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The New England Textile Strike of 1922: Focus on Fitchburg

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The New England textile strike of 1922 looms as one of the major labor confrontations of the twentieth century, however little is known about this event. The strike involved over 68,000 individuals employed in over sixty-five different mills, yet the only analysis of the strike in Massachusetts was written in 1923. That analysis was flawed by the fact that several large strikes, in Ware and Fitchburg, were totally excluded from the discussion.\(^1\) Basically, the New England strike was over a twenty percent wage cut and, outside of Massachusetts, an increase in the work hours per week.\(^2\) Companies wanted to make themselves more competitive in their struggle with Southern textile mills for domination of cotton textile manufacturing. One of the ways companies could improve their position was by reducing labor costs. In 1922, mill owners tried to achieve the same ends by unilateral decisions on wages and hours.

This study focusses on the strike in Fitchburg. It has never been analyzed and, indeed, in his 1923 study Leonard Tilden was totally unaware of its existence. Financial records of the Parkhill Manufacturing Company, the company which was struck, are available to historians, and when combined with other local documents, produce an accurate picture of what really happened.

Parkhill Manufacturing Company was the largest employer in the city of Fitchburg in 1922. Organized in 1881 by John Parkhill, from 1883 until it merged into Amoskeag Manufacturing Company of Manchester, New Hampshire in 1925, it was managed by his son-in-law, Arthur H. Lowe. Arthur Lowe was the treasurer of the corporation and his only son, Russell B. Lowe, served as president from 1912 to 1925. After the merger, both father and son served in succession as presidents of Amoskeag.\(^3\) Parkhill owned three mills, called simply A, B, and C. These operated forty thousand spindles producing yarn, and two thousand looms weaving the cloth. The mills and their fifteen hundred employees annually turned three million pounds of raw cotton into twenty-five million yards of fine gingham cloth.\(^4\)

Parkhill’s adversary in the strike was the Amalgamated Textile Workers of America. This union was formed in late 1918 because the more militant textile unionists had lost faith in the United Textile Workers and decided to create their own organization. Headed by former clergyman A. J. Muste, the fledgling union

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was sponsored by Sidney Hillman’s Amalgamated Clothing Workers and included many former International Workers of the World (I.W.W.) members and many World War I pacifists. The A.T.W. fought several bitter strikes in 1919, including one in Lawrence, Massachusetts. The strength of its stand in Lawrence helped the union to grow in 1920 to some fifty thousand members, including the three hundred formerly in the United Textile Workers local in Fitchburg. During the New England textile strike of 1922, the A.T.W. organized the mills in the Pawtucket Valley of Rhode Island, and in Fitchburg, while the U.T.W. dominated the rest of New England.⁵

After a boom period during World War I, textile prices collapsed in late 1920. Manufacturers reacted by lowering wages twenty-two and a half percent in January of 1921. Employees saw the necessity of this move and no strikes resulted from this action. However, when manufacturers announced another twenty percent wage cut in early 1922, textile workers were not as passive. Significantly, no wage reductions were announced in the highly-organized textile cities of Fall River and New Bedford. Perhaps mill owners wanted to cut wages only in the towns least likely to protest effectively. And indeed, that is exactly what happened in Fitchburg. Five of the six textile mills in town simultaneously announced pay reductions of twenty percent, yet no strike was anticipated by local people.⁶

Fitchburg workers were not ready for a strike in February of 1922 and everyone realized that fact. While twenty-four hundred people worked in cotton textiles in Fitchburg, only three hundred belonged to a union and most of these were Finnish. These Finnish activists were a minority in the mills, which contained many different nationalities, the majority being French-Canadians. While a few of the most militant workers wanted an immediate walkout, the A.T.W.’s imported organizer Fred Harwood urged them to sit tight. Formerly an organizer for both the U.T.W. and the Socialist Party of America, Harwood realized that workers had to be united and prepared before taking any crucial steps. The secretary of the A.T.W. local in Fitchburg, Emil Lasko, was far more impulsive. He was quoted as declaring that the “workers of this country have made up their minds to die like men rather than to work like dogs under slave-drivers.”⁷

The more experienced Harwood got his way. Workers in Fitchburg delayed actions while they actively recruited in the city. By March 1, the local A.T.W. chapter boasted nine hundred union members. Since all but one hundred of these recruits worked at the Parkhill Manufacturing Company, the union decided to concentrate their efforts there. The Amalgamated Textile Workers first tried to negotiate with President Lowe, but he insisted that he would only deal with local employees. When the locals met with the Lowes, they were told that because Parkhill was not making any money, wage negotiations were pointless. At this point, the A.T.W. decided to call for a strike vote at Saima Hall on Friday, March 24.⁸ The strike meeting was well-attended and the vote was 483 to 73 in favor of immediate action. The workers decided to go out at 9:30 the next morning. At that time, virtually all of the 1,450 employees walked out of the mill. While a small group of people kept working, the numbers were so few that the company soon turned off the power and sent them home.⁹
The *Fitchburg Sentinel* commented on the peaceful nature of the strike, with no incidents worth noting. This calm was in sharp contrast to events at the Pacific Mills in Lawrence, which had been extensively damaged by acid thrown into the machinery. The Confidential Weekly Report of the F.B.I., on the other hand, reported that there was “much disorder and several arrests.”\(^{10}\) A similar incongruity exists pertaining to the strike reports for Monday, March 27. The *Sentinel*, which had a reputation in this period as a conservative newspaper, reported that the mills were quiet and pickets were in place. The F.B.I. reports, on the other hand, noted disturbances at “mill #3.” Supposedly, windows were smashed, offices stoned, and several revolver shots fired. “The police soon had the disturbance under control, made no arrests partially because of the threatening attitude of the strikers and mob of sympathizers,” the F.B.I. reported. The Fitchburg police log indicates neither disturbance nor arrests at the mills on any day in March of 1922. The only mention of the strike came on March 31, when Sergeant Arthur Sanderson reported that the pickets were “very orderly” and never needed to be spoken to. In contrast to the thirteen officers assigned to strike duty on March 25, he concluded that “one officer is all that is necessary there for the present.”\(^{11}\) This is hardly the report of major disturbances at a strike site, complete with smashed windows and shots being fired, as reported by F.B.I. agent Adrian L. Potter.

Instead of violence, both sides in the strike intended to rely on propaganda and the molding of public opinion in the course of the strike. Even before the strike started, Parkhill officials had insisted that business conditions were poor and that it did not really matter if the mills were open or not. Now Arthur Lowe claimed that the average worker was earning $18.65 a week after the wage reduction, while the A.T.W. insisted that the average was only $17.46. Using the payroll records for March 20, 1922, we can conclude that Lowe was correct. However, excluding management wages, the average worker earned only $17.60. Even without access to the company books, the union had an excellent notion of who was earning what at Parkhill Mills.\(^{12}\)

The A.T.W. was clever in its creation of a local Strike Committee. While the names of the committee members were not released publicly, the union did let the ethnically-diverse city know that the committee had Finnish, French, German, and Italian representatives, corresponding to four of the more numerous ethnic groups within the mill. Also, at strike rallies, speeches were often given in English, French, and Finnish.\(^{13}\)

Once the strikes began, aid was essential. Fitchburg’s Overseers of the Poor noted in their report for 1925 that many Fitchburg workers lived from “hand to mouth” and that the smallest financial setback became a major catastrophe. The same report could just as easily have been written in 1922. Within a week of the strike’s start, six families needed assistance, and thirty-two others needed support within a month. The more activist minded Finnish community was among the first to rally behind the strikers. The Finnish cooperative grocery stores promised food at cost to strikers, while the Finnish Socialist bakery offered free use of its ovens. Later in the strike, Finnish grocers pledged part of their weekly income for strike aid. The Finnish organizations in Fitchburg were also sponsors of most of the benefit dances. Other groups contributed assistance too, but most
did so more quietly. The smaller neighborhood stores seemed more willing to oblige their traditional customers with credit and special discounts, while the larger Main Street stores hesitated, waiting for an official resolution of the local Chamber of Commerce—a resolution which was never forthcoming.\footnote{14}

As the strike continued into its second and later into its third month, financial resources were becoming exhausted. The Fitchburg Sentinel reported fifty families with 225 individuals needing help by May 10 and almost one hundred families in need by the middle of June. Money was raised at other factories in town, and indeed, at least as far away as North Adams, but the funds raised were becoming insignificant in relation to the need. Many French-Canadian and Finnish families decided to return to their homelands for the duration of the strike. Those who could not or would not flee, had to continue fighting. The A.T.W. tried to get the destitute strikers on city relief, since the factory gates were shut and there was no possibility of work. The clerk of Fitchburg’s Overseers of the Poor, John F. Madden, refused their requests. Following the lead of similar groups in Worcester and Lawrence, he ruled that strikers were ineligible for relief regardless of the circumstances. Nothing in Madden’s pronouncements indicate a pro-management bias, but the obvious effect of this policy was to weaken the ability of strikers to remain out of work.\footnote{15}

Once the strike was underway at Parkhill, the A.T.W. sought to expand it to other mills in both Fitchburg and other cities in New England. The union men believed that if the strike became all-inclusive, the mill owners would have “their backs to the wall” and would be forced to negotiate. Fred Harwood of the A.T.W. hoped to make this a reality by expanding the strike to Nockege, Orswell, Grant Yarn, and Fitchburg Yarn Mills. Needless to say these targeted mills were not anxious to be part of an expanding strike. They kept A.T.W. representatives out of their mills but could not prevent contacts after working hours. Soon, Harwood claimed three hundred members at Nockege and Orswell mills, a number rapidly approaching half the work force of these separately-owned but jointly-managed mills. These efforts abruptly stopped in early May when the local management threatened to shut down all the city’s textile mills unless union recruitment stopped. With the strike in its seventh week and relief virtually nonexistent, Harwood agreed to stop active recruiting at the other city mills. While a complete shutdown would in the long run have put great pressure on the mills to negotiate, it would have been a financial disaster for many textile workers in the shorter run—something Harwood and the A.T.W. did not want to risk.\footnote{16}

The Fitchburg strike was one of molding public opinion rather than violent confrontation, as previously mentioned. The largest effort by the union in this regards was its distribution of three thousand leaflets to the citizens of Fitchburg on April 21. A Word to the Public, as the leaflet was entitled, sought to explain their side of the strike. In essence, the strikers called for “an American wage sufficient to maintain an American standard of living.” Workers must be able to provide their families with decent living conditions, they declared; wages should not be reduced to “the level of bare subsistence.”\footnote{17}

Claiming to be prepared to strike all summer if necessary, the union moderated its position by insisting that if the company would open its books to an
impartial investigation and prove that it was incapable of paying higher wages, the workers would willingly accept this second wage cut. But the public was reminded that Parkhill had made large profits over the past ten years and that very little of the money was shared with its workers. Indeed, wage increases rarely kept even with the increase in the cost of living. Since prices had decreased seventeen percent in the last year and a half, the company had in effect decreed two wage cuts totalling forty-two and a half percent. Workers could not accept these cuts and "hope to live decently," they insisted. The public was therefore urged to rally behind the strikers, support them with donations, and put pressure on Parkhill to release the figures which would settle the dispute.\textsuperscript{18}

None of these arguments was unique to the Fitchburg situation. Union tactics in all the strike towns was to call for opening the company books to justify management claims of poverty. All the strike leadership similarly insisted that labor was being ground into abject poverty to keep mill profits high. And all the unions wanted impartial arbitration of the strike, hoping that impartial mediators would be more generous than the manufacturers.\textsuperscript{19}

One of the underlying causes of the strike was southern competition in the textile industry. By World War I southern mills had developed into the leading textile producers of the nation. Their machines were newer and faster while labor costs were cheaper. Indeed, many observers claim that the real reason for the 1922 wage cut was not the lack of profits but the future inability of the New England firms to compete with those in the South. The average wage in Massachusetts textile mills at the beginning of 1922 was 40.9 cents an hour compared with 32.5 cents in Virginia, 29.2 cents in North Carolina, 22.9 cents in South Carolina, and 24 cents in Georgia. A twenty percent wage cut would lower Massachusetts wages to 32.7 cents an hour, roughly equivalent to those of Virginia although still much higher than those in the rest of the South. Massachusetts workers were reputedly more productive than their southern counterparts, so the second wage cut was seen as a device to keep Bay State mills competitive.\textsuperscript{20}

From a worker's point of view, being competitive was not worthwhile if it meant that one's standard of living would sink to the poverty line. This second and closely-allied issue can be viewed from two radically different perspectives. Textile workers were notoriously low-paid in the pre-war period, as Donald Cole's study of Lawrence demonstrates. Wages rose dramatically during the period of the first world war, peaking in 1920. For cotton textile workers in Fitchburg, the average weekly salary was only $8.70 in 1913, rising to $24.33 in 1920. This is equivalent to a 280 percent increase in pay. The consumer price index rose 202 percent in the same period, indicating a substantially-increased standard of living for Fitchburg's textile workers. The process reversed for the period 1920-22. The cost of living declined seventeen percent while wages went down approximately thirty-eight percent. Viewed from the "golden" year of 1920, workers felt cheated. Compared with the low base year of 1913, on the other hand, employers could note that wages were up two hundred percent while the cost of living had only risen 169 percent.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, both sides felt they were "in the right" during the 1922 textile strike.

Massachusetts entered the controversy with a "Special Investigation" of the
textile industry in 1923. While the Commonwealth felt that temporary wage reductions during a business depression of 1921 were justifiable, the investigators declared that

The financial condition of the [textile] industry as evidenced by the information in the possession of the department is sound and prosperous and the department is of the opinion . . . that a permanent reduction in wages on the basis of the reductions made was not necessary.22

This investigation took place after the strike was over and thus had no impact on it.

In April and May of 1922, Parkhill was a typical company in that it insisted that it was barely making money and that the shutdown was a “godsend” to management. What Parkhill officials were doing, basically, was waiting out the strike and “softening up” the workers. It was fairly common in New England textile strikes for the company to shut down for a period sufficient to use up worker resources and thus insure that many workers would be forced by the crush of debts and the lack of further credit to cross picket lines when the plant reopened. Three weeks after Parkhill claimed that the strike was a “godsend,” President Lowe was publicly announcing that he wanted the mills to reopen soon. If the mills do not open soon, he argued, it would not get any orders for Fall delivery and it would be an entire year before it returned to full production.23

With that not so subtle hint in mind, Fred Harwood increased the number of pickets at factory gates and waited for the inevitable announcement that the mills were going to reopen. No one was shocked when the company announced that the mills would reopen on Monday, June 5.24 On Sunday, June 4, Fred Harwood called union rallies for the Strand Theater in the heavily French-Canadian section of Cleighorn and at the Finnish Saima Farm. At each rally, he urged workers to hold out a while longer. “We are going to make them recognize us as human beings,” he said, “and not just as a part of the machinery.” If workers stayed out of the mills now, Harwood declared, negotiations would start soon.25

Police Chief Thomas J. Godley was also prepared. He placed thirty-two patrolmen at the mill gates and carefully explained what was and what was not legal in picketing in the state. The Fitchburg police showed remarkable sensitivity to the needs of both management and labor. In Manchester, New Hampshire, when Amoskeag reopened on the same day, Police Chief Michael Healy only permitted two pickets at each factory gate. When six thousand “spectators” gathered to watch, he closed the adjacent street to traffic. In Fitchburg, on the other hand, the Amalgamated Textile Workers were permitted to have over two hundred pickets at a mill. As long as the pickets kept moving and did not physically block the entrance to the mills, they were left alone. “Bosses” were permitted to urge specific individuals to enter the mill, and union organizers were allowed to plead with hesitant employees to stay out. When several women at Mill C claimed that the very existence of 250 pickets was intimidating them, they received police escorts into the mill. In essence, the police tried to make
everyone happy while not having to physically intervene.  

Thanks in large part to the Fitchburg police, the reopening of Parkhill Manufacturing Company on June 5 was a very quiet affair. Only forty-six additional employees entered the mills and fourteen of them left almost immediately. Parkhill claimed that twenty to twenty-five percent of its work force had showed up, but based on payroll records, the figure was actually below ten percent, even including management personnel. And some of the employees who did cross the picket lines were related to the foremen.  

Day two of the reopening was equally quiet. There were three fewer people crossing the picket lines, but, on the other hand, strangers appeared at the mills. None crossed the picket line that day, but considering the high unemployment in New England, workers were apprehensive. While the number of adult employees ranged in the thirties, for the remainder of the week the company did manage to recruit some thirty-five youths aged fourteen to sixteen. State laws required them to attend school at least one day a week, but otherwise they were free to work. Cynically referring to these youths as the “kindergarten,” Harwood of the A.T.W. was concerned if anyone took over the unoccupied machinery. All were unskilled and earned extremely little in the weeks to come, but any break in worker solidarity was a potential crisis.  

The temptation to return to work grew stronger with each passing week. Money was tight and union relief efforts were minimal. The largest group of workers were French-Canadians, a group noted for their hesitancy to strike. Parkhill tried to further confuse the issue by claiming that the strike was really over union recognition instead of the twenty percent wage cut, a charge strongly denied by the A.T.W. Still, workers slowly drifted back to work. Harwood tried to create a virtual army of cameramen on June 23, hoping that being recorded on film would keep employees from crossing the picket line. The effort failed. While Parkhill was inaccurate in claiming that over seven hundred had returned to work by June 28, an actual count of employees revealed 536 names on the payroll for June 26-27. In addition to foremen, second hands, and other management people, over four hundred workers had crossed the lines and gone back to work.  

As worker solidarity weakened, the Amalgamated Textile Workers took steps to revive lagging enthusiasm. At the open-air meeting in late June in front of Turner Hall, seven hundred strikers were exhorted by union organizers to stand firm. Predicting a breakthrough in a matter of two weeks, they urged the strikers to stay out a little while longer. The strikers responded by unanimously voting to remain on strike, but the cost was great. The union promised results within two weeks, a promise it was going to be difficult to keep.  

Two weeks later, the union ranks were broken for the first time as fifteen union members crossed the picket lines. The strike was in its sixteenth week with no end in sight. Half the strikers had taken other jobs, some on a permanent basis but most merely to survive until the strike was over. The dwindling impact of the strike is indicated by the fact that when Harwood called a special meeting in response to the fifteen union men returning to work, only four
hundred attended in comparison with seven hundred two weeks previously.32

By the end of July, Parkhill did have nearly seven hundred employees back on the job. This was only half the work force and the numbers were still increasing very slowly. Yet, the trends were definitely in favor of the owners and against the union. By now, the strike was no longer newsworthy. The newspapers ignored it, in large part because the national railroad strike held the public’s attention. Harwood left town in August, never to return. The A.T.W. was going bankrupt and could not afford to keep an organizer in Fitchburg.33

Lacking a major “event,” the strike would have slowly collapsed and no one not related to either strikers or management would have been aware of its demise. But just at this point in time, the Lawrence mill owners decided to settle the strike. In a complicated effort to save face while giving in, a formula was arranged whereby the twenty percent wage cut would be ended as of September first although the additional salary would not appear in the pay envelopes until October second. Lowell mills complained that it was necessary for them to follow the lead of Lawrence and soon the rest of New England felt likewise. In Fitchburg, wages were restored to their old level on September 11.34

Regrettably, this did not end the strike in Fitchburg. The wage issue was resolved but the union wanted all strikers to be guaranteed their old jobs. President Lowe was willing to rehire the strikers as individuals, but he refused to fire his new employees and would not pledge to rehire all of the old ones. Among the most militant strikers were various “radical elements,” often associated with the I.W.W. Parkhill seemingly was using the end of the strike as an opportunity to eliminate these potential troublemakers from its work force.35

The strike continued, but it was crumbling rapidly at the same time. Fitchburg’s workers were united in March on the issue of a twenty percent pay cut. Having won on this issue, the workers were not inclined to continue the strike in October for what was essentially a different issue. Giving in to the inevitable, some two hundred diehards met in Saima Hall on October 15 and agreed to call off the twenty-nine week old strike against Parkhill Mills. There were no guarantees against discrimination and none would be forthcoming. In the week before this final strike vote, almost fifteen percent of the workers had crossed picket lines and returned to work. With the vote, another twenty percent returned to work. Thereafter, the number of workers continued to climb until it reached pre-strike levels in late November of 1922. But now, employment levels were more a factor of company need than of worker desire to return.36

It is always difficult to analyze the impact that a crisis such as a strike has on the later history of an organization. On the one hand, a pamphlet written by the company in 1924 boasted that 482 employees had worked continuously with the company for at least five years. Obviously, the employment gap created by the strike was ignored. On the other hand, the time of prosperity was clearly over. Parkhill specialized in gingham, a fabric which was going out of vogue for women’s fashions. Company profits for 1923 were only 2.6 percent. Then in 1925, Parkhill merged with Amoskeag of Manchester, New Hampshire. Parkhill’s owners received 55,280 shares of stock, each valued on the open market at
approximately one hundred dollars. At the same time, Arthur and Russell Lowe were both first made directors and later successive presidents of Amoskeag.37

Parkhill had no sooner merged with Amoskeag than plans appeared to have been made to shut Parkhill down. Creamer and Coulter charged this in their monograph, and an analysis of Parkhill's records supports their contention. It seems significant that Parkhill's allocation for repair, replacement, and improvement of its plant was 6.3 percent of its 1923 income, but a minuscule 0.2 percent of its 1926 income. Since that figure was more than cut in half in 1927, it becomes obvious that President Lowe of Amoskeag was not planning to stay in Fitchburg for a long time.38

Mill profits in 1926 were a very healthy 16.5 percent of income, but this figure would disappear if the 1926 repair, replacement, and improvement expenditures had equaled those of 1923. Early in 1928, Arthur Lowe decided to shut down operations in Fitchburg and ship all machinery to Manchester. Despite his forty-five years of association with Parkhill in Fitchburg, the failing state of the gingham market led him to make this decision. One wonders if he turned his back on his home town and on the factory he had developed because a bad feeling remained within him from the strike of 1922. No records remain to test this hypothesis. Manchester and Fitchburg both made gingham cloth and it was not selling very well. It was probably a good business decision, although a cruel blow to a city which had elected him mayor in 1893.39

NOTES


2. Massachusetts state law prohibited women and minors from working over 9 hours a day, 48 hours a week, or after 6:00 p.m.; therefore the attempt to raise weekly hours to 54 was not an issue in the Bay State. See Mass. General Laws, Chap. 149, Sect. 56, 59.


13. *Fitchburg Sentinel*, March 29, April 8, 10, 1922.

14. Ibid., March 29, April 4, 5, 6, 7, 24, 1922; and Fitchburg, *City Documents #53* (Fitchburg, 1926), p. 365.


16. *Fitchburg Sentinel*, March 29, April 5, 12, May 8, 10, 1922. Quote is from May 8 issue.

17. Ibid., April 25, 1922; *A Word to the Public about the Strike of the Workers Employed in the Parkhill Mills* (N.P., 1922).


21. Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries, “Census of Manufactures - 1923 - City of Fitchburg” (Press Release #11, December 8, 1924),


28. *Fitchburg Sentinel*, June 6-9, 1922; vol. 152 and 189, Parkhill Mfg. Co. Papers. One measure of the intensity of a strike is the number of policemen assigned to strike duty. While thirty-two officers were on the scene for the first few days of reopening, this quickly decreased to seventeen before the end of the first week and to ten by the beginning of the third week. With three mill sites to cover, this meant only three or four officers at any given mill. See Officers Daily Record, vol. 19, June 5 - August 5, 1922, Fitchburg Police Department Records.


32. *Fitchburg Sentinel*, July 3, 11, 12, 1922.
33. Ibid., August 30, 1922; F.B.I. Confidential Weekly Report of Potter, August 7 and 14, 1922.


35. F.B.I. Confidential Weekly Report of Potter, September 11, 1922; Fitchburg Sentinel, September 11, 12, 30, 1922; Brooks, "United Textile Workers," p. 231. The quote comes from the F.B.I. report, but the existence of this group is confirmed independently in Brooks' study.


