoln would be prevented from carrying New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania if all the non-Republican parties in those states ran on a fusion ticket. But the Democratic factions were “so embittered against each other that this union meets with opposition.” The state elections of October shattered virtually all of Everett’s remaining hopes that the Republicans might be defeated. The crucial free states, particularly Pennsylvania, went “overwhelmingly” for the Republicans, making it “nearly certain” that Lincoln would be elected. Only a Republican loss in New York could prevent this, but Everett thought it “very doubtful” that a winning fusion ticket would be arranged there.37

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Everett's worst fears were confirmed by the results of the November elections. Although fusion tickets were arranged in most of the doubtful northern states—including New York—the Republicans still swept to victory. In an election post-mortem, Everett penned his own diagnosis of the returns. "A very little show of real strength at the North" by the fusionists, he avowed, would have given the Constitutional Unionists "the entire South." But the Republicans' massive victory in Pennsylvania had strengthened the Breckinridge men in the South, while it had sapped the confidence of the unionists in the North. As a result, the non-sectional parties had lost influence and the struggle had become "one of South and North." Naturally, this had resulted in a victory for the Republicans, who dominated the more populous section. Everett confessed that it was "impossible" to predict what might result from the election. But he feared the beginnings of a "revolutionary" movement led by Alabama or South Carolina. To be sure, there still existed a strong unionist feeling in the South, but it was "inadequately represented" in public bodies. Moreover, "the offensive tone of exaltation at the North over the recent victory" would not "tend to calm the agitation at the South." Everett could only foresee further trouble as the sections became progressively more polarized. 38

Edward Everett's conduct in the 1860 campaign is illustrative of some of the difficulties faced by conservative nationalists in the sectional crisis. Everett, like many men of this type, was a patrician Whig who believed that government should be the province of statesmen infused with "public virtue"—"an unselfish devotion to the common good." 39 Everett could never accept unalloyed ambition as a legitimate motive for office-seeking, either in others or himself. He feared that the opportunistic politician, unrestrained by principles or scruples, would pursue his own aggrandizement without regard for the public interest. This anxiety conditioned Everett's response to the sectional crisis: it was the result of demagogues "agitating" divisive issues in order to obtain popular favor. It also shaped his conception of how to deal with the crisis. The nation needed to be led once again by selfless "patriots" who valued the welfare of the country above everything else. These "good men" would, of course, refuse to exploit political controversies for personal or partisan advantage. It was Everett's hope that the Constitutional Union Party might help bring to power such men of principle.

Yet the resort to party action required that a man like Everett mix in the very element he despised; for any party with hopes of being effective had to engage in expedient compromises of principle. The Unionists, as Everett learned to his pain, could not simply rest their claims to power upon their superior "virtue." To be sure, their national convention avoided sectional issues in its platform, which affirmed adherence to the Constitution and the laws as the guiding principle of the party. 40 But the Selma Platform showed that partisan and sectional interpretations of this "principle" could vary. Furthermore, the northern Unionists had to engage in a practical political strategy, fusion, which made their fortunes hostage to those of the feuding Democrats.

Still, bisectionalism put the Unionists at a distinct political disadvantage when competing against politicians who did not have to make concessions to colleagues
in the other section. Everett may not have been wrong to fear that a party of self-styled "patriots" could not hope for much success in a period of sectional antagonism. He was discerning enough to see that the "virtue" on which the Unionists prided themselves was also lethal to their popular appeal.

NOTES


2. Frothingham, Everett, Chap. VI; Robert Haws, "Massachusetts Whigs" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1971), Chap. III.


5. Edward Everett to Hiram Ketchum, March 28, 1859, Edward Everett Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Microfilm Edition, Reel XXXI, Vol. 110, Everett Letterbook, pp. 149-50. All references to the Everett Papers are to this collection. Quotations from the Everett Papers are by permission of the Director of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

6. Ibid., pp. 150-51.


11. Everett was actually the second choice of the Massachusetts delegation; Crittenden was the first. The delegation turned to Everett after Crittenden declined to be a candidate.


13. Edward Everett to George S. Hillard, May 9, 1860, Ibid., p. 44.


21. Crittenden to Everett, May 25, 1860, ibid., Reel XVII, Frames 973-75; Frisbie to Everett, May 25, 1860, ibid., Frame 979.

22. Prothingham, Everett, p. 411.


25. Edward Everett to W. W. Corcoran, June 6, 1860, ibid., p. 98; Edward Everett to Mrs. Charles Eames, June 29, 1860, ibid., Reel XVII, Frame 1058.


27. Edward Everett to Sidney H. Everett, June 5, 1860, ibid., p. 94.


32. Leverett Saltonstall to John H. McCue, n.d., ibid., pp. 179-80. See also Saltonstall to M. Chester, July 5, 1860, ibid., p. 139; Saltonstall to T. H. Watts, July 16, 1860, ibid., p. 155.


38. Everett Diary, November 8, 1860, Everett Papers, Reel XL, Vol. 179, pp. 274-75.
