

James W. Fraser, "Mayor John F. Fitzgerald and Boston's Schools, 1905-1913" *Historical Journal of Massachusetts* Volume 12, No 2 (June 1984).

Published by: Institute for Massachusetts Studies and Westfield State University

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Mayor John F. Fitzgerald and Boston's Schools, 1905 - 1913

James W. Fraser

On New Year's Day, 1906, John F. Fitzgerald was inaugurated mayor of Boston. Noted by later generations mostly as the grandfather of the nation's first Irish-Catholic President, Honey Fitz was significant in his own day as the first American born, Irish-Catholic mayor of Boston, and as a pre-eminent representative of his generation of Irish political leaders. These were people born in the United States, symbolizing in their own careers the new-found strength and pride of their immigrant communities, and suspicious of those who, in the name of reform or progressive government, would block their entree into the rewards of political power.

In the same election in which Bostonians had chosen Fitzgerald over Louis Frothingham, they had also elected a newly-reorganized Boston School Committee. And for the honor of sitting on the new, five member committee, the voters had selected the entire slate sponsored by the reform-oriented Public School Association. This group was headed by James Jackson Storrow, Yankee reformer par excellence and a man destined to tangle with Fitzgerald on many occasions in the years ahead. With these seemingly contradictory results of the election of 1905, Bostonians had set the stage for the full flowering of what David Tyack has called, "administrative progressivism" within the city's schools, as well as for the beginnings of a rather sharp reaction against the movement.¹

The reformers who jubilantly took control of the new School Committee in 1906 had, only recently, been a discouraged lot. In December of 1904, George A. O. Ernst, long a leading advocate for school reform, wrote "The Movement for School Reform in Boston." In this article, Ernst reported to fellow reformers around the nation on the recent defeats in Boston. In January of 1904, what Ernst called a "strictly partisan and reactionary majority" had taken control of the school committee.² This anti-reform majority, led by Fitzgerald's sometime ally, Julia Duff, had replaced the superintendent of twenty-four years, Edwin Seaver,³ and consciously turned their backs on the movement towards centralization and professional control of education which was so important to people like Ernst. Hardly an objective reporter, Ernst saw these changes as a return to an "inherently vicious system" in which primary

power resided with the sub-committees of the twenty-four member elected school committee rather than being centralized in a professional superintendent. To Ernst, this rejection of “the cardinal principle of reliance upon experts . . .” could only have been done for the most corrupt reasons.⁴

The changes which took place in 1904 were all the more painful to Ernst and his fellow reformers, because they came at a time when school reform had seemed to be gathering momentum. In the mid-1890s, a Public School Association had been formed in Boston to lobby for the reforms advocated by good government types such as Ernst.⁵ The primary focus of these reforms, as Ernst noted so clearly in his article, were away from the diffusion of power through a large school committee with many sub-committees, and the centralization of decision-making in a professionally trained, appointed staff. There was also a clear assumption among the reformers that this trust in experts would “take the schools out of politics” and substitute the leadership of those with “an unselfish interest in the welfare of the schools” for those with a concern for a “distinct pecuniary value to a certain class in the community.”⁶ The fact that such high-minded altruism seemed to be lodged in the older, richer, Yankee inhabitants, themselves a “certain class,” and not in the newer arrivals, did not seem to be of concern to Ernst—at least according to his public writings.

Given the nature of his complaint, Ernst had certainly chosen a sympathetic audience. The *Educational Review*, edited by Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler, was a journal for like-minded reformers through the nation. Butler himself had led the campaign which had begun in 1896 to centralize the New York City school system under a small school board while the real decision-making would be done by the professional managers who shared the non-partisan, management-oriented values of Butler and his colleagues. Clearly, Boston’s struggles were not isolated, but rather a part of a national movement to change the shape of power and process in the nation’s public schools.⁷

Ernst closed his article on a note of optimism, stating that the reformers would continue their efforts, “with every hope of ultimate success.”⁸ That success, at least in its opening stages, came more quickly than Ernst might have dared to hope. James Jackson Storrow, a popular young banker who knew virtually nothing about the Public School Association or the schools, but who did share many of the “good government” values of Ernst and his allies, had been nominated by the PSA and elected to the school committee in 1901. Frustrated after a three-year term, Storrow decided in 1904 that rather than seek re-election he would devote himself to structural reform. During early 1905, in cooperation with Paul Hanus of the newly emerging Harvard School of Education, Storrow drafted a bill which reduced Boston’s school committee from twenty-four to five members and after intensive negotiations with the Republican-controlled State Legislature, secured its approval. All that remained was to elect the right members and implement the rest of the reform agenda.⁹ In the short run, this would be as easy to accomplish as the structural change had been.

In the election scheduled for the fall of 1905, Boston’s usually boisterous

politics reached new heights of both color and confusion. There were no candidates who could take election to either the mayor's office or the school committee for granted. The incumbent mayor, Patrick Collins, was an Irish-born Democrat whose long political career, culminating in a term as United States Consul in London, had won him wide respect from all segments of Boston's population. But Collins died in mid-September, well before the November Democratic primary. The result was a wide open race in which former Congressman Fitzgerald defeated Edward Donovan for the Democratic nomination; the latter had received the support of the majority of the city's ward leaders—allowing Fitzgerald to pose as an anti-boss candidate. In the final election in December, the Democratic nominee had a somewhat easier time defeating the Republican Louis Frothingham in spite of the latter's support from the recently formed Good Government Association. The fact that Fitzgerald had won without either the support of most of the ward bosses—Roxbury's James Michael Curley was an important exception—or the Good Government reformers meant that the new mayor would have considerable freedom in setting the course for his administration.¹⁰

The campaign for school committee was at least as hard fought as that for mayor. The Storrow reforms, reducing the committee from twenty-four to five members, meant that the usual value of incumbency was eliminated. The major opposition to the Storrow-led P.S.A. slate was a slate led by former school committee member Julia Duff of Charlestown.¹¹ Duff had made a name for herself on the old committee for her distrust of outside experts and for her commitment to keep the teaching jobs in Boston for the graduates of the public schools and the city's Normal School. With her rallying cry, "Boston Schools for Boston Girls," she defended the personal contacts which were allowed by a large committee with many sub-committees and she opposed Storrow's reforms at each step of the way. Fitzgerald supported the Duff slate.¹²

In spite of Fitzgerald's success at the top of the city ballot, the Storrow slate easily won all five of the school committee positions. There were many factors in the seemingly contradictory conclusion. Storrow was much more popular than Frothingham, and there had been more than a hint of scandal surrounding Duff's last term on the old committee. But probably the most decisive factor was the women's vote. Beginning in 1879, the state of Massachusetts had allowed women to vote in school committee elections; but in spite of many attempts, the legislature would never vote a general suffrage for women. Thus, women were not able to vote for mayor or city council until the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.¹³ In addition to this dichotomy, the city's Roman Catholic hierarchy had made it quite clear that they opposed women voting. After some serious struggles in the 1880s between the Catholic clergy and Catholic politicians who obviously wanted to take advantage of this new group of potential voters, the politicians conceded. Thus between the 1880s and 1920 the city was left with the strange reality of a much more Protestant—as well as female—electorate in school committee elections than in others.¹⁴ Storrow, the Protestant reformer, was one of the chief beneficiaries of this difference.

In spite of the rhetoric of the campaign, neither the traditional Democratic

mayor nor the reform-minded school committee sought a confrontation at the start of their terms. On the contrary, Mayor Fitzgerald especially sought to portray himself as an advocate of reform in public education. In his inaugural address the new mayor said he was pleased with Boston's long-time support for its schools, but he also was worried that "Boston no longer stands at the head in education. Many cities in the Middle West, for example, are distinctly stronger and more progressive in public education. . . ." ¹⁵ This was hardly the language of one of Ernst's "strictly partisan and reactionary" politicians. ¹⁶ Fitzgerald also went beyond rhetoric. The primary recommendation in this speech was for the establishment of a Commercial High School. Fitzgerald noted that the old school committee had voted to establish such a school, but he wanted to be certain that the new reformers followed through. Boston should, he argued, establish a school to do for those "about to enter business in Boston what the time-honored Latin School had long been doing for those about to go to college." And while the proposal had once been for this to be a boys' school, Fitzgerald wanted it open to both sexes.

In addition to the Commercial High School, Fitzgerald wanted the state to pay a larger portion of the costs of the city's Normal School, to maintain high quality scholarship in the primary and grammar grades as a base for more practical work at the High School level, and a thorough reorganization of the evening schools to make them serve those who worked in the days with more efficiency. He closed this part of his speech with a reminder that Boston has long depended on the skill of its workers. "It must take its stand in the forefront of progress commercially, industrially and intellectually, and the place to begin is in the school-room." ¹⁷ It was a speech worthy of any progressive educator of the time. It was also a speech which must lead historians to ask whether we have made a mistake in declaring that the leading immigrant politicians were consistently opposed to progressivism in education.

The school committee began its year on an equally progressive although far less rhetorical note. To no one's surprise, the committee elected James Jackson Storrow as its chairman. In accord with their own reformist pledges, they also voted to set up a process to "formulate and report to this Board a plan whereby the appointment and promotion of instructors shall be made in accordance with civil service rules, due weight being given in cases of appointment to the results of written examinations, and in cases of promotion to length and character of service." No time was to be wasted in undoing the personal connections which had been so important in the relationships between individual teachers and the sub-committees of the old school committee. And finally, and most important, they set in motion a search process for a successor to Superintendent George H. Conley, who had died late in 1905. ¹⁸

After a two month search, the committee met in March of 1906 to elect a superintendent for a six-year term. ¹⁹ The choice had come down to two candidates, Jeremiah E. Burke (who would eventually be elected superintendent in 1921) and Stratton Brooks. ²⁰ Burke was currently a supervisor—or assistant superintendent—in the Boston system. Brooks had held a similar position until the beginning of 1906 when he had resigned to become superintendent of schools in Cleveland, Ohio. The differences between the two men were not great,

but in the subtle shades, and in their sources of support, some important issues for the future of public education emerge.

Burke was nominated by committee member Thomas J. Kenney. In reading Kenney's speech, one learns not only about Burke, but about Kenney's own priorities for a superintendent. According to Kenney, Burke was the "right man" because he was a "man who has been trained as a scholar and teacher in the schools of New England, one who is and has been in closest touch with the best traditions of the schools here." In addition, Burke was supported, Kenney argued, by those with the greatest stake in the system. "If you would know of his work in Boston," Kenney said, "ask the teachers in Boston, talk with the parents of the school children who have sought his advice, consider carefully the morale, and the discipline of his schools as well as the results attained. . . ."²¹

The other candidate, Stratton Brooks, was nominated by the committee chairman. James Jackson Storrow virtually refuted Kenney's speech point by point. Why take a New Englander, Storrow asked, why not "the very best man we could find in the United States," rather than allowing the "locality argument" to dominate. It was a good rhetorical point, but it also placed Storrow and Brooks on the side of those educators who were not particularly interested in responding to the personal and local concerns in any given school system. Again, while Kenney looked to the recommendations of the teachers and parents, Storrow's concern was to find a leader who would "advance our school system to a degree of efficiency and effectiveness which will cause those charged with teaching or school administration to come from all over the country to Boston. . . . The national progressive movement—the sort of people who would read *Educational Review*—were people whose judgment was to be trusted in school affairs above the more parochial views of parents and teachers.

The three to two vote which elected Brooks was not a surprise. Neither was Kenney's motion, made he said at Burke's suggestion, that the election be declared unanimous.²² This had not been a bitter fight—as earlier and subsequent superintendent elections were. All five of those voting had been elected together on the Public School Association slate, and they would continue to work together in the future. The differences among them were differences within the reform movement, but still the differences were real.

The man whom Storrow and his reformist allies had elected was a prime example of the sort of administrative progressive who were taking leading positions in school systems around the nation. Just before his election, Brooks had delivered an address before the Philadelphia Teachers Association, in which he spelled out quite clearly what he meant, and did not mean, by school reform. The speech could have served as a worthy inaugural address for the new superintendent. Brooks told his Philadelphia audience that while he was, of course, pleased with the growing interest in school reform, he also worried about the dangers. He reminded them that efficiency in education required "a careful estimate of modern necessities made by those competent by training and experience to make such judgment." These people were to be the new, well-trained, school administrators like himself, who could resist being "carried away by the immediate interests of the majority. . . ." For Brooks, the majority was too

often represented by people like his old foe Julia Duff who had served on the old school committee when he was a Boston supervisor and who represented the "grave danger that we shall have a mixture of politics with school administration." This danger was especially acute when it "renders it necessary to fill all the positions with girls from the local normal school or with residents of the city, because they have friends who are powerful upon the school board." In Brooks' world, administrators, unhindered by political considerations, made all personnel decisions. It was equally important to Brooks that the administrators remain unhampered by the teachers. He rhetorically asked to what extent teachers had a role in the administration of the schools, and then answered his own question, "It seems clear to me that the answer is, not at all."²³ Teachers were to work for efficiency within the classroom; decisions about policy were reserved for people like himself.

At the beginning of his tenure, Brooks was indeed painting an exalted role for the superintendent, one beyond the wildest dreams of his predecessors but closely in tune with the management-orientation of the majority of the new school committee. Standing at the apex of the system, he alone was the judge of true standards, "He must for the public be at the same time both servant and master, and for the teachers both leader and friend."²⁴ That Brooks would not wholly succeed in the role was not for want of a clear conception of what was needed.

Early in the year 1906 then, the city of Boston found itself with an extraordinary range of leaders concerned with improving the quality of the city's schools. Not often in the twentieth century would Bostonians find themselves with a mayor who spoke so forcefully on the topic, combined with a unified school committee supporting an articulate superintendent. A new era of cooperation and progress could have been dawning; but it was not to be. The failure of administrative progressives to unite with more traditional, professional politicians in implementing a progressive educational agenda did not stem from fundamental differences in the philosophy of education. The two factions did not have significant differences in their hopes at this point. Rather the division came about because the administrative progressives, in their attachment to certain specific structural reforms as the only possible means of accomplishing their goals, and in their class elitism which led them to ignore Fitzgerald's outstretched hand, alienated the most important source of political support they might have received for their goals. The result, within a decade, was that the Yankee reformers had virtually been driven off the stage of leadership in all phases of Boston's life, and progressivism itself had been given a bad name, as one more Yankee scheme.²⁵

A small, but potentially important symbolic issue provided the first sign that, despite the large areas of agreement in the educational policies espoused by the city's leaders, the give and take necessary for a coalition might not be possible. In the minutes of the meeting at which Brooks was elected superintendent, the committee also heard from "representatives of various Irish societies who desired that the history of Ireland should stand on the same footing in the public schools as the history of England."²⁶ Here was an issue on which the Yankee-dominated committee had an excellent opportunity to show their willingness to

cooperate with Fitzgerald's primary constituency. At a subsequent meeting, however, the committee recorded that they were ordering a single text, Johnston & Spencer's *Ireland's Story* to be made available as a reference book. That this was far from what had been meant by the initial request was clarified by a communication which the committee received from the City Council through Mayor Fitzgerald. In its response, the committee wrote regarding Irish history in the schools: "in so far as this is desirable it can be accomplished by providing suitable supplementary and reference books for use in the regular history course now in operation."²⁷ Perhaps the school committee saw these requests as merely one more example of the interruption of school policy by political pressure. Perhaps they believed that a significant emphasis on Irish history was not educationally justified. Whatever their reasoning, the committee lost a useful early chance to show good faith with their potential allies. In the next test of wills, the stakes would be considerably higher.

Boston's teachers had reason to be nervous about the new Storrow-Brooks administration. The teachers had been appointed under the old, very personal system, through the influence of committee members such as Julia Duff. The reform language of merit and hierarchy did not sound like language geared to protect their position. As late as 1929, a retiring assistant superintendent remembered the personal contact of the old system fondly, writing, "I must confess to a feeling of warm regard towards the members of the old twenty-four who builded better than they knew and who encouraged us and sustained our hands."²⁸ In comparison the new board seemed austere and remote. Once the new board was organized and Brooks installed, some of the teachers' worst fears quickly began to materialize. During his first months in office, the new superintendent recommended a new certification system based on strict merit examinations. While the board did modify the rule to make it apply only to new teachers or candidates for promotion, but not for reappointment, teachers did not rest secure. The committee also passed a rule that any teacher could be required to take—and therefore pass—an examination if recommended by the principal or supervisor. For a professional staff which had come to their positions through far less formal measures, the new examination system did not seem to indicate smooth sailing.²⁹

In addition to job security, the most pressing issue for Boston's teachers was their salaries. There had been no raises since 1895-96, and the majority of teachers received less than \$1000 per year. They were ready for an increase. The new school committee quickly acknowledged the need for raises in teachers' salaries. But they also agreed that they would not raise any teachers' salaries until they could raise them all without cutting back on other school programs. The practical result of this policy was that the issue of teachers' salaries was postponed for several years. To the teachers, the worst part of this situation was that while they were not receiving raises, there were many salary increases being given in the school system—to those who were moving into the new administrative positions being created by Brooks and the committee. A number of new administrative positions, most notably the departmental chairs at the high schools, had been created as part of the reorganization. These positions carried significantly higher salaries, and they were positions more likely to open up for men than for women. Yet for the vast majority of the system's teachers,

who were women, the years went by without any financial recognition of their service. Only with the careful bargaining of Mayor Fitzgerald with both the school committee and the state legislature in 1911 and 1912, did all of the teachers finally receive salary increases.³⁰

Even moves which should have helped to smooth relationships turned out to work in the opposite direction because of mistakes on the part of the administration. Teachers, along with the principals and masters, had been asking for a pension plan for several years before the new board came into office. In their second month in office, the new board set up a special committee to examine the best financial arrangements for a pension system for teachers. After two years of negotiations between teachers, who believed that pensions were well-earned by their years of service, and the committee, which argued that the teachers ought to contribute to the pension fund, the relationship soured. By the time the state legislature finally authorized a pension plan for Boston teachers in 1908, the reform committee looked more grudging and parsimonious than generous. Superintendent Brooks' subsequent comments that the pension plan was not "in recognition of services rendered," but was designed to speed the retirement of older teachers and thereby to "protect pupils and maintain the efficiency of the schools," did nothing to help the strained relationship.³¹

The final issue in the break between Brooks and the teachers during the first years of his term was over the issue of teacher transfer policy. In December of 1907, Brooks notified a teacher in Girls Latin School, Ellen Griswold, that she was being transferred to Dorchester High School. Brooks' stated reason was that he believed Griswold to be hostile to his new policies. Brooks' failure to consult with the headmaster at Girls Latin School and the growing distrust on the part of many parents of what they saw as meddling on the superintendent's part provoked a storm of protest. After a hearing in January of 1908, the school committee backed the superintendent fully, but the resentments generated by the transfer issue would plague both superintendent and board members in future years.³²

After 1908, the alienation between the teachers and their supporters on the one hand and the superintendent and his allies on the other was complete. No real basis for mutual understanding remained. For reformers such as James Jackson Storrow or Stratton Brooks, the desire for a well-organized, merit-based school administration seemed the only sensible approach to proper school administration for Boston. But it was equally true that this approach to the best ordering of the schools by an older, partially displaced, Yankee elite came into direct confrontation with the equally pressing search for a predictable and orderly world in the poorer, predominantly immigrant and Irish-Catholic working class communities. David Tyack caught the heart of the problem when he wrote that "pejorative labels often obscured different world-views. . . . One man's participatory democracy was another's chaos."³³

Julia Duff was probably the most consistent spokesperson for the lay view of education in Boston. As a member of the old school committee and leader of the Fitzgerald-backed slate in the crucial 1905 election, she was an authentic voice for her community, with her rallying cry "Boston schools for Boston girls."

Such a position might be denigrated by Superintendent Brooks as aiming at less than “the best men and women in the country,” or as taking the decisions out of the hands of those “who have some knowledge of educational ability and some experience in judging of efficiency of education. . . .” In Boston, however, it represented a basic understanding of the needs of many citizens. Serving her community as faithfully as she believed Storrow served his, Duff saw no reason why the public school system should not help to meet the need for both security and status by providing a number of useful positions.³⁴

The administrative progressives, led by Storrow and Brooks, consistently defended their support for a school administration which was hierarchical and meritocratic—rather than local and popular—by pointing to the welfare of the school children. Their public statements are filled with reminders “That the schools are established for the children and not the children for the schools is a trite saying, but it is often overlooked or forgotten in the discussions which constantly arise over the rights or claims of contractors, tradesmen, teachers, janitors, the clerical force and other necessary adjuncts to the school system.”³⁵ What the reformers failed to remember, however, was that the school children all too quickly grow up. And in Boston, large numbers of children did become “contractors, tradesmen, teachers, janitors. . . .” Thus when Duff insisted on “Boston schools for Boston girls,” or when Fitzgerald defined progressive education primarily in terms of the opening of new high schools of commerce and the mechanic arts they saw themselves as protecting the future for the children of the Boston schools in a way which the reformers seemed all too willing to forget.³⁶

Political leaders such as Duff and Fitzgerald—and large numbers of their followers—had experienced years of the paternalism of Yankee reformers. They quickly recognized a phrase such as “take the schools out of politics” as a thin cover for shifting control over public education from their own growing power base to another, harder to reach power base. The political advantage and skill of those who talked against politics in education was all too clear to their opponents. Many years later, James Michael Curley would quote another ward boss, Martin M. Lomasney, that “the uplifter is never liked.” This was especially true at a time when the uplifters seemed to be intent on taking both power and economic security away from those they were claiming to help. The teachers and their political allies did not want to be “helped;” they wanted rights and respect. Increasingly the reform agenda seemed to do the opposite.³⁷

Mayor Fitzgerald was defeated for re-election in 1907 by a reformer, George A. Hibbard. Not surprisingly, Fitzgerald sought restitution by running again in the 1909 election. This race was not merely a rematch of the last two. It took on special importance because the reformers had now sought a new structure for all of the city’s government. Essentially they wanted to do for the city what they had done for the schools. And again they succeeded. The new charter adopted for Boston in 1909 increased the mayor’s term of office from two to four years and vastly increased his power at the expense of the city council. Once again, power was to be centralized in a “professional” mayor who, it was hoped, would administer the whole city as a city manager over a hierarchical bureaucracy.³⁸

In addition to the new charter, the mayor's race—now scheduled for January of 1910—also took on special importance because of the candidates. Mayor Hibbard was seeking re-election, but he had turned out to be colorless and unimportant. The major candidates symbolized the respective parties in Boston. For Fitzgerald the race was an opportunity for vindication, an opportunity as he said, to “meet the attacks made upon me” and to redeem both his name and the power which his constituents needed.³⁹ For their part, the reformers picked the obvious candidate, James Jackson Storrow. With these stakes and these candidates the race was guaranteed to be a referendum on reform as espoused by the administrative progressives.

School issues gave Fitzgerald an important edge in the campaign. The teacher's need for salary increases had been an issue in the 1907 campaign, and Fitzgerald was emerging as their clear ally and supporter.⁴⁰ During the 1909-1910 campaign, the frustrations with Superintendent Brooks and his mentor Storrow were also coming to a head. Fitzgerald supporters claimed that at least one teacher had been bribed to keep quiet about her shabby treatment by the Brooks' administration.⁴¹ The truth of the charge was considerably less important than its value in portraying Storrow as an uncaring elitist. In addition, Storrow's role on the school committee gave him a record in public management for Fitzgerald to attack. The former mayor claimed that an examination of school management during Storrow's tenure would show corruption and waste of scandalous proportions.⁴²

Fitzgerald won the election. It was a close race, and school policy was far from central issue. Mayor Hibbard's refusal to retire allowed the reform vote to be split, and Fitzgerald was an experienced campaigner against a businessman who turned out to be surprisingly inept. The vote was far from a mandate, but as far as policy in Boston was concerned, the results might as well have been a landslide. While future mayoral elections would regularly feature charges of corruption and demands for various kinds of reform, after 1910 such demands would represent mostly rhetorical window dressing. Not until almost four decades later, with James Michael Curley's “last hurrah” in 1949 would serious structural reform of Boston's municipal government be considered, and by that time the circumstances of reform would be quite different. For most of the first half of the twentieth century, indeed in most respects for most of the twentieth century, Boston would be governed through a structure of government designed by turn-of-the-century municipal reformers but administered by political leaders deeply hostile and distrustful of reform.

Fitzgerald lost no time in consolidating his power base. During his second term, he often vetoed school committee appropriations. At the same time, he used his power to force the school committee to finally grant the teachers' long-sought salary increases. He was still very much interested in school policy, but on his own terms. Superintendent Brooks resigned in 1911, just before the conclusion of his term, to become President of the University of Oklahoma. He would not be badly missed. Even the Boston newspapers which had been most supportive of the superintendent asked for a more humane successor. Certainly Mayor Fitzgerald had made it clear that he wanted a very different superintendent. The change in policy was not drastic. Brooks' successor, Franklin B. Dyer,

was also a professional educator, closer to his predecessor than to the mayor, but not as acerbic in his methods. Reformers, in fact, continued to control a majority of the school committee for some years to come. But after 1910, the momentum of reform was over in Boston. The alliance of professional politician and professional school manager which could have led to substantial change in Boston's schools never happened. The result was probably inevitable. The world views of the two groups were too far apart, and their immediate social and political interests made it virtually impossible for them to understand each other, much less work together. In the eyes of each side, their opponents represented tyranny and chaos, while they alone were the guardians of order and responsiveness in education.⁴³

In his final annual message as mayor in 1913, John F. Fitzgerald reminded his audience that "As a graduate of the Boston public schools I have interested myself in educational questions, laying strong emphasis on the practical side of school work." He had indeed interested himself in the practical side of school work. He had also dreamed of a time when "School halls and buildings should be the theaters of the people."⁴⁴ But it would be a long time in Boston before such dreams would be linked to a school management able to implement them.

NOTES

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3. For the story of Seaver's election in 1880, see Michael Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy & Schools* (New York, 1971), p. 97.
4. Ernst, p. 433.
5. For a useful history of the Public School Association, see Alice Woodard Karl, "Public School Politics in Boston, 1895-1920," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1969, pp. 25-39.
6. Ernst, p. 439.
7. For a useful study of Butler's role in progressive reform see Patricia A. Graham, *Community & Class in American Education, 1856-1918* (New York, 1974).
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9. Henry Greenleaf Pearson, *Son of New England: James Jackson Storrow, 1864-1926* (Boston, 1932), pp. 43-52.
10. For a colorful history of the 1905 campaign see John Henry Cutler, "*Honey Fitz*" *Three Steps to the White House: The Life and Times of John F. (Honey Fitz) Fitzgerald* (Indianapolis, 1962), pp. 79-96.
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12. For an excellent study of Julia Duff's role in Boston school history see Polly Welts Kaufman, "Boston Women and City School Politics, 1872-1905," Ed.D dissertation, Boston University, 1978, pp. 331-375.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.
14. Lois Bannister Merk, "Boston's Historic Public School Crisis," *New England Quarterly* XXXI (June, 1958): 172-199.
15. John F. Fitzgerald, *Inaugural Address of John F. Fitzgerald, Mayor of Boston, to the City Council, January 1, 1906* (Boston, 1906), pp. 33-34.
16. Ernst, p. 443.
17. Fitzgerald, *Inaugural, 1906*, p. 36, 40.
18. City of Boston, "Proceedings of the School Committee," January 1, 1906, pp. 1-4.

19. City of Boston, "Proceedings of the School Committee," pp. 3 and 24.
20. For a useful study of Jeremiah Burke's career, see Sharlene Voogd Cochrane, "Dynamics of Reform: Jeremiah E. Burke and the Boston Public Schools, 1921-1931," unpublished paper, Boston College, Spring, 1977.
21. "Proceedings of the School Committee," March 12, 1906, p. 69.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
23. Stratton D. Brooks, "Dangers of School Reform," *Educational Review*, XXX (March 1906): 226-235.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230, 235.
25. John D. Bunker, "The Mahatma and Progressive Reform: Martin Lomasney as Lawmaker, 1911-1917," *New England Quarterly* XLIV (September, 1971): 397-419; and J. Joseph Huthmacher, *Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933* (Cambridge, 1959), see especially, pp. 62-71.
26. "Proceedings of the School Committee," March 12, 1906, p. 71.
27. *Ibid.*, April 30, 1906, p. 103.
28. Boston Public Schools, *Annual Report of the Superintendent*, September, 1929, School Document No. 7-1929 (Boston, 1929), p. 173.
29. See Karl, pp. 157-162.
30. Kaufman, pp. 294-298; Karl, pp. 166, 189-95.
31. "Proceedings of the School Committee," February 16, 1906, p. 52; Karl, pp. 164-166 and Kaufman, p. 389.
32. Karl, pp. 198-204.
33. Tyack, *One Best System*, p. 79.
34. See Kaufman, pp. 334 ff and 359; Brooks, "Dangers of School Reform," p. 230.
35. Finance Commission of the City of Boston, *Report of the Boston School System* (Boston, 1911), p. 82.
36. See Marvin Lazerson, *Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massachusetts, 1870-1915* (Cambridge, 1971).
37. See for example, Kaufman, pp. 340-347; Graham, p. 154; and James Michael Curley, *I'd Do It Again* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957), p. 147.
38. Thomas Mason's dissertation offers a very detailed study of both the 1909 charter change fight and the 1910 election.
39. *Boston Herald*, October 1, 1909.

40. See Karl, pp. 186-192.
41. *Boston Transcript*, January 6, 1910, cited in Karl, p. 202.
42. Cutler, pp. 122-132.
43. Karl, pp. 144, 192, 276-77, 361-62.
44. John F. Fitzgerald, "Mayor's Address, January 1, 1913," (Boston, 1913), p. 9.