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Amos A. Lawrence and the Formation of the Constitutional Union Party: the Conservative Failure in 1860

Barry A. Crouch

Disintegrating American political parties in the 1850's left Northern and Southern conservatives unable to coalesce. Southern Whigs drifted into the Democratic party, while Northern Whigs, and later the National Americans or Know Nothings, were unsuccessful in maintaining a middle-of-the-road coalition. In both sections the moderates fought a desperate battle against divisions within their own ranks or the influence of other organizations. After John Brown's raid the nation faced a monumental crisis. A prominent Boston merchant, Amos A. Lawrence, realized the dimensions of the impending conflict, but whether he, along with like-minded individuals, could rally the conservatives was a question only the electorate could answer.

Lawrence, a cotton entrepreneur who had many dealings with Southerners, was concerned over the future of America. Undoubtedly economic considerations influenced his thinking, but his abiding faith in the nation was irrevocable. Although not an abolitionist, the Bostonian was opposed to the extension of slavery. He had been the major financier of the New England Emigrant Aid Company during the Kansas crusade, and later aided John Brown and his family. A Cotton Whig until the mid-1850's, Lawrence then joined the Know Nothings. With the failure of that movement he, along with the Kentucky Whig John J. Crittenden, was a leader in forming the Constitutional Union party. Gentlemen of property and standing in Northern and border states were attempting to find a viable course between Republicans and Democrats. To save the Union became their rallying cry.¹

When the American Party collapsed after the 1856 election, Lawrence became anxious about national parties and unity. Speaking in Worcester he stated it was a "solemn conviction that our existence as a united people de-
pends upon the existence of great national parties; that to them we owe it, . . .
that our Government and our glorious Constitution have stood firm to this
time." To Lawrence, if the light of liberty went out, it would be due to the
breakdown of these two aspects of American political development. Although
slavery remained a problem, he told his audience "let us not aim at sectional
power, except so far as it comes from our intelligence and industry, and the
natural preponderance of population, of territory and wealth." 2

By 1859 the political scene had changed, with Lawrence becoming increas-
ingly involved in politics. He queried Charles Robinson, a future Kansas gov-
ernor, "is there any prospect of whipping the Democrats in 1860? [Salmon P.]
Chase and [Kenneth] Rayner; Crittenden and [Nathaniel P.] Banks. We are
ready for any sort of combination that will unite the opposition." 3

Lawrence was in frequent contact with various politicians. Martin Conway,
the first congressman from Kansas territory, and Massachusetts Senator
Henry Wilson apprised him that William Henry Seward was an unacceptable
choice. Wilson was in a quandary since he opposed President James Buchanan's policies, as did Lawrence. When the Republican National Committee proposed their convention, Lawrence contended the call was "defective" and the party was based on the "slavery issue."*4

In the 1859 state elections Lawrence had little hope of defeating the Republicans and Democrats. George Lunt, Boston Courier editor, proffered a position, but Lawrence was noncommittal about whether he would run or actively participate in the campaign. The Bostonian preferred to work behind the scenes, admitting he was discouraging any movement among the conservatives as success appeared minimal. He urged the opposition to nominate former governor George Briggs, and sent an investigator into Essex County to ascertain the desires of that area.5 Lawrence was looking ahead to 1860.

Lawrence voted for Briggs in 1859 but the Republicans swept the state. It was a shattering victory and stirred the Bostonian and fellow believers into action. Even Representative William Appleton, Lawrence's father-in-law, and ex-president Franklin Pierce, also a Lawrence relative, expressed fears about the continuance of the Union. To mitigate the political hysteria a new party was outlined in an early December meeting at Faneuil Hall. Lawrence was requested to serve as vice-president but declined because he felt it might aid the Democrats. He did, however, attend the assembly which had as its theme the promotion of better sectional accord.6

Lawrence was receiving disturbing reports from the South which indicated that "many persons" had been driven out "on account of their anti-slavery opinions." Relief appeared in the form of a letter from Crittenden who desired to form a national party based on cooling sectional tensions. Lawrence concurred and informed the Kentuckian if Massachusetts conservatives could be "assured that there [was] a reliable organization in the other States and especially in the South, they will rally at once, and will draw back a majority of those who were seduced by the party leaders into the support of [John C.] Fremont: the old Whigs will follow." Optimistically, Lawrence stated that not more than half the "full vote of the State was cast" at the last election.7

While Crittenden was busy on the national scene, Lawrence was pushing developments in Massachusetts. He promised to spend $500 in the Bay State immediately to aid in the nucleus for a new national party and to "co-operate with others in the States to put down sectional agitation." Lawrence sent individuals throughout the countryside to begin the organizational process and to poll people's reactions.8

To Crittenden, Lawrence outlined what he had accomplished and the political prospects for the country. General Winfield Scott's nomination had received little consideration and probably would not unless the Kentuckian recommended it. The American Party wanted Crittenden and they would not look elsewhere until the Senator directed "them to do so." Both the Fremont and conservative Republicans had confidence in Crittenden but the Whigs

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had essentially disappeared from the Bay State "so far as numbers are concerned," Lawrence lamented, and "their organ, the Boston Courier with its editors, has favored the Democrats." Whether the Constitutional Union Party succeeded hinged on the supposition that the Banks wing of the Republicans could be split, and the Bostonian believed it a possibility. Lawrence insisted the "American portion of it can be brought up upon National ground, and the great reserved vote will vibrate to that side."9

The spirit in the old puritan bailiwick was excellent and the position of Southern congressional members was respected. "If they go to the Democrats," Lawrence observed, "they will damage the hopes of any successful action in this part" of the nation, and if they went Republican the effect would be equally as bad. A fresh program was imperative and new members should be added to the national committee. Neither "fossilized men, nor politicians" were wanted. If Crittenden would send some short notes "asking whether the union loving men" of Massachusetts were "ready to unite with the opponents of the Democratic party in the other states for the defeat of that party and all extremists," Lawrence promised to organize the entire state in two months. All that would be required was Crittenden’s word, and he briskly asked, "shall we have it?"10

The difficulties of raising opposition outside the Democrats and whether the rivals could "throw as large a vote as the Republicans" remained. There were two alternatives — severing prominent persons from "their present association," or separating the Americans from the freesoilers. If the Republicans nominated a "conservative" for president, then nothing could or would be done and Lawrence would regret to see the "Southern opposition refuse to go with the Republicans if they lay down a fair platform" and "select a National Candidate." As long as the Southern opposition prevailed Lawrence would "stand" by it although he "would not work for" his own party "when it is in the wrong."11

Lawrence now concentrated his energies on the CUP's operation in Massachusetts. Virginian William C. Rives, a former Representative and Senator, told Lawrence that because of "certain contingencies arising from the movements of the other political parties," the Constitutional Union Party "might succeed in having the government." The Bostonian engineered a Massachusetts conservative convention for the latter part of March. In addition, he employed individuals to "form" union clubs but had little idea whether it would "appear a quixotic effort after all," and it certainly would if the whole movement failed. "Blessed are the peacemakers," Lawrence wrote, in his efforts to form a conciliation party.12

The "conservative" convention, according to Lawrence, would include "some of the best men in the State." The work had been done quietly, public attention diverted, and the meeting would be a good one. Lawrence was at a "loss to know whether it" would turn the tide against the Republicans. They felt quite safe in New England, but the Bostonian still preferred Crittenden,
and above all, Edward Bates, a moderate Republican and ex-Missouri Whig, as a safe selection. Lawrence wrote Emerson Etheridge of Tennessee that a number of intelligent New Englanders would have earlier joined the Republicans if they could have commanded moderate support in the South. No matter what "we think of slavery," he continued, "(and the Northern sentiment is pretty much alike on that subject) we cannot jeopardize the Union of the States by strengthening a sectional organization." By "giving our influence to this one," the Bostonian observed, "we add life and force to the other."\(^{13}\)

The day before the convention opened, Lawrence reported to Levi Lincoln, Massachusetts governor from 1834 to 1841, that the formation of the party had progressed satisfactorily and that 350 clubs had been established in towns and wards throughout the Bay State. The convention met in Faneuil Hall with 844 delegates representing 212 towns. When Crittenden's name was proposed, it was received "with singular enthusiasm" and the "severe decorum of the assembly completely broke down: the old men behaved like boys." A central committee was appointed and Lawrence was confident that if Crittenden were one of the nominees "we should carry the State against both parties. But, as the Bostonian related, an office seeker "must represent a party, and if that is defeated, he must go with it."\(^{14}\)

Lawrence proceeded with the organizational details of the party, adding names to the state central committee, listing old Whigs who would take an interest in the new group, and contributing $1,000 to defray the current expenses of the party. He despaired when he learned the Republicans had won Connecticut, but the Rhode Island returns brightened his spirits. William Sprague, an ex-Whig, was chosen governor. "My sympathy now is with the latter," Lawrence confided to his diary, "for I wish to see an end to sectional agitation on the plea that it is designed to ameliorate the condition of the slaves." A few days later he was gloomy again because the National Union Committee was at a standstill.\(^{15}\)

When the Constitutional Union Party national convention was held at Baltimore in May, Lawrence was conspicuously absent, along with other important conservatives. He did not attend because his interest in the party was "already as great" as his engagements would authorize, and he would "give all the attention to it here in Massachusetts in my power." Lawrence thought the Bay State delegation was comprised of "pretty good men" although they might not "fairly represent" the state convention's sentiments which was "decidedly" for Crittenden. Some former members of the American Party were also unable to attend and were replaced with ex-Whigs. Lawrence was of the opinion that Crittenden could carry "twice as many New England votes" as Edward Everett. "No attempt should be made to define the position of the Party on the Slavery question," Lawrence suggested, "except to stand by the Constitution and to enforce the laws. Nor should we attempt to trade with either of the other parties."\(^{16}\)
To promote the party statewide, there was a meeting at Appleton’s office. A discouraged Lawrence stated that “people are quite indifferent about the Government so long as they have no personal disturbance. I mean people who have property and who might exert an influence.” Compounding the party’s difficulties, Everett was experiencing doubts whether to accept the vice-presidential nomination. Lawrence believed Everett was popular in the South because of his fund-raising activities to purchase Mount Vernon but could not command many votes in New England due to his “disinterestedness” and lack of courage.17

Lawrence was depressed and shared with Crittenden his innermost feelings about the party’s plight. “If you had allowed” the Baltimore convention to “nominate you for President,” he lamented, “it is possible that we might have stirred up some enthusiasm here in favor of the ticket. That appeared to be the only course if we aspired to any degree of success.” The Bostonian also observed that if John Bell, the party’s presidential choice, “could see how difficult it is for us to make even a respectable opposition to the enthusiasm of the Republicans, he would cease to look in this direction for available support.” This was the prevailing opinion throughout New England. “The whole public sentiment which appears on the outside is in favor of ‘Old Abe’ and his split rails.”18

Constitutional Union Party prospects were dismal. They could not even gather enough people for a meeting “except in collecting a crowd of boys to hear 100 guns fired on Boston Common.” There were no plans to assemble until Patrick Henry’s grandson, G.A. Henry of Tennessee, came to Boston, June 1. The “intelligent, conservative men, the great merchants and manufacturers expressed great satisfaction” with the party’s nominations, Lawrence wrote, but they immediately added “it is of no use.” The Bostonian complained they avoided politics except to vote and some refused even to do that. The outlook was grim but these were the “real facts.” Lawrence, however, informed Crittenden there was no idea of surrendering “in any contingency.”19

After presenting the “real facts,” Lawrence learned of Crittenden’s possible visit to Boston and invited him to stay at his home in Brookline. There the Senator could easily receive visitors as he would be forced to do because “they will not let you off.” If Lawrence had known Crittenden was coming he “would not have said a word of our present condition.” This did not change the situation but the Bostonian now waxed optimistic, writing that “it has been impossible not to believe that there would be some interposition to save us from an inglorious defeat.” Crittenden’s prospective visit provided a “providential way of escape.” The whole aspect of the campaign could be changed and the Senator would be welcomed as no other Constitutional Unionist had been. Fanueil Hall would be “packed from top to bottom. The inert mass of conservatism here in Massachusetts will be stirred into life and hope.”20

On June 1 the Constitutional Union Party held its “grand meeting” at
Faneuil Hall, where Henry was the major speaker. Everett consented to be the party’s vice-presidential candidate. The gathering was successful and the enthusiasm “unbounded.” The “tide seems really to have turned,” Lawrence averred, “at least it requires very little to set it back.”

Lawrence’s efforts were unceasing both organizationally and financially. Alexander R. Boteler, an American Party Representative from Virginia, thanked him for advancing $1,000 to the National Union Committee. In August the secretary of the Union Party State Central Committee urged Lawrence to accept the gubernatorial nomination. The Bostonian refused and declared that his choice was former governor John H. Clifford who unfortunately “is not an office seeker.”

In late summer 1860 when Kentucky reported a 25,000 majority for the opposition, Lawrence exclaimed: “Good! This is a heavy blow to the sectional parties.” In Massachusetts attention was focusing on the gubernatorial race. Speaking for the party’s State Central Committee, President Leverett Saltonstall requested that Lawrence enter the race. Once again the Bostonian declined.

In August the Republicans nominated John A. Andrew as their gubernatorial candidate. A displeased Lawrence wrote that Andrew was “anti-slavery in the extreme” and that he advocated a “‘higher law’ than the Constitution.” After the Republicans chose Andrew, Lawrence had a conference with the Democratic supporters of Stephen A. Douglas about uniting on a state ticket but did not think it would “come to anything.” The situation was further compounded when Marshall P. Wilder, Banks, and Clifford all withdrew from the race. This time Lawrence had decided to accept the nomination if the Constitutional Unionists asked, as there was no one else to whom they could turn. Even some Republicans talked about voting for Lawrence because Andrew was too radical on the slavery question. Lawrence was not misled, however, and did not believe they would “abandon their party candidate in any numbers: besides which he will get the vote of the abolitionists who seldom vote at all.”

Besides worrying about “falling into the dirty pool of party politics,” and “doing anything which [was] dishonest or dishonorable to obtain votes,” Lawrence was concerned with the national scene. He wrote Boteler, chairman of the national Constitutional Union Party, that the Republicans were trying to prove that Bell was a strong pro-slavery candidate. The Bostonian felt that the best way to counteract this ploy would be to give “copious extracts from Southern Democratic papers” in which Bell was alluded to as a freesoiler.

Lawrence’s opinions aside, he was in the mainstream of the state and national campaigns of 1860. Through August he had merely been raising money, trying to ascertain public reaction, and attempting to consolidate the party. As the election entered its final stages, charges were bandied about on all sides. Those opposed to Andrew tried to connect him with John Brown and
disunion. Lawrence was also accused of aiding Brown, mainly because the Sharps rifles he had sent to Kansas had been used at Harpers Ferry. The Bostonian replied that he had never confided in Brown because he "doubted his devotion to United States Law." Lawrence even called on Benjamin F. Butler, the Breckinridge nominee, requesting him to rescind certain statements connecting him with Brown; Butler agreed to the retraction.26

When Pennsylvania and Indiana went Republican, Lawrence became convinced that Lincoln's election was virtually assured. The opposition parties in Massachusetts became alarmed and seriously attempted unification. Lawrence met with Butler and Erastus Beach, the Douglas Democratic gubernatorial candidate, to see if their respective parties could rally around one individual. It was "our desire," Lawrence wrote, to "afford to the people of the State," opposed to Andrew's election, an opportunity to "vote effectively instead of throwing their votes away as they are now obliged to do." A committee of Democrats and former American Party members came to Lawrence about calling a combined state convention. He was agreeable if the Constitutional Union Party state committee concurred. An all-parties committee then met but was unable to form a coalition. This made Andrew's election a certainty. Lawrence told Beach that nothing more could or would be done to unite the national parties in the Bay State except on the district level.27

After the coalition failure, Lawrence was under no illusions about his political fortunes. Although several newspapers were favorable, he realized they could not get him elected. Moreover, Andrew would have twice as many votes because the Republicans were twice as numerous, and Andrew was taking "measures to obtain the whole votes" of his factionalized party. Andrew, however, advocated "those measures which would drive every Southern State to secede from the Union if they were carried out," but Lawrence "hoped that the people will see the danger in time to adopt a fairer and safer policy." The only consolation, at least to Lawrence, was the hope that Andrew might abandon some of his ideas once he was elected.28

Nationally, the south was disturbed over the probability of Lincoln's election but Lawrence quite perceptively noted that "there is no cause for alarm from Mr. Lincoln even if he had not against him both houses of Congress. The efforts at the South for secession may produce anxiety, and they will not cease immediately after the election if Lincoln should be chosen." The alarm, however, did not directly increase.29

In the closing days of the campaign Lawrence kept busy on numerous political fronts. He continued his exertions to raise money to defeat district Republican candidates, and he attempted to get Eli Thayer, his New England Emigrant Aid Company partner, reelected to his Worcester congressional seat. Even though Thayer was a Republican, Lawrence considered him a "genius" and a "very eloquent man," but he had not conformed to "Republican party drill." Lawrence urged the people to vote for Thayer as a practical Republican, and "they seemed to approve."30
On election day the defeat of the opposition parties was staggering. Even if non-Republicans had been able to unite on the state level, Andrew would still have won by several thousand votes. It was truly an overwhelming victory for the Republicans. Lawrence ran third in a slate of four, garnering almost 24,000 votes. He had expected to lose and was not particularly disillusioned by the result. Thayer was also defeated, but Appleton retained his seat in the House.31

In 1858 when Lawrence had also been an unsuccessful gubernatorial nominee the New York Tribune stated that “the 'American' candidate, is left so dismally out in the cold that he will one day be obliged to procure affidavits that he was ever a candidate at all.” The 1860 loss was just as disastrous and Lawrence realized it. When the union men held a grand dinner drinking to Lawrence’s health with great cheering, the Bostonian retorted that “this is in acknowledgement for being handsomely defeated.”32

Even though the Constitutional Unionists were crushed, they reminded the voters that if Lincoln was elected, a Southern convention would meet to determine whether their congressmen should resign; many predicted Southern secession. Excitement was rising and when disunion talk, led by the South Carolinians, began after the election, Lawrence asserted “this was expected.” He believed there were ample union votes in the upper South “that a reaction may be looked for, if no outbreak occurs.” In his diary the Bostonian prayed for the nation: “God bless my distracted country. Turn the hearts of the people toward each other again. Save us from disunion, and save us from shedding fraternal blood.”33

Many thought Constitutional Union Party ideas were outmoded because they did not deal directly with the slavery question. A simple maintenance of the Constitution and enforcing the laws could neither please those in the South who wanted slavery to expand into the territories, nor those in the North who desired to abolish or limit it where already in existence. Whether anyone in 1860 could have offered a satisfactory solution is doubtful but the party’s failure indicates how far the irreversible tensions had gone.

The idea of a moderate coalition in 1860 began in the mind of John J. Crittenden, but men like Lawrence were instrumental in providing organization and funds for both the state and national party. In Lawrence’s thinking the Bay State was a key Northern area for establishing a conservative party. Massachusetts had long been the acknowledged leader of the abolitionist forces and if gains could be made there, then it might augur well for the future. Lawrence undoubtedly made a herculean effort to promote the party as demonstrated in his acquiescence in running for governor, since he really preferred working in the background, letting those more attuned to politics be the candidates. The Bostonian only took the final step when it seemed no one else could rally the conservatives.

The Constitutional Union Party was characterized by Henry L. Dawes as a
“class of simple-minded people who believed that the sun rises in Chelsea, comes up over State Street, hovers about the state house, and sinks in the waters of Back Bay.” They were former Whigs “who turned their eyes from the future back to the past.” Others shared this outlook. The party’s attempts to give the voters an alternative failed because in reality it was not an alternative. But even with outdated ideas, the party had alerted the nation to the danger of disunion. The widening rift between the two sections, however, could not be mended with simple patriotic slogans. Slavery cut so deeply into the American character that both North and South believed compromise was no longer possible, and the Constitutional Unionists were not able to effectively cope with the changing attitudes. Theirs was a party for a more simple and placid era, not for the increased moral awareness and hardened political visions that delineated the 1850’s and 1860’s.

NOTES


2. Speech of AAL in the Music Hall, Worcester, Mass., September 10, 1857. According to AAL the (Washington) National Intelligencer had used his speech as the subject of their leading article and fully complimented it under the heading of “Patriotic Sentiments,” AAL Diary, December 20, 1857.

3. AAL to Charles Robinson, January 7, 1859, Charles Robinson Papers (Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence); Don W. Wilson, Governor Charles Robinson of Kansas (Lawrence, Manhattan, and Wichita, 1975).


5. AAL Diary, September 23, October 1, 3, 8, 13, 1859; AAL to J.M.S. Williams, August 18, 1858, IV, 239-40; AAL to George Briggs, September 29, 1859, IV, 346; October 6, 1859, IV, 349; October 13, 1859, IV, 551, all in AAL Letterbook; Thomas H. O’Connor, Lords of the Loom: The Cotton Whigs and the Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1968), 132-33.
6. AAL Diary, November 18, 21, December 9 or 10, 15, 20, 1859; AAL to Linus B. Comius, February 22, 1859, IV, 298, AAL Letterbook; Edith E. Ware, Political Opinion in Massachusetts During Civil War and Reconstruction (New York, 1916), 229. Lawrence had earlier written that "we ought to be thankful to the Whigs who still keep alive the seed of a great conservative party," AAL to F.W. Prescott, November 7, 1855, III, 243, AAL Letterbook. For the 1859 fall elections see William G. Bean, "Party Transformation in Massachusetts with Special Reference to the Antecedents of Republicanism, 1848-1860" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1922); Godfrey T. Anderson, "The Slavery Issue as a Factor in Massachusetts Politics From the Compromise of 1850 to the Outbreak of the Civil War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1944).

7. AAL Diary, January 3, 5, 1860; AAL to John J. Crittenden, December 21, 1859, Miscellaneous Papers (New York Public Library). Hereinafter John J. Crittenden will be abbreviated JJC.


10. AAL to JJC, January 6, 26, 1860; George Lunt to JJC, January 10, 1860, all in Vol. 22, JJC Papers (Library of Congress); AAL Diary, January 7, 9, 21, 27, February 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 1860; AAL to Governor Clifford [January ?, 1860], IV, 337; AAL to A.H. Rice, February 29, 1860, IV, 382; AAL to Dr. Steele, February 29, 1860, IV, 383; AAL to Henry Wilson, March 16, 1860, IV, 387, all in AAL Letterbook; James L. Baker to AAL, January 6, 1860; George Winston Smith, Henry C. Carey and American Sectional Conflict (Albuquerque, 1951), 53-54.

11. AAL to JJC, January 26, 1860, Vol. 22, JJC Papers (Library of Congress). When John Henry Vessey of England dined with the Lawrence in the spring of 1859, he was amazed when they expressed "their sympathy with the Southerners on the slave question," and then added, "I should never have dreamt of mentioning in Boston which I had always considered to be the very hotbed of abolition," Brian Waters (ed.), Mr. Vessey of England: Being the Incidents and Reminiscences of Travel in a Twelve Week's Tour Through the United States and Canada in the Year 1859 (New York, 1956), 164.


15. AAL Diary, April 7, 14, 16, 1860; AAL to JJC, March 30, 1860, Vol. 22, JJC Papers (Library of Congress).

17. AAL Diary, May 22, 23, 1860.


22. AAL Diary, June 7, July 3, August 2, 1860.

23. AAL Diary, August 10, 25, 27, 1860.

24. AAL Diary, August 29, September 8, 12, 14, 19, 1860, and clippings.

25. AAL Diary, September 16, 1860; AAL to Alexander R. Boteler, September 16, 1860, HM 23763, Main File (Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, San Marino, California).


28. AAL Diary, October 15, 20, 1860.

29. AAL Diary, October 20, 26, 31, 1860.

30. AAL Diary, September 25, October 8, 29, November 1, 2, 5, 13, 1860; AAL to George P. Stearns, September 29, 1860, IV, 396, AAL Letterbook.

32. The *Tribune* is quoted in Robert C. Winthrop, Jr., *A Memoir of Robert C. Winthrop* (Boston, 1897), 207-209; AAL Diary, November 8, 9, 1860.

33. AAL Diary, November 9, 12, 29, December 3, 1860. For one aspect of Lawrence's involvement both before and after the outbreak of war see Crouch, "The Merchant and the Senator," 53-60.

34. Dawes' statement is quoted in Ware, *Political Opinion in Massachusetts*, 230-52, 305. For the newspapers that supported the various candidates see Ware, 401-403.